Despite the restrictions on warships in the Bosphorus, it seems clear that Turkey - like other countries including Israel - has sought to take a stand-in policy as the Russian-Ukrainian crisis intensifies. While its NATO partners are morally suspicious of Turkey's strategy.
At a time when Turkey announced, in conjunction with Western moves, to prevent the Russians from using its air and land airspace, the Turkish regime announced stopping the use of the phosphorous host in the media, while on the ground, the Turkish sea, land and air space remained open to Russian moves.
Although Turkey voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it has not imposed sanctions on Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Some observers have been quick to highlight the differences between Turkish policy and the pro-Ukraine approaches of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), suggesting that Ankara is trying to make it both ways — and remains rhetorically committed to Ukraine's independence and offer to mediate Conflict while leaning towards Russia.
The geopolitical balancing act of Turkey when dealing with Russia means trying to be pro-Kiev without being openly anti-Moscow. But this may soon face resentment from the two sides of the conflict, especially after the escalation of the state of separation between all countries on the "Western - Russian" axes. Especially since the Turkish fear of Russian anger, which will be reflected in the understandings between the two parties in Syria and other regions, so that the Turkish option with its NATO allies will result in a nail that hammers Turkish ambitions in Syria, especially in the Kurdish file that preoccupies the Turkish regime.
Turkey's traditional policy toward Ukraine - a mixture of deterrence and dialogue towards Russia - now needs to be revised with the failure of the first part. But despite the failure of deterrence, Turkey continues to pursue the side of dialogue by trying to mediate between the two sides. As expected, the meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Turkey did not produce a result, but served as a boost to Turkey's international standing.
This war between the two parties may be an opportunity to re-develop Turkish relations with the international community, as that relationship lost its strength as a result of the occupying Turkish ambitions in Libya, Syria and Iraq, and its formation as a direct threat to the security of Europe from the gateway to the Cypriot or Greek crisis with Turkey, and the destabilization of the eastern Mediterranean .
What has followed since the invasion is not a new policy - yet - but a new rhetoric that is set to urge a revision of the current policy. Crucial to this new language was that Turkey began using the word "war" to define the invasion, which then required Ankara to restrict the passage of Russian warships through its straits as outlined in the 1936 Montreux Convention - as it did then a few days after the invasion .
Before the invasion, deterrence for Turkey meant providing Kyiv with defensive equipment, especially armed drones, to enhance its security, while the dialogue spoke of Ankara's preference for diplomacy over military escalation as the way out of this crisis.
Turkey's control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles makes it a strategic player in the Black Sea, and thus also in the invasion where Ukraine specifically called for the closure of the strait and the international community welcomed Turkey's decision to restrict passage.
Russia's faltering in Ukraine would limit its power in conflict zones where Turkey and Russia are both involved, not least in the Middle East.
In the short term, these restrictions will be insignificant for Russia because it already has naval dominance in the Black Sea. But if the invasion is prolonged, the loss of the ability to move warships between its fleet in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is likely to affect Moscow. The decision will also affect Russia's role in conflict areas in Syria and Libya, but Moscow may soon test Western resolve in Libya by escalating tensions.
Economic problems make sanctions difficult
This current conflict also comes during an economic downturn in Turkey, and just one year after the presidential election, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's seemingly dull political future now depends on an increasingly improbable economic recovery.
Since the country is already overly vulnerable to Russia economically, it is unlikely to actively join international economic sanctions - even when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Turkey declared the move illegal but did not impose sanctions on Moscow and Turkey remains the largest trading partner Moscow in the Middle East. Middle East region.
Russians made up 19 percent of tourists visiting Turkey in 2021 and Ukrainians about 8.3 percent. Russia is also Turkey's second largest energy supplier after Azerbaijan, and Turkey imports 80 percent of its grain from Russia and Ukraine.
However, due to the systemic nature of the sanctions, Ankara may have to comply with their consequences, so it may have to passively implement some of them - especially those related to the banking system. But this is unlikely to lead to retaliatory measures on the part of Russia.
There are two other major factors that have a particular bearing in determining the next phase of Turkey's policy. If the invasion becomes a protracted war of attrition, with a real possibility of turning into a quagmire for Russia, and if the current international resolve to confront Russia continues, Ankara is likely to escalate its anti-Russian rhetoric and continue. Delivering military equipment and assets to Kyiv.
Moscow's complete dominance of the Black Sea is ominous for Turkey which is also a Black Sea power, while Russia's bog in the Ukrainian quagmire would limit its power in conflict zones where both Turkey and Russia are involved, at least in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey is overly vulnerable in geopolitical terms to Russia.
Ankara and Moscow have long competed and engaged with each other across conflict zones such as Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. But there is a significant difference between Turkish-Russian engagements in the Middle East and North Africa and in the post-Soviet region.
Vladimir Putin's rhetoric questioning the basis for Ukraine's independence makes it clear that he considers the post-Soviet space to be Russia's hegemonic zone, and thus is likely to be more sensitive and less tolerant of Turkey's policy toward Ukraine if it is viewed as openly hostile. While Turkish-Russian interactions in the Middle East have relatively reduced Western influence in that region, in the post-Soviet space, Moscow sees Ankara encroaching on its influence.
But as both actors are likely to increase their interaction in the post-Soviet space, the competitive - and possibly antagonistic - nature of Ankara and Moscow's relations will become more apparent. The invasion of Ukraine occurred at a time when Turkey's international relations are going through one of its most turbulent periods, with Turkey targeting Turkey through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) to purchase Russian S-400 missile systems.
Turkey's attempts to achieve strategic balancing may now prove too costly for Ankara, and this invasion illustrates the need for greater clarity about Turkey's place in any new European security architecture.
The crisis-ridden nature of Turkish-Western relations means that Ankara is more careful to pursue policies that could put it on a collision course with Moscow. But Ankara's policy is not equidistant between Ukraine and Russia - it provides military support to Kiev and has closed the strait - the question is how much and how clearly it will venture into the anti-Russian camp.
In addition to Ukraine, there are other regional crises that pave the way for further rapprochement between Turkey and the West, such as the rise of Serbian nationalism and separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, developments in the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan. It is still not known whether convergence can turn into cooperation, but the level of interactions has increased significantly.
Politics of equilibrium is untenable
Turkey has also largely reached the limits of its past policy of geopolitical balance between Russia and the West - a strategy that belongs to an era when Russian-Western relations were discussed in terms of competition rather than conflict. Invading Ukraine, especially if prolonged, requires making choices especially since Turkey is a member of NATO.
The gray areas have come to an end, and the cancellation of Nordstream 2 in Germany is a great example of the new age. Turkey's attempts to achieve strategic equilibrium now may prove too costly for Ankara, and this invasion demonstrates the need for greater clarity about Turkey's place in any new European security architecture.
Putin's invasion has eliminated any prospect for the foreseeable future of Russia as a partner rather than an enemy in the European security system. Now the debate will almost certainly show Russia as the enemy and threat to such a regime, and the broader security doctrine will likely operate from the perspective of confronting the dual threats of China as a systemic adversary and Russia as a geopolitical adversary.
This makes it all the more urgent to define the role of non-NATO Turkey - and the UK as well - in this structure, as this relates not only to Turkey's place in the European security system, but also to its future international relations.
From the imperial era to the present day, Western Turkish relations have been largely shaped by developments at the systemic level and global geopolitical considerations. The Ottoman Empire joined the Treaty of Paris in 1856 after the Crimean War, while Turkey's membership in NATO in 1952 was the result of the Cold War and the Soviet threat. The current crisis is another watershed moment that will profoundly reshape Turkey's future standing in the world.
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Citation Sources: Chatham Hosse Foundation and Konkell Foreign Relationships.
Translation and preparation: the geostrategic team for studies
