Geostrategic Studies Team
A Geostrategic Reading of Deterrence, Interests, and the Limits of Power
In the Middle East, the real mystery is not war itself, but the ability of rivals to repeatedly approach the edge of conflict and step back at the last mome
For more than four decades, relations between Iran and the Gulf states have moved along a fragile line between escalation and explosion. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, tensions between the two sides have never truly disappeared. Instead, they have taken different forms: political confrontation, competition for regional influence, proxy conflicts, military threats, attacks on strategic infrastructure, and disputes over the future security order of the Middle East.
With every new crisis, the same questions return: Why does this prolonged confrontation not turn into a full-scale war? Why do Gulf states avoid a direct military response to Iranian pressure? And why, despite repeated threats and escalating rhetoric, do Tehran and the Gulf capitals continue to keep their rivalry below the threshold of open war?
The answer does not lie in a lack of military capability, nor in the absence of deep disagreements. Rather, it lies in a more complex reality: all sides understand that a direct war between Iran and the Gulf states would not be merely a military confrontation. It would be a regional earthquake affecting energy markets, global trade, maritime security, and the interests of major international powers.
Therefore, the decision for war is not measured only by who can launch the first strike, but by who can endure the consequences that follow.
What may appear to some as hesitation or weakness is, in reality, part of a broader strategic calculation based on managing conflict rather than seeking decisive confrontation, and building deterrence rather than testing war.
The New Gulf: When Stability Became a Source of Power
To understand the Gulf states’ approach toward Iran, one must first understand the transformation that has taken place in the nature of Gulf power over recent decades. These states are no longer defined solely by their role as energy producers. They have increasingly sought to build global economic positions based on investment, finance, logistics, technology, tourism, and strategic development projects.
Ports, sovereign wealth funds, financial centers, aviation networks, technological initiatives, and economic diversification programs have become essential components of national power.
This transformation has fundamentally changed the meaning of national security. Security is no longer limited to protecting borders, military bases, or energy facilities. It now also means protecting investor confidence, economic stability, global connectivity, and the long-term development model of the state.
This is one of the most important factors explaining Gulf decision-making. War does not threaten only physical infrastructure; it threatens the economic environment upon which future influence is built.
A country that spends decades and billions of dollars building itself as a global investment and business hub understands that a major conflict could impose costs far beyond the battlefield. Even a military success could come with economic losses, market instability, and declining international confidence.
Therefore, avoiding war does not mean the Gulf states lack the ability to respond. It means they view power through a broader strategic lens. Power is not only the ability to destroy an adversary; it is also the ability to protect the national project and prevent prolonged regional instability.
The central question for Gulf policymakers is not simply: Can we confront Iran?
The deeper question is: Would war serve our strategic objectives, or would it undermine what we are trying to build?
Iran: A Strategy Built on Raising the Cost of Conflict
Understanding this equation also requires looking at Iran beyond political rhetoric alone. Tehran has pursued a regional strategy based on expanding influence, developing strategic depth, and creating leverage, but it has also shown awareness of the limits of direct confrontation.
Over the past decades, Iran has developed a different security model from traditional military powers. Instead of relying solely on conventional superiority, it has built a combination of ballistic missiles, drones, naval capabilities, and regional networks that provide it with asymmetric tools of deterrence.
The objective of this strategy is not necessarily to achieve a traditional military victory, but to make any potential confrontation extremely costly for its opponents.
In other words, Iran’s approach is based on convincing adversaries that the price of war would be too high.
However, Tehran also understands that a direct and prolonged conflict would be fundamentally different from the indirect confrontations it has managed for decades. A large-scale war involving Gulf states and potentially international powers could create consequences that would be difficult to control.
Iran’s economy, despite its resources and industrial base, faces significant challenges from sanctions, economic pressure, and domestic difficulties. A major war could transform its regional strategy from a source of influence into a source of severe exhaustion.
Therefore, Iran’s approach has largely been based on maintaining a level of tension that preserves its leverage without crossing the line into a full-scale war whose consequences could become unpredictable.
Mutual Deterrence: When Fear Becomes a Barrier Against War
In international relations, deterrence does not eliminate hostility; rather, it creates an understanding that the costs of confrontation outweigh the possible gains
This principle explains much of the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states.
Each side possesses different sources of power. The Gulf states have significant economic resources, international partnerships, advanced military systems, and global influence. Iran, meanwhile, possesses missile capabilities, regional networks, and tools of asymmetric warfare.
This does not mean both sides are equal in every dimension of power. Instead, it means that each side possesses the ability to impose significant costs on the other.
From this reality emerged a form of strategic balance — a balance not based on trust, but on mutual recognition of the consequences of escalation.
Iran understands that a major attack could trigger military, economic, and political consequences. Gulf states understand that direct confrontation could open a cycle of escalation that would be difficult to contain.
This explains the recurring pattern in the region: escalation followed by containment, threats followed by diplomatic messages, limited strikes followed by efforts to restore stability.
Everyone seeks to improve their position, but everyone also fears the moment when escalation escapes political control.
The greatest danger is therefore not the existence of conflict itself, but the collapse of the mechanisms that currently manage it.
The United States: The Actor Preventing Full-Scale Escalation
No analysis of Gulf security can ignore the role of the United States. For decades, Washington has been a central component of the regional security architecture through military cooperation, strategic partnerships, and defense commitments with Gulf allies.
However, the American role is more complex than simple confrontation with Iran. Washington does not necessarily seek a large-scale war, because such a conflict would have consequences for global energy markets, international trade, and American strategic priorities.
Instead, U.S. policy has generally focused on maintaining a balance: preventing Iran from dominating the region, strengthening allied capabilities, and at the same time avoiding an uncontrolled conflict.
The primary American objective is not to eliminate rivalry between Iran and the Gulf states — a rivalry rooted in deep political and strategic differences — but to prevent that rivalry from becoming a regional war.
In this sense, the U.S. presence functions as part of a deterrence system rather than an absolute guarantee against conflict. Washington can raise the cost of escalation, but it cannot eliminate every possibility of miscalculation.
Is This Balance Sustainable, or Is War Only Delayed?
Although deterrence has so far prevented a major war, it is not a permanent guarantee of stability. History shows that many major conflicts did not begin because leaders wanted them, but because they lost control over the consequences of their own decisions.
A limited military incident, a political miscalculation, or a shift in strategic calculations could rapidly transform a managed crisis into a wider confrontation.
The real challenge for the region is therefore not only preventing war, but addressing the conditions that repeatedly produce instability. Deterrence can prevent an explosion, but it cannot resolve the underlying disputes.
The Middle East is entering a new phase in which power is no longer measured only by military strength. It is increasingly measured by economic resilience, crisis management, diplomatic influence, and the ability to protect national interests without being trapped in endless wars.
Conclusion: The War That Has Not Happened Yet
The greatest misunderstanding about Iran-Gulf relations is the belief that the absence of war means the absence of conflict. The reality is that confrontation exists, but it is managed within limits because all parties understand that a full-scale war may not produce a genuine victory for anyone.
The Gulf states are not avoiding war because they lack power; they are redefining what power means. Iran is not avoiding war because it has abandoned its regional ambitions; it understands that influence does not always require direct confrontation.
Between these calculations exists a fragile structure of deterrence and containment that has kept the region away from a major war despite all the factors pushing toward escalation.
The question is therefore not whether any side possesses the ability to start a war. All sides possess tools of escalation.
The real question is:
Will all sides continue to possess the strategic restraint necessary to prevent one?
Because the most dangerous wars are not always those planned by leaders, but those that begin when leaders lose control over the consequences of their own decisions.
