A Geopolitical Analysis of Ankara’s Strategy and the Future of the Kurdish Question in the Middle East "
Geo-Strategic Studies Team
3 November 2026
Introduction: The Kurdish Question Within a Changing Regional Order
The Kurdish question is entering a decisive phase in which domestic political calculations in Türkiye are increasingly intertwined with transformations across the Middle East. Ankara’s current approach cannot be understood exclusively through the traditional framework of counterinsurgency or internal security. It must also be examined in the context of the changing balance of power in Syria, the uncertain trajectory of Iran following the military confrontation with the United States and Israel, and Türkiye’s efforts to consolidate its influence across Iraq and the wider region. These developments have created a strategic environment in which the resolution—or restructuring—of the Kurdish question has acquired significance beyond Türkiye’s domestic political agenda. The central hypothesis of this study is that Ankara may be seeking to advance the disarmament and institutional integration of Kurdish armed structures, while simultaneously attempting to limit the emergence of independent Kurdish political and military centres of influence before a potential transformation of the Iranian state produces a new regional balance.
This hypothesis does not imply that Türkiye’s current initiative is necessarily insincere, nor does it assume that the collapse of the Iranian regime is inevitable. Rather, it suggests that the timing, geographical scope and political conditions of the Turkish initiative deserve to be examined as part of a broader strategic calculation. The distinction between resolving the Kurdish question and neutralising the armed and political structures associated with it is fundamental. A genuine settlement would require more than the termination of armed conflict: it would involve constitutional recognition, political participation, cultural and linguistic rights, decentralised governance where appropriate, and institutional guarantees capable of surviving changes in government. By contrast, a security-centred process could achieve the dismantling of armed structures and their incorporation into state institutions without addressing the deeper political and historical causes of the Kurdish question.
The distinction is particularly important because the Kurdish question is not reducible to the PKK, the Syrian Democratic Forces, or any other armed organisation. It encompasses the political representation, national identity, language, historical experience, social rights and constitutional status of Kurdish communities across several states. Any analysis that treats the issue solely as a security problem risks confusing the end of an armed conflict with the achievement of a durable political settlement.
Türkiye’s Domestic Initiative: From Ending Armed Conflict to Defining the Terms of Integration
The process that became publicly visible in Türkiye in autumn 2024 developed into a significant political initiative following Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the PKK to disarm and dissolve. The organisation subsequently announced its decision to end its armed struggle and dissolve its organisational structure, while a symbolic weapons-burning ceremony in northern Iraq marked an important stage in the process. In August 2026, the Turkish parliament adopted Law No. 7595, formally titled the Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration. The legislation establishes a legal framework for certain procedures concerning individuals associated with the organisation, including conditional arrangements for reintegration and the suspension of some legal penalties. Its implementation, however, is linked to official verification that the organisation has ended its operational existence and surrendered its weapons, followed by the required confirmation through the National Security Council process. The law therefore represents a concrete institutional step, but it should not be confused with a comprehensive constitutional settlement of Kurdish rights. Reuters reported that the legislation does not itself resolve wider demands concerning political and cultural rights, anti-terrorism legislation or Öcalan’s legal status.
This distinction reveals the central political question surrounding Ankara’s initiative: is the state prepared to transform the legal and constitutional relationship between the Turkish Republic and its Kurdish citizens, or is it primarily seeking to close the armed-conflict file under conditions defined by the existing state structure? The two objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but they are not equivalent. Disarmament can create the conditions for political reform; it cannot substitute for reform. If the process concentrates on the obligations of the Kurdish side while postponing the state’s own political and legal commitments, it risks producing an asymmetrical settlement in which one party makes irreversible concessions while the other retains broad discretion over the future of political recognition.
The parliamentary and legal dimensions are therefore as important as the military dimension. A sustainable settlement would require clear and enforceable arrangements concerning political participation, the right to organise, the use and education of the Kurdish language, local administration, freedom of expression, the treatment of political prisoners and the legal status of individuals returning to civilian life. It would also require confidence-building measures that are not dependent solely on executive discretion. The assessment published by the Democratic Progress Institute in September 2026 indicates that the implementation of the new law remains tied to verification, monitoring and reintegration procedures, while broader political and social arrangements remain under discussion. This reinforces the argument that the adoption of a legal framework is an important stage, but not proof that the underlying political question has been resolved.
Ankara may nevertheless have strategic reasons to pursue this process at the present moment. Ending the armed conflict would reduce the security burden on the Turkish state, strengthen its position in regional diplomacy and remove an important source of instability along its southern borders. It could also improve the investment environment and allow the government to redirect resources towards economic and infrastructure priorities. Yet these potential benefits do not answer the question of whether the Kurdish population will receive reciprocal political guarantees. The success of the initiative will ultimately depend not only on whether armed structures are dismantled, but also on whether the political system becomes more inclusive and capable of accommodating Kurdish identity and representation.
Syria: The Strategic Consequences of Integrating the Kurdish-Led Structures
Syria has become one of the most consequential external dimensions of Türkiye’s Kurdish policy. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the subsequent emergence of a transitional political order created a new environment in which the future of the Kurdish-led administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces became a central question. The agreement reached between Damascus and the SDF in January 2026 established a framework for military and administrative integration into the Syrian state. On 25 August 2026, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced the end of the organisation’s mission as an independent military force following the integration process. The United Kingdom House of Commons Library reported that the arrangements included the transfer of significant administrative and territorial responsibilities to Damascus, the integration of Kurdish-led forces into state structures, and commitments concerning Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. It also noted that questions surrounding the permanent constitutional status of these rights and the future of the Kurdish education system remained unresolved.
From Ankara’s perspective, the transformation of the SDF from an autonomous military structure into formations operating within the Syrian state could represent a major strategic achievement. Türkiye has long viewed the military and organisational links between the SDF and the PKK as a security concern. The integration process could therefore reduce the possibility of a neighbouring autonomous military structure operating outside Damascus’s authority, while also changing the geographical conditions under which Kurdish political and security actors operate in northern Syria. In this sense, the Syrian developments complement the Turkish domestic initiative: both processes move towards the incorporation of previously autonomous or armed structures into recognised state institutions.
However, the political consequences for the Kurdish population in Syria cannot be assessed solely through the dissolution of the SDF as an independent force. The decisive question is what kind of state structure will replace the previous arrangement. If integration leads to meaningful political participation, constitutionally protected language rights, local administrative powers and guarantees against discrimination, it may create a framework for coexistence within a unified Syrian state. If, on the other hand, integration is primarily administrative and security-driven, with decision-making concentrated in Damascus and Kurdish rights left dependent on temporary decrees or political understandings, the process could weaken Kurdish institutional influence without resolving the underlying question of representation.
For Türkiye, the distinction is strategically important. Ankara may prefer a Syrian state in which Kurdish military structures no longer operate independently and in which the central government exercises authority over borders, energy resources and security institutions. Yet a stable Syria also requires the inclusion of its Kurdish population as political actors with legitimate rights, rather than treating them merely as a security file. The long-term outcome will therefore depend on the constitutional arrangements that emerge from the transitional period, not simply on the formal integration of military units.
Iran: The Regional Variable That May Accelerate Ankara’s Calculations
Iran represents the most significant strategic uncertainty in the regional environment surrounding the Kurdish question. The military confrontation that began with US and Israeli strikes in February 2026 has profoundly affected Iran’s political and security environment. The death of Ali Khamenei, the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as his successor, the growing role of security institutions and the economic consequences of the conflict have intensified uncertainty about the future direction of the Iranian state. By 2 November 2026, diplomatic efforts to end the conflict remained fragile. Reuters reported that mediated contacts between Washington and Tehran were continuing, but discussions in Doha had ended without a breakthrough, with major disagreements persisting over sanctions, the Strait of Hormuz and the sequencing of negotiations. The situation therefore points to an unstable and contested political environment rather than a settled post-war order.
The implications for the Kurdish question are substantial. Iran is home to a large Kurdish population with a long history of political mobilisation, cultural demands and organised opposition. Iranian Kurdish parties have maintained political and, in some cases, armed structures across the border regions and in Iraqi Kurdistan. A major weakening of the Iranian central state, a prolonged internal crisis or a negotiated political transition could create new opportunities for Kurdish political mobilisation. Such a development would not necessarily lead to independence or the creation of a unified Kurdish political project; the Kurdish political landscape is diverse, internally divided and shaped by the distinct interests of its organisations and communities. Nevertheless, a transformation in Iran could increase the strategic significance of Kurdish actors and potentially alter the calculations of neighbouring states.
Ankara has reasons to monitor this possibility closely. A period of instability in Iran could create cross-border security challenges, encourage political and organisational coordination among Kurdish movements, and complicate Türkiye’s efforts to consolidate the results of its own peace initiative. From the Turkish state’s perspective, the most sensitive scenario would be the emergence of a more active Kurdish political and military environment along several of its borders at a time when the regional balance is already under pressure. This does not establish that Ankara’s initiative was designed specifically to pre-empt an Iranian transformation. It does, however, support the hypothesis that the timing of the Turkish process may be influenced by a desire to reduce existing security uncertainties before the regional environment becomes even less predictable.
There is also an important counterargument. A stable and democratic transformation in Iran could create opportunities for a broader regional settlement of minority and national questions, including the Kurdish issue. It could encourage political solutions based on citizenship, constitutional pluralism and decentralisation rather than competition between armed organisations. Türkiye would then face a choice between adapting to a more pluralistic regional environment or attempting to preserve a security-centred model of state relations. The outcome in Iran is therefore not simply a threat variable for Ankara; it could also become an opportunity for a different regional political framework.
Iraq and the Kurdistan Region: The Geographical and Political Bridge
Iraq occupies a central position in Türkiye’s calculations because it connects the domestic Kurdish question with the cross-border security environment. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has long been an important economic and political partner for Ankara, while northern Iraq has also been the principal geographical arena for Turkish military operations against PKK positions. Relations between Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil have increasingly combined security coordination, trade, energy and infrastructure projects. Carnegie Endowment’s February 2026 analysis describes Iraq as a central component of Türkiye’s regional strategy, highlighting the intersection of the Kurdish issue, security cooperation, energy relations and the proposed Development Road corridor.
For Ankara, cooperation with Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government can help establish a more predictable security environment in northern Iraq and reduce the operational space available to armed groups. The withdrawal of PKK fighters from several camps in October 2026, reported by the Council on Foreign Relations’ conflict tracker, is one indication that the Turkish process has implications beyond Türkiye’s borders. Yet Iraq is not merely a security arena. The Kurdistan Region possesses its own political institutions, economic interests and internal political competition. Its relationship with Türkiye is therefore shaped by both strategic cooperation and the need to preserve its own autonomy and constitutional position within Iraq.
The possibility of an Iranian political crisis adds another layer to this relationship. Iraqi Kurdistan could become an important geographical and political space for Iranian Kurdish parties and movements, whether through political activity, cross-border displacement or increased security tensions. Ankara would likely seek to prevent northern Iraq from becoming a platform for developments that could undermine its domestic security calculations. At the same time, Baghdad and Erbil would have their own interests in avoiding a regional confrontation that could threaten Iraq’s stability and economic recovery.
The strategic importance of Iraq therefore lies in its dual function: it is both a theatre in which Türkiye seeks to consolidate the consequences of its domestic peace process and a potential corridor through which wider regional developments could affect the Kurdish question. A durable settlement will require the recognition that Kurdish political institutions in Iraq are not simply instruments of external actors, but independent political stakeholders whose interests must be taken into account.
Integration Without Reciprocal Guarantees: The Core Political Dilemma
The central issue in the emerging regional process is not whether armed groups should be integrated into state institutions. In principle, the incorporation of armed formations into a unified national framework can be a legitimate component of state-building, provided that it takes place through negotiated arrangements, legal safeguards and inclusive political institutions. The problem arises when integration is treated as a substitute for political settlement, or when the obligations imposed on Kurdish actors are not matched by reciprocal commitments from the state.
A security-led model of integration typically prioritises the dissolution of independent armed structures, the transfer of territorial control, the centralisation of security institutions and the re-establishment of state authority. These measures may reduce immediate conflict and strengthen central government capacity. However, they do not automatically resolve questions of identity, political representation, local governance, language rights or historical grievances. If these issues are postponed indefinitely, the result may be a reduction in Kurdish institutional leverage without a corresponding expansion of political rights.
A reciprocal political settlement would require guarantees that are specific, enforceable and institutionally protected. These could include constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity and language, meaningful representation in national institutions, elected local administrations with defined powers, safeguards for education and cultural institutions, fair access to public resources, and legal protections for peaceful political activity. In Türkiye, this would require a broader democratic and legal reform agenda alongside the disarmament process. In Syria, it would require the permanent constitutional protection of Kurdish rights and an agreed framework for local administration. In Iraq, it would mean respecting the constitutional position of the Kurdistan Region and its right to exercise its recognised powers.
The distinction is not merely normative; it is strategic. Political guarantees reduce the likelihood that the end of one armed conflict will be followed by another cycle of mobilisation. They also strengthen the legitimacy of state institutions and reduce the capacity of external actors to exploit unresolved grievances. A settlement that dismantles armed structures without addressing the political causes of conflict may produce a temporary reduction in violence, but it would leave the underlying instability intact.
International Actors: The United States, Israel and Europe
The United States remains an influential actor in the restructuring of the regional order, particularly through its relationships with Türkiye, the Syrian transitional authorities, the SDF and its wider security partnerships. Washington’s position has evolved alongside the changing circumstances in Syria and the effort to bring Kurdish-led military structures into the Syrian state. Its priorities include preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State, limiting regional escalation and maintaining a workable relationship with Ankara. These priorities may encourage Washington to support integration arrangements that reduce military fragmentation, but they do not necessarily guarantee that Kurdish political rights will be protected in the long term.
Israel’s calculations are different. The weakening of Iran’s regional position and the changing security environment in Syria have created opportunities for Israeli influence, while also increasing Ankara’s concerns about the emergence of new regional alignments. Any Israeli interest in Kurdish actors should be assessed carefully and on the basis of specific evidence rather than treated as a settled strategic alliance. Nevertheless, the possibility that regional powers may seek relationships with Kurdish political forces could reinforce Türkiye’s determination to prevent the emergence of autonomous structures that it perceives as potential security threats.
Europe has a different set of instruments and interests. Its influence is exercised through diplomacy, economic relations, legal standards, human-rights mechanisms and its relationship with Türkiye’s political and institutional development. European actors could contribute to a sustainable settlement by supporting independent monitoring, legal safeguards, political dialogue and the protection of minority rights. However, Europe’s effectiveness will depend on whether it treats the Kurdish question as a political and rights-based issue rather than approaching it exclusively through migration management, counterterrorism cooperation or short-term regional stability.
Strategic Scenarios
Scenario One: Reciprocal Political Integration. Türkiye and the relevant regional authorities move beyond security arrangements towards enforceable political and constitutional guarantees. In Türkiye, this would involve democratic reforms and recognition of Kurdish political and cultural rights. In Syria, it would mean permanent constitutional protection and meaningful local participation. This scenario offers the strongest prospects for long-term stability because it addresses the political causes of conflict rather than merely dismantling its armed manifestations.
Scenario Two: Security Integration Without a Comprehensive Political Settlement. Armed structures are dissolved or incorporated into state institutions, while broader political and constitutional questions remain unresolved. This scenario may produce short-term stability and strengthen central governments, but it risks creating a structural imbalance between the concessions made by Kurdish actors and the guarantees provided by the state. It is the scenario most consistent with the concern that integration could become a process of political neutralisation rather than a comprehensive settlement.
Scenario Three: A Regional Shock and the Reopening of the Kurdish Question. A renewed escalation between Iran and the United States, a breakdown in the Iranian political system, renewed conflict in Syria or the failure of the Turkish process could generate new security pressures across the region. Kurdish political actors could become more influential in some arenas, while neighbouring states might respond with more restrictive security policies. This scenario would increase the risk that unresolved political questions are once again managed through coercion and military competition.
Strategic Assessment and Conclusion
The developments of 2026 suggest that the Kurdish question is being restructured across several interconnected arenas. Türkiye is advancing a legal and political process aimed at ending the PKK’s armed presence; Syria has moved towards the integration of Kurdish-led military and administrative structures into the state; Iraq has become increasingly important to Ankara’s security and economic strategy; and Iran is undergoing a period of profound uncertainty following the military confrontation and leadership transition. These processes are connected by geography, security calculations and the interests of regional and international actors, even though they are not controlled by a single political centre.
The hypothesis that Ankara is seeking to reduce the Kurdish armed and political factor before a major transformation in Iran is strategically plausible, but it should remain a hypothesis rather than a declared fact. The timing of the Turkish initiative, the parallel restructuring in Syria and the heightened uncertainty surrounding Iran provide grounds for examining such a calculation. Yet the available evidence does not establish that the Turkish process was designed exclusively or primarily to pre-empt an Iranian transition. Domestic political considerations, the desire to end a costly conflict, economic priorities and the changing balance in Syria are also significant explanatory factors.
The decisive test will be whether the process produces reciprocal political guarantees. If the outcome is limited to disarmament, organisational dissolution and administrative integration, without constitutional recognition and meaningful political participation, then the region may witness the neutralisation of particular Kurdish power structures rather than the resolution of the Kurdish question. If, however, the process creates enforceable rights and inclusive institutions, it could become an opportunity to transform one of the Middle East’s longest-running conflicts into a new framework of political coexistence.
The question facing Ankara is therefore larger than whether it can end the conflict with the PKK. It is whether Türkiye seeks to resolve the Kurdish question as a political and historical issue, or primarily to remove a security challenge before the regional order changes. The question facing Damascus is whether the integration of Kurdish institutions will be accompanied by permanent constitutional guarantees. The question facing the international community is whether it will support a settlement based on rights and political inclusion, or accept a narrower arrangement that prioritises central state control.
Ultimately, the future of the Kurdish question will not be determined by the dissolution of armed organisations alone. It will be determined by the political status, constitutional rights and institutional role afforded to Kurdish communities in the states in which they live. The end of armed conflict can open the door to peace; only a just political settlement can keep that door open.
Selected References
Reuters, “Turkish parliament passes landmark law to advance PKK peace process,” 10 August 2026.
Democratic Progress Institute, “Türkiye Peace Process Briefing: September 2026.”
UK House of Commons Library, “Syria in 2026: Interim government and Kurdish integration,” 2 September 2026.
Reuters, “Syria’s Kurdish-led SDF dissolves as part of integration with Damascus,” 25 August 2026.
UK House of Commons Library, “Iran in 2026: Six months after the US/Israeli strikes,” 27 August 2026.
Reuters, reporting on US–Iran mediated contacts, 2 November 2026.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Evolving Middle Eastern Regional Order: Türkiye-Iraq Relations in Context,” 18 February 2026.
Michael M. Gunter, “The Torturous Turkey-PKK Peace Process,” Middle East Policy, first published 15 May 2026.
