Saudi Arabia and the Houthis: Strategies, Alliances, and the Balance of Power in Yemen A Comparative Strategic Study

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Houthi Movement (Ansar Allah)
Regional and International Relations, Strategic Doctrine, Military Power, Economic Capabilities, and the Balance of Power in the Yemeni Conflict

 
Prepared by: The Geo-Strategic Studies Team

A strategic comparison between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah and commonly referred to as the Houthis, requires moving beyond the conventional approach of comparing the Saudi Armed Forces with Houthi military formations and drawing conclusions primarily from military budgets, aircraft, tanks, and missile inventories. Although these indicators are important, they cannot, on their own, explain the trajectory of the Yemeni war or clarify how an armed movement that emerged in northern Yemen developed into a force capable of threatening Saudi territory, economic interests, and maritime navigation in the Red Sea.
A more accurate comparison must distinguish between conventional military power, the capacity to inflict damage on an adversary, the ability to sustain a prolonged conflict, and the ability to translate military outcomes into political and strategic gains. Saudi Arabia is a state with substantial financial resources, formal military institutions, extensive international defence relationships, and advanced aviation and technological capabilities. The Houthis, by contrast, are an armed movement with a territorial base inside Yemen that has developed an unconventional military system combining missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime weapons, and ground forces, while drawing on accumulated combat experience and external technical assistance.
Developments discussed in reports published during September and October 2026 indicate that Houthi capabilities cannot be treated simply as an extension of a local civil war. Reports have pointed to intensified operations along Yemen’s western coast, growing threats to Red Sea shipping, and a renewed confrontation involving Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between events corroborated by multiple sources and military claims requiring independent verification, particularly when they concern control of strategic positions or the reported consequences of attacks.
This study examines six interconnected dimensions: the political and organisational nature of each actor, their external relationships, their strategic doctrines, their military capabilities, their economic and technological resources, and their respective strengths, weaknesses, and potential scenarios for the future course of the conflict.

 

The Nature of the Two Actors and Their Sources of Strategic Power

1. Saudi Arabia as a Regional Power

Saudi Arabia derives its strategic strength from the combination of several resources and capabilities that are difficult for any single non-state actor to replicate. It possesses substantial financial resources, an energy sector of global importance, an extensive territory in a strategically significant geographical position, formal political and military institutions, and the ability to maintain long-term defence relationships with the United States and European and Asian countries.
The importance of these resources extends beyond financing the armed forces and purchasing weapons. They also enable the kingdom to support partners, finance external operations, rebuild damaged capabilities, and maintain government institutions during periods of crisis. Saudi Arabia can therefore operate through diplomatic, economic, and security channels, giving it a broader range of strategic instruments than military force alone.
These capabilities are reflected in defence expenditure. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia's military expenditure reached approximately $83.2 billion in 2025, making it the largest military spender in the Middle East that year according to the institute's data. However, high expenditure does not automatically translate into battlefield superiority in every operational environment. Outcomes also depend on the nature of the mission, the effectiveness of command, the integration of different weapons systems, the quality of intelligence, and the ability to define achievable objectives.
From a strategic perspective, Saudi Arabia faces a dual challenge. It must protect its national security, southern borders, and critical infrastructure while preserving a relatively stable regional environment in which economic development and the transformation programmes associated with Saudi Vision 2030 can continue. A prolonged and costly conflict along the kingdom's southern frontier therefore represents a burden extending beyond immediate military losses, imposing security, economic, and political costs over the longer term.
Saudi power should consequently be measured not only by its ability to conduct air strikes or procure advanced defensive systems, but also by its capacity to secure a political settlement or establish security arrangements that prevent the threat from returning after military operations have ended.

 
2. The Houthi Movement as an Armed Actor with Political and Regional Influence

The Houthi movement, on the other hand, does not operate merely as an armed organisation with limited resources. Over years of conflict, it has evolved into a de facto authority in the areas under its control, maintaining security and military institutions, mobilisation and recruitment structures, supply networks, and increasingly sophisticated weapons capabilities.
The movement's seizure of Sanaa in September 2014 marked a major turning point in its development. Control of the capital, state institutions, and existing Yemeni military stockpiles provided it with a foundation that a conventional insurgent movement starting from scratch would not possess. Published analyses indicate that the Houthis benefited from weapons inherited from the former Yemeni military and from the expertise of military officers and technicians before developing their missile and drone systems further through cooperation with external technical networks.
One of the movement's most important characteristics is its ability to combine local territorial control with instruments of regional pressure. Its geographical position in northern and western Yemen, together with the proximity of areas under its control to the Red Sea, allows it to increase the costs of confrontation for its adversaries. Missile attacks, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime threats can force opposing parties to devote substantial resources to defence, interception, surveillance, and infrastructure protection.
This does not mean that the Houthis possess the full capabilities of a state or can compete with Saudi Arabia across every domain. The economy of the territories they control is limited compared with the Saudi economy, while their ability to import advanced equipment and finance a prolonged war independently of external assistance remains constrained. Their distinctive advantage lies instead in their capacity to use comparatively limited and less expensive resources to generate security, economic, and political effects disproportionate to their material strength.
The fundamental difference between the two sides is therefore clear: Saudi Arabia possesses a far broader overall power base, while the Houthis can concentrate their limited resources on selected capabilities that increase the costs of employing Saudi conventional military power.

 
Foreign Relations and Alliance Networks

1. Saudi Relations with the United States and Western Powers

The defence relationship with the United States is one of the most important components of Saudi Arabia's strategic environment. It encompasses arms procurement, training, maintenance, intelligence cooperation, air and missile defence, and political coordination concerning Gulf security, maritime routes, and energy supplies.
The importance of this relationship is reflected in the equipment operated by the Saudi armed forces. SIPRI data indicate that the United States accounted for approximately 77% of Saudi Arabia's imports of major arms during the 2021–2025 period. This figure refers specifically to imports of major arms under SIPRI's methodology; it should not be interpreted as representing all Saudi military equipment or total defence expenditure.
The relationship provides Saudi Arabia with access to advanced weapons systems, technical expertise, spare parts, and maintenance and support services that the Houthis cannot obtain on a comparable scale. However, it also creates a degree of external dependence, since the operational readiness of some advanced systems relies on the continued availability of spare parts, technical support, upgrades, and cooperation with suppliers.
Riyadh views Washington through the understanding that missile threats and maritime insecurity are not exclusively Saudi concerns but are also connected to Gulf security and international commerce. Nevertheless, Saudi and American interests should not be assumed to coincide in every circumstance. Each country has its own calculations concerning the scale of military intervention, the costs of escalation, relations with Iran, and broader foreign-policy priorities.
Saudi relations with European countries also encompass arms procurement, training, security cooperation, and diplomacy. These relationships diversify the kingdom's sources of equipment and expertise, although they do not eliminate the importance of its principal suppliers or establish complete Saudi defence independence.
2. Saudi Relations with Arab and Regional States

Saudi Arabia's approach to Yemen relies on a network of formal and regional relationships, particularly its support for the internationally recognised Yemeni government. However, this support does not necessarily produce a unified and cohesive Yemeni force. The anti-Houthi camp includes political and military actors whose priorities, interests, and visions for the future of the Yemeni state differ considerably.
The strategic problem is that providing financial and military assistance to several allies does not automatically create a unified command capable of coherent planning and execution. When local formations disagree over the distribution of influence, resources, or the future political system, the effectiveness of external assistance can decline even when substantial resources are available.
Recent analyses have highlighted how divisions within the anti-Houthi camp, together with leadership and coordination problems, have complicated the military situation along Yemen's western coast. This demonstrates that Saudi Arabia's challenge is not limited to confronting the Houthis directly. It must also help develop a Yemeni partner that possesses political legitimacy, military capacity, and institutional cohesion.
At the regional level, Saudi Arabia also maintains relationships with Gulf states, Pakistan, Türkiye, and other countries that may cooperate with it in defence, training, and security. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between defence agreements, political coordination, logistical assistance, and direct participation in combat operations. These represent different levels of cooperation and should not be treated as interchangeable.

 
3. The Houthi Relationship with Iran

Iran is the Houthis' most important external partner in military, technological, and strategic affairs. Numerous reports and analyses indicate that Iranian support has included the transfer of knowledge and expertise related to missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime weapons, alongside technical assistance, training, and the development of components for certain weapons systems.
The relationship, however, requires careful characterisation. It would be inaccurate to describe the Houthis as a force that automatically implements every instruction issued by Tehran. Equally, it would be misleading to portray them as entirely independent of Iranian assistance. The relationship combines overlapping regional interests, military and technical cooperation, Houthi dependence on external expertise and components, and the existence of a local leadership with its own calculations concerning political authority, security, and organisational survival in Yemen.
Cooperation with Iran gives the Houthis access to technical knowledge and components that their domestic economy could not easily provide. Tehran, in turn, can use its relationship with the movement to strengthen its regional influence and maintain an additional source of pressure on Saudi Arabia, the United States, and maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
Analyses published by the Council on Foreign Relations have indicated that Iranian support, together with training and expertise provided by Lebanon's Hezbollah, has contributed to the development of Houthi military capabilities. Nevertheless, the extent of direct support and the degree of Iranian control over operational decisions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Neither similarities between certain weapons nor the alignment of political interests are sufficient, on their own, to establish the precise nature of command and control.
Strategically, the relationship reduces the Houthis' technological isolation and allows them to benefit from expertise accumulated outside Yemen. It does not, however, eliminate local constraints relating to finance, raw materials, maintenance, and the independent production of sophisticated weapons systems.

 
4. Houthi Relations Beyond Iran

The Houthis' external networks are not limited to Iran as a potential source of equipment and components. A distinction must be made between direct military assistance, the acquisition of commercial components with both civilian and military applications, and political relationships or informal contacts with external actors.
Recent reports have indicated that some components used in Houthi military systems originate from international supply chains, including commercial electronics and other components that can be incorporated into unmanned aerial vehicles and related systems. However, identifying a component manufactured abroad does not, by itself, prove that the country of manufacture provided direct military assistance to the Houthis, nor does it establish the existence of a strategic agreement between that country and the movement.
Even greater caution is necessary when assessing reports of intelligence or military cooperation with Russia or China. The evidentiary basis for such claims varies, and reports attributed to anonymous sources should not be equated with publicly announced defence agreements or independently documented arms transfers.
It is also important to distinguish the Iranian-Houthi relationship from Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United States. The latter is based on longstanding official relations between two states, supported by formal contractual arrangements, defence institutions, and publicly acknowledged cooperation. The relationship between the Houthis and Tehran, by contrast, involves political, military, and technical cooperation within a regional conflict, while some supply channels and the extent of influence over local decisions remain less transparent.

 
5. The Strategic Implications of External Relationships

Saudi Arabia possesses a broader network of formal relationships and greater financial resources for building multiple defence partnerships. The Houthis, by contrast, rely more heavily on a concentrated relationship with a principal regional partner that provides technical expertise and technologies essential to the development of unconventional military capabilities.
Nevertheless, the breadth of Saudi Arabia's alliances does not guarantee battlefield superiority, just as Iranian assistance does not enable the Houthis to match Saudi capabilities in every domain. Outcomes depend on how effectively external support is adapted to the nature of the conflict, the quality of the institutions using it, and each side's ability to convert its resources into sustainable military and political results.
Strategic Doctrine and War Objectives
1. Saudi Arabia's Strategy Towards the Houthis

Saudi Arabia's primary strategic objective is to prevent the emergence of a sustained military threat along its southern border, protect cities and critical infrastructure, safeguard energy facilities, and prevent Yemeni territory from becoming a permanent base for repeated attacks against the kingdom.

This objective is connected to a broader regional security vision. Saudi Arabia does not want its security and economic policies to remain hostage to a prolonged conflict in Yemen, particularly when major development projects, foreign investment, and market confidence depend on a relatively stable security environment.

Militarily, Saudi Arabia has several options, including air and missile defence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air strikes, and support for Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthis. Each option, however, faces different constraints. Air strikes can destroy specific military targets but cannot, on their own, guarantee the dismantling of a command network or prevent the reconstruction of military capabilities. Air defence can reduce damage, but it may come under pressure if attacks continue at high frequency or arrive from multiple directions using different types of weapons.
Supporting Yemeni forces allows Saudi Arabia to rely on local actors in ground operations. However, the results of those operations depend on the cohesion of these forces, their ability to coordinate, and the existence of an effective command structure.
Saudi strategy also has a diplomatic dimension. Ending the threat does not necessarily require the complete destruction of the Houthi movement. It could instead be achieved through political and security arrangements that restrict the movement's ability to attack Saudi territory and establish more sustainable mechanisms for managing border security and preventing escalation.
The central dilemma is that a negotiated settlement involving reciprocal concessions could reduce the direct costs of war while leaving the Houthis with significant military and political influence inside Yemen. Conversely, attempting to impose a comprehensive military outcome could require more time and resources than the expected gains would justify.

 
2. The Houthi Strategy Towards Saudi Arabia

The Houthi strategy combines the preservation of internal control, the development of unconventional deterrent capabilities, the raising of the costs of any military campaign against the movement, and the use of regional threats to seek political and economic gains.
This approach does not require the movement to defeat Saudi forces in a large-scale conventional war. From the perspective of asymmetric deterrence, it may be sufficient to inflict repeated damage or create risks that are difficult to contain completely, thereby increasing the cost of war for the stronger party.
The principal instruments of this strategy include missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, attacks against critical infrastructure, and maritime threats. When employed repeatedly, these capabilities can force an adversary to allocate resources to defence, interception, surveillance, and emergency preparedness, while also influencing economic and political calculations.
An ACLED analysis published in 2026 documented an escalation in Houthi attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and maritime targets, interpreting these operations as an attempt to exert economic and political pressure on Riyadh. This interpretation represents an analytical assessment of the campaign's objectives, however, rather than proof that every attack achieved its intended result.
The Houthi strategy also depends on the ability to absorb attacks and rebuild at least some military capabilities. A movement that preserves its leadership structures, supply networks, and significant portions of its arsenal after an air campaign may prevent its adversary from achieving a decisive outcome, even if it suffers substantial losses.
This strategy nevertheless has clear limits. Escalating attacks against Saudi Arabia could encourage Riyadh to expand military operations, strengthen cooperation with external partners, or provide more concentrated support to the Houthis' opponents inside Yemen. Attacks against economic interests and international shipping could also intensify external pressure on the movement.
The success of the Houthi strategy therefore depends not merely on its ability to escalate, but on whether it can manage escalation without creating a broader coalition against itself or suffering domestic losses that undermine its control.

 
3. Different Definitions of Victory

The definition of victory is one of the most important keys to understanding the conflict. Saudi Arabia may consider a satisfactory outcome to be the securing of its borders, the cessation of attacks, and the prevention of Yemeni territory being used to threaten its infrastructure, even if the Houthis remain a political force inside Yemen.
The Houthis, by contrast, may regard the retention of their territorial base, preservation of their core military capabilities, and recognition of their political role in Yemen's future as a strategic success, even if they cannot control the entire country or impose a military defeat on Saudi Arabia.
This reveals a fundamental asymmetry in the objectives of the war. Saudi Arabia may expend greater resources and achieve clear superiority in the air while failing to accomplish all its political objectives if the Houthis remain capable of launching repeated attacks. Conversely, the Houthis may preserve their military and political presence without achieving their broader objectives if their territories are devastated, their resources decline, or local opposition to their rule expands.
The outcome of the conflict therefore cannot be defined solely by the number of positions held by either side or the number of targets each claims to have destroyed. It must be evaluated through the relationship between declared objectives, accumulated costs, the level of security achieved, and the durability of any resulting political settlement.

 

Detailed Military Comparison

1. Air Forces

Saudi Arabia possesses a modern air force equipped with advanced combat aircraft, command-and-control and reconnaissance systems, and the ability to conduct relatively long-range air operations. These capabilities allow it to strike military positions, support ground forces, monitor extensive areas, and coordinate operations involving multiple platforms.
This air power rests on an institutional framework encompassing training, maintenance, armaments, and logistics, all of which are essential for operational readiness. Operating advanced aircraft requires more than possessing the platforms themselves. It also requires trained maintenance personnel, spare parts, suitable munitions, accurate intelligence, and the ability to identify targets and assess the results of strikes.
The Houthis do not possess a conventional air force comparable to Saudi Arabia's. Instead, they have expanded their use of unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly systems designed for reconnaissance and attack, as an alternative means of projecting air power.
These systems can carry out attacks at a lower cost than conventional combat aircraft, while some types can be assembled or produced locally using commercial components and expertise acquired from abroad. Recent reports indicate that the Houthis have developed local production capabilities for certain unmanned aircraft, although more sophisticated systems continue to depend on external components and technologies.
The fundamental distinction is that Saudi Arabia enjoys a clear advantage in conventional air power, while the Houthis seek to offset that advantage through unmanned systems that do not require them to possess a comparable fleet of combat aircraft.
Nevertheless, drones should not be equated with fighter aircraft in terms of performance. They serve different functions and have different ranges, payloads, accuracy levels, and operational requirements. The Houthis' possession of effective unmanned aircraft does not mean that they have achieved air-power parity with Saudi Arabia. Rather, it gives them a means of creating specific aerial threats despite their lack of conventional air superiority.

 
2. Ballistic Missiles and Cruise Missiles

Missile capabilities represent one of the most significant developments in the Houthi military arsenal. According to specialised reports and analyses, the movement has developed and employed ballistic and cruise missiles serving different purposes, including attacks against land-based targets, relatively distant infrastructure, and maritime targets.
Reports suggest that the movement's arsenal developed partly from weapons inherited from Yemen's previous military stockpiles and subsequently benefited from external expertise and components. The extent of external dependence varies according to the missile type and its technical complexity. It should not be assumed that all Houthi systems are manufactured entirely within Yemen or that all depend on external sources to the same degree.
These capabilities are important because they allow the movement to threaten targets with significant political and economic value, forcing Saudi Arabia to allocate resources to air and missile defence, surveillance, early warning, and threat assessment.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, possesses advanced air and missile defence systems, together with aviation and intelligence capabilities that help detect and counter certain threats. However, the successful interception of one attack does not guarantee that every future attack will be intercepted. Equally, the penetration of a defensive system by a single missile does not mean that the entire defence network has collapsed.
Outcomes depend on numerous factors, including the type of projectile, its flight path, detection characteristics, the nature of the target, operational conditions, the availability of interceptor munitions, and the coordination of warning and defence systems.
Terminology also requires caution. Descriptions used by armed groups to characterise their missiles, including claims that certain systems are “hypersonic,” are not sufficient to establish that those weapons possess the technical characteristics associated with that classification. Independent information about actual system performance is necessary.
The most accurate comparison is therefore that Saudi Arabia possesses a more advanced institutional and technological air and missile defence architecture, while the Houthis have offensive missile capabilities that create a threat that cannot be ignored despite the substantial disparity in resources.

 
3. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Asymmetric Warfare

Unmanned aerial vehicles have become central to the Houthi strategy because they combine relatively low costs, operational flexibility, the possibility of local component production, and the ability to threaten targets beyond the immediate battlefield.
Reports indicate that the Houthis have developed experience in operating attack drones, including systems from the Samad family, alongside other types used for reconnaissance and offensive missions. However, capabilities vary considerably between systems, and it would be inaccurate to assume that all have the same range, payload, or accuracy.
The significance of these weapons extends beyond their immediate military effects. Even when defensive systems intercept most incoming attacks, repeated alerts may temporarily disrupt activities, trigger precautionary measures, raise insurance and protection costs, or influence investors' perceptions of security risks.
Saudi Arabia can draw on its financial and technological resources to build a layered defence system encompassing detection, interception, physical protection, and emergency management. The challenge lies in balancing cost and effectiveness. Using expensive interceptors against cheaper incoming weapons can create financial and operational pressure if the pattern continues for an extended period.
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to conclude that drones automatically provide the Houthis with strategic superiority. Their effectiveness depends on reliable supplies, the ability to maintain inventories, the quality of the opponent's defences, and the extent to which attacks achieve their military and political objectives.

 
4. Ground Forces and the Ability to Fight Inside Yemen

Saudi Arabia possesses regular ground forces equipped with modern military hardware and capable of supporting joint operations involving aviation, artillery, reconnaissance, and logistics. However, Yemen's geographical and political conditions make the conversion of equipment superiority into sustainable territorial control particularly difficult.
Yemen has diverse terrain, including mountains, highlands, desert regions, coastlines, and densely populated cities. These conditions influence troop movements, reconnaissance, supply lines, and the ability to retain control of territory after combat operations have ended.
The Houthis, meanwhile, have accumulated extensive combat experience since the conflicts that preceded their seizure of Sanaa and throughout the Yemeni war and the Saudi-led military intervention that began in 2015. This experience has enabled them to develop methods suited to local terrain, benefit from recruitment and mobilisation networks, and employ military and security formations connected to their governing structures.
Recent analyses have highlighted the relative cohesion of Houthi leadership, accumulated battlefield experience, and problems involving command, salaries, and coordination among some anti-Houthi formations as important factors in explaining certain Houthi battlefield successes. These observations do not mean that all Houthi forces are superior to all their opponents. Rather, they indicate that command effectiveness and organisational cohesion can sometimes matter as much as, or more than, differences in equipment.
It is also necessary to distinguish between the regular Saudi armed forces and Yemeni forces supported by Saudi Arabia. The latter do not necessarily constitute a homogeneous bloc, and their loyalties, local objectives, and leadership interests may differ. Assessing Saudi Arabia's ability to influence the balance of power inside Yemen therefore requires examining the quality and cohesion of the local forces on which Riyadh relies, rather than focusing exclusively on the specifications of the Saudi military itself.

 
5. Maritime Capabilities and Pressure on Shipping

Saudi Arabia possesses conventional naval capabilities and has direct interests in protecting its ports and maritime export routes. The Houthis, by contrast, concentrate on less conventional methods of threatening vessels and disrupting navigation.
According to specialised reports, Houthi capabilities include anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels, and other systems that may threaten shipping in the Red Sea. Maritime operations since 2023 have demonstrated that the movement can turn its geographical position into an instrument of regional pressure without possessing a large conventional navy.
The Red Sea's strategic importance derives from its role in international trade networks and energy transportation routes. Maritime threats can increase insurance premiums, force vessels to change routes, lengthen shipping times, and create additional risks for ports and coastal infrastructure.
For Saudi Arabia, maritime security is not merely a military issue. It is directly connected to exports, economic activity, and international trade. Nevertheless, the ability of the Houthis to threaten shipping must be distinguished from the ability to impose a complete and sustained closure of maritime routes. The latter would require a level of control and operational sustainability that cannot be assumed simply because individual attacks have succeeded.
Maritime security also depends on more than Saudi naval power alone. It involves international cooperation in surveillance, early warning, vessel protection, and intelligence-sharing. These partnerships provide Saudi Arabia with additional capabilities but do not eliminate the risks created by sporadic attacks or prolonged escalation.

 

The Economy, Financing, and Defence Industry

1. The Saudi Economy and Its Capacity to Finance War

Saudi Arabia rests on a far broader economic base than the one available to the Houthis. The size of its economy, public revenues, and access to financial markets enable it to fund its armed forces, purchase weapons and ammunition, develop defensive infrastructure, support allies, and absorb some of the economic costs associated with crises.
Financial resources, however, are not unlimited. Allocating funds to security and defence involves trade-offs with development priorities, investment, and public services. The longer the conflict continues, the more important it becomes to account for accumulated costs, particularly if sustained expenditure is required for air and missile defence, critical infrastructure protection, and external military operations.
A distinction must also be made between the size of military expenditure and the ability to sustain a particular war. High annual spending creates a wide range of options, but it does not guarantee the availability of every type of ammunition in the quantities required. Nor does it ensure that consumed equipment can be replaced immediately or automatically resolve problems of command and coordination.
One of Saudi Arabia's strengths is its ability to purchase equipment and services from several countries and develop advanced defensive systems. However, multiple suppliers can also create challenges involving interoperability, maintenance, supply chains, training, and the standardisation of procedures.

 
2. The Houthi Economy and Available Resources

The Houthis operate in a much more constrained economic environment characterised by damaged infrastructure, a weakened Yemeni economy, institutional fragmentation, and restrictions affecting trade and finance. Consequently, the movement cannot match Saudi Arabia's defence expenditure or purchase advanced military systems on a comparable scale.
Limited economic resources do not mean an absence of revenue. The Houthis control territories containing a substantial population, commercial and economic institutions, and sources of income. They can draw on taxation, fees, local revenues, and commercial activities within areas under their control.
The scale of these resources and the manner in which they are used remain subjects of differing estimates. The weakness of the local economy also imposes constraints on public services, investment, and production. Houthi financial strength cannot be reliably measured simply by estimating potential revenue, because available figures do not necessarily reveal how much money can actually be converted into sustainable military capability.
One of the movement's relative advantages is that certain weapons, including comparatively simple drones, can be assembled from commercial components, whereas more sophisticated systems require specialised technical expertise and more complex parts.
Reports indicate that the Houthis have moved beyond reliance on weapons inherited from the former Yemeni military and developed local capabilities in certain areas, while continuing to depend on external assistance for other technologies.

This means that the Houthis do not need an economy comparable to Saudi Arabia's to maintain a limited but consequential military threat. Nevertheless, the long-term sustainability of that threat remains linked to access to components, expertise, and the resources required for maintenance, development, and replacement.

 
3. Defence Industry and Arms Independence

Saudi Arabia possesses financial and technological resources that enable it to develop domestic defence industries and localise certain maintenance, manufacturing, and assembly activities. However, complete defence independence cannot be achieved merely by purchasing technology or announcing localisation targets. It requires the ability to produce critical components, ammunition, engines, electronics, and command systems, as well as the development of a domestic base of engineers, technicians, and suppliers.
The Houthis follow a different model based on combining commercial components, local expertise, and external assistance. This approach enables them to develop certain relatively inexpensive systems, but it does not mean they possess an integrated industrial base capable of independently producing every category of sophisticated weapon.
The difference between the two models lies in the constraints each faces. Saudi Arabia can allocate greater financial resources to manufacturing and technological development, but it must build a sustainable industrial and technical ecosystem. The Houthis can exploit unconventional supply chains, but remain more exposed to restrictions affecting external components and expertise.
Over the long term, these differences will influence each side's ability to replace military losses and develop new capabilities. Nevertheless, the outcome will not be determined by financial resources alone. It will also depend on the extent to which those resources are converted into actual production, operational readiness, and supply-chain resilience.
Intelligence, Command and Control, and Electronic Warfare

 
1. The Saudi Intelligence System

Saudi Arabia can draw on formal state institutions, security cooperation with external partners, aerial and technical reconnaissance, and border-surveillance systems. These capabilities provide a foundation for gathering intelligence on potential threats, assessing military movements, and monitoring borders and critical areas.
However, advanced surveillance technology does not guarantee a complete intelligence picture. Identifying mobile weapons, concealed storage facilities, or command networks in mountainous and densely populated areas can be difficult. Available information may also be outdated, incomplete, or misleading.
Effective intelligence requires accurate field analysis, verification through multiple sources, and a command structure capable of translating information into appropriate decisions. Intelligence failures may therefore result from weaknesses in collection, misinterpretation, or failures to communicate information to decision-makers, rather than simply from a lack of technology.

 
2. The Houthi Intelligence System

The Houthis do not necessarily possess a technological reconnaissance system comparable to Saudi Arabia's. Nevertheless, they can draw on local knowledge, human intelligence networks, accumulated experience inside Yemen, and certain technical capabilities acquired or developed over time.
Recent analyses suggest that organisational coordination, cooperation between units, and the ability to gather information about opponents have contributed to some Houthi battlefield successes. These assessments do not establish that the movement is generally superior to Saudi Arabia in intelligence. Rather, they illustrate that intelligence effectiveness depends on the mission, operating environment, adversary, and type of information required.
The local environment provides the Houthis with certain advantages, including familiarity with terrain, roads, and local communities. At the same time, these advantages may diminish when operations expand into unfamiliar areas, local resistance increases, or the movement's access to reliable information declines.
An intelligence comparison cannot therefore be settled merely by identifying which side possesses satellites or surveillance equipment. It requires examining the accuracy of the information collected, the speed with which it reaches decision-makers, the ability of commanders to use it, and each side's success in protecting its own information from penetration.

 

Strategic Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Side

1. Saudi Arabia's Strategic Strengths

Saudi Arabia's principal strengths include its financial and institutional superiority, its ability to operate modern regular forces, its advanced air force, and its access to defensive systems and military technologies unavailable to the Houthis on a comparable scale.
The kingdom also benefits from its extensive diplomatic relationships and its ability to act through formal institutions, defence partnerships, and political mediation. These advantages provide several options for addressing the crisis, ranging from direct defence to diplomatic pressure, support for the Yemeni government, and negotiations over security arrangements.
These strengths do not eliminate strategic challenges. The war in Yemen has demonstrated that superiority in aviation and weaponry is not sufficient, on its own, to achieve sustainable political objectives. Reliance on multiple Yemeni partners can also make operational outcomes dependent on local problems that Saudi Arabia cannot fully control.
Saudi Arabia must additionally balance the resources devoted to defending its territory and critical infrastructure against those required for external operations. The greater the cost of protecting energy facilities, ports, borders, and other strategic assets, the more important it becomes to find solutions that reduce the need for continuous defensive mobilisation.

 
2. Saudi Arabia's Strategic Weaknesses

Saudi Arabia's principal challenge is not a shortage of resources but the difficulty of translating those resources into sustainable strategic outcomes within Yemen's complex environment.
The ability to destroy a military target is not equivalent to eliminating the threat it represents. Strikes against military infrastructure may fail to dismantle recruitment networks, supply chains, or command structures. Similarly, supporting local allies does not guarantee the creation of a unified Yemeni military institution if political and leadership divisions remain unresolved.
Dependence on imported weapons systems also means that readiness is linked, to some degree, to external supply chains. This is not an absolute weakness, but it is a factor that must be considered in a prolonged conflict, particularly when demand for interceptor missiles, spare parts, and technical services increases.
The deeper challenge is that Saudi Arabia requires a sustainable political outcome, not merely temporary military successes. If military operations end without addressing the underlying sources of conflict inside Yemen, threats may return in different forms.

 
3. The Houthis' Strategic Strengths

The Houthis' principal strengths include relative organisational cohesion, accumulated combat experience, familiarity with local terrain, and the possession of unconventional offensive capabilities that can impose significant costs on a materially stronger adversary.
The movement also does not need to achieve comprehensive military superiority to prevent its opponent from accomplishing its objectives. If it preserves a significant portion of its leadership and military capabilities while continuing to threaten certain critical targets, it may retain the ability to influence negotiations and Yemen's political landscape.
The Houthis also benefit from external technical assistance and experience acquired in the development of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime weapons. These capabilities have expanded their ability to operate beyond traditional ground-combat zones and increased their regional impact.

 
4. The Houthis' Strategic Weaknesses

Despite their expanding capabilities, the Houthis remain far weaker than Saudi Arabia in financial resources, conventional air power, industrial infrastructure, and access to advanced military technology on a large scale.
Their dependence on external components and expertise in certain fields also makes them vulnerable to supply restrictions and operations targeting military infrastructure, production facilities, and storage sites. The movement may conceal some capabilities or rebuild parts of its arsenal, but this does not mean that it can replace every loss at the same speed or maintain every category of weapon independently.
The movement also faces a political challenge arising from its limited acceptance among sections of the Yemeni population, particularly in areas outside its control. Military control of territory does not necessarily create stable political legitimacy. Retaining territory may become more difficult if resources decline or local opposition expands.
Finally, an escalation strategy creates risks for the movement itself. Attacks that raise the costs of war for Saudi Arabia may encourage Riyadh to expand its operations, increase support for anti-Houthi forces, or strengthen external military cooperation. If threats to international shipping widen, the movement may face growing external pressure rather than converting its maritime leverage into net political gains.

 

The Comparison in Light of Developments During 2026

1. What Do Recent Developments Reveal?

Reports published during September and October 2026 indicate renewed escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, military movements along Yemen's western coast, attacks against Saudi targets, and threats to Red Sea shipping.
A Reuters report published in September indicated that Houthi advances along the western coast and threats to maritime routes had exposed problems within the anti-Houthi camp, as well as the limits of relying on conventional military superiority when local forces are divided or unable to retain positions.
These observations are consistent with a broader lesson from the Yemeni war: military outcomes depend not only on the amount of force available but also on its concentration, command cohesion, intelligence effectiveness, and the ability to retain territory and secure supply lines.
Nevertheless, an individual battlefield success should not be transformed into a sweeping conclusion about the overall balance of power. The capture of a coastal position, a missile attack, or a breakthrough on a particular front does not, by itself, demonstrate that the side responsible can win a prolonged war.
Reports concerning military operations may also contain claims made by belligerents or preliminary assessments that change as new information emerges. Each reported event should therefore be evaluated individually, taking into account the publication date, the source of the information, and the availability of independent confirmation.

 
2. Why Can a Larger Power Struggle Against a Smaller One?

 
This phenomenon can be explained by the difference between the capacity to inflict damage and the capacity to achieve a decisive outcome. A stronger military can generally mobilise greater resources and conduct broader operations, but its success depends on linking those resources to a realistic political objective.
A weaker actor may benefit from terrain, the fragmentation of its opponents, the lower cost of certain offensive systems, and the ability to avoid the kind of conventional confrontation that would work against its interests.
In Yemen, these factors interact with weak state institutions and domestic political divisions. The Houthis' ability to endure pressure cannot be explained by weapons alone, just as Saudi Arabia's difficulties cannot be attributed solely to limitations in military power.
The relationship between military force and political outcomes lies at the heart of the problem. A stronger party may destroy numerous targets without achieving its intended objective if the adversary retains its leadership, recruitment networks, and capacity to rebuild parts of its arsenal.
Conversely, a weaker party may succeed in preventing a decisive outcome without necessarily converting that survival into comprehensive political victory, a stable economy, effective public services, or broad international recognition.

 

Potential Strategic Scenarios

 
Scenario One: Continued Mutual Attrition

This scenario involves continued Houthi attacks and Saudi responses without either side achieving a decisive military outcome or a stable political settlement. The Houthis could continue using missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime pressure, while Saudi Arabia maintains investment in air defence and support for forces opposing the movement inside Yemen.
The costs would differ between the two sides. Saudi Arabia could devote greater financial resources to the war and territorial defence, but persistent threats could increase security expenditure and affect economic priorities. The Houthis would face mounting pressures on resources and supply networks, yet might retain the ability to inflict damage as long as their military networks remained operational.
Continued attrition would not mean that the losses were equal. Each side has different resources and objectives, and the political and economic consequences of attacks do not necessarily correspond to their number or the scale of direct physical damage.

 
Scenario Two: A Security and Political Settlement

This scenario could involve an agreement focused on ending cross-border attacks, safeguarding maritime navigation, and establishing mechanisms to monitor compliance, alongside broader understandings concerning Yemen's future.
Such a path could be less costly than continued warfare, but it would face obstacles involving the future of Houthi weapons, the structure of authority in areas controlled by the movement, guarantees against renewed attacks, and the interests of other Yemeni political and military actors.
Signing a political agreement would not, by itself, guarantee stability. A successful settlement would require credible verification mechanisms, enforceable security arrangements, agreements on resources and political authority, and guarantees that reduce incentives for a return to war.
Nor would a Saudi-Houthi agreement automatically resolve every conflict inside Yemen. Disputes among Yemeni actors over the structure of the state, power-sharing, territory, and political influence could continue.
Scenario Three: Broader Military Escalation
The conflict could expand if attacks against Saudi critical infrastructure or maritime traffic intensified, or if Riyadh concluded that existing measures were no longer sufficient to contain the threat. This could lead to expanded direct military operations, increased support for anti-Houthi Yemeni forces, and closer defence cooperation with external partners.
Escalation, however, would not guarantee a decisive outcome. Greater military pressure could increase the cost of maintaining Houthi capabilities, but it could also raise the risks of a wider war, civilian casualties, economic disruption, and greater difficulty in reaching a subsequent settlement.
The central dilemma is that a military campaign must be measured by the extent to which it achieves its political and security objectives, not simply by the scale of the strikes. If certain Houthi capabilities are degraded without changing the conditions that enable them to be rebuilt, the campaign's effects may prove temporary.

 
Scenario Four: A Reshaping of the Balance of Power Inside Yemen

Continued conflict could produce changes within the anti-Houthi camp itself, whether through stronger central command, a redistribution of influence among local actors, or new understandings between Yemeni groups supported by external powers.
This scenario could significantly affect the balance of power because the Houthis' ability to expand depends not only on their own strength but also on the cohesion and effectiveness of their opponents.
However, unifying military command would not automatically resolve political disagreements. Building a Yemeni force capable of confronting the Houthis would require institutional, financial, and political arrangements that sustain coordination, reduce competition among commanders, and connect military operations to a political project capable of gaining broader acceptance.
Chapter Ten: Final Assessment of the Balance of Power

 
1. Who Possesses Overall Military Superiority?

In terms of financial resources, conventional air power, defensive infrastructure, access to technology, and formal defence relationships, Saudi Arabia possesses a clear advantage over the Houthis.
This advantage does not mean that Saudi Arabia can necessarily achieve all its objectives in Yemen through military force alone. The ability to destroy military targets is not equivalent to dismantling an opposing political and military organisation. Nor does control of the air guarantee control of territory or prevent an adversary from rebuilding its capabilities.
The Houthis do not possess the resources or systems required to compete with Saudi Arabia across every military domain. However, they have unconventional capabilities that enable them to prolong the conflict and increase its costs even when confronting an adversary with substantially greater resources and technology.
The strategic question is therefore not whether the Houthis are militarily stronger than Saudi Arabia in an overall sense. It is whether Saudi Arabia can use its military superiority to achieve a sustainable political and security outcome, and whether the Houthis can preserve their core capabilities without suffering losses that make their continued control costly or unstable.

 
2. Which Side Is Better Equipped to Sustain a Prolonged War?

Saudi Arabia possesses a broader financial and institutional base, giving it more options for financing operations, replacing equipment, and developing defensive systems. However, it faces economic and security costs associated with persistent threats, while its objectives extend beyond military survival to the protection of stability, development, and international relationships.
The Houthis possess far fewer financial resources, but the nature of the military system they have developed allows them to avoid some of the costs associated with conventional armies. They can exploit relatively inexpensive weapons and draw on local networks and accumulated combat experience. Nevertheless, their ability to sustain a prolonged conflict depends on maintaining supply, recruitment, and financing networks while avoiding attrition that undermines their authority inside Yemen.
The ability to endure war cannot therefore be reduced to the size of a military budget. There is a difference between the ability to finance a conflict, absorb its losses, maintain domestic political support, and achieve objectives that can be sustained over time.

 
3. Which Factors Will Have the Greatest Influence on the Final Outcome?

The decisive factor is not possession of a particular weapon or a single alliance. It is the interaction of four elements: leadership cohesion, intelligence quality, supply-chain sustainability, and clarity of political objectives.
If Saudi Arabia improves coordination with Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthis, links military operations to a clear political objective, strengthens its defences, and reduces the costs of attrition, it may improve its strategic position without having to eliminate the movement entirely.
Conversely, if the Houthis preserve organisational cohesion and the ability to replenish some of their weapons, and continue exerting pressure without expanding the number of their adversaries beyond a manageable level, they may retain significant influence despite the substantial disparity in resources.
However, if economic, political, and military pressure on the movement intensifies, its ability to obtain supplies and recruit personnel declines, or anti-Houthi Yemeni forces become more cohesive on a stable institutional basis, the balance of the conflict could change in ways that depend on more than Saudi military superiority alone.

 
Strategic Conclusion

The comparison between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis reveals two actors with different sources of power, pursuing objectives and employing methods that do not fully correspond.
Saudi Arabia is a state with substantial financial resources, modern regular armed forces, an extensive network of international defence relationships, and advanced aviation and defensive capabilities. Its primary objectives are to protect national security, prevent cross-border threats, and achieve a stable political and security environment in Yemen.
The Houthis, by contrast, are an armed movement exercising de facto authority and maintaining political and military influence inside Yemen. They have drawn on weapons inherited from the former Yemeni military, accumulated combat experience, and external technical assistance to develop an unconventional system of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime weapons. Their strength lies in their ability to impose security, economic, and political costs on a materially stronger adversary, rather than in possessing comprehensive military superiority over Saudi Arabia.
The analysis indicates that Saudi superiority in resources and technology does not automatically translate into a decisive political outcome, just as the Houthis' ability to endure pressure and threaten certain targets does not mean that they can defeat Saudi Arabia in a conventional war or govern the entirety of Yemen in a stable manner.
The most important conclusion is that the balance of power between the two sides varies according to the domain being assessed. Saudi Arabia clearly leads in financial resources, conventional air power, and defensive infrastructure. The Houthis, meanwhile, possess capabilities in asymmetric warfare, the maintenance of local armed networks, and the use of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime threats that make the conflict more complicated than a conventional comparison of military strength would suggest.
The most meaningful criterion for assessing the future of the confrontation is therefore not the number of aircraft or missiles held by either side. It is each side's ability to convert its resources into sustainable security and durable political gains while avoiding the exhaustion of its resources or the expansion of its adversaries.

 
Principal Sources

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Data on military expenditure and international arms transfers.
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): Analysis of Iranian support for the Houthis and the development of their military capabilities.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED): Analysis of patterns of violence, Houthi attacks, and escalation involving Saudi Arabia during 2026.
Reuters: Reporting on the development of Houthi capabilities and changes in the military situation in Yemen and the Red Sea during September 2026.
United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen: Reports concerning weapons, components, and restrictions on arms transfers to Yemen.