Special: Editorial Board of Geostrategic Studies
New game tracks
The Ukrainian war changed the rules of the game between the Western powers and Russia, and thus restricting Russian interests and preventing any expansion of them in the Middle East has become the clear strategy by the United States of America.
The space that was given to Russia in playing a central role in the Syrian crisis is no longer what it used to be, because the process of restricting Russia in Syria has returned to the fore again, and the Western powers will not abandon their influence in the Middle East subject to Russian expansion. Thus, this will be clearly reflected in the process of the Syrian crisis, and a strong return to the US-European influence in the Syrian crisis, and push the scene towards restricting the allies of the Russians, including the support of the opposition that the coalition forces trust, and at the top of the list is the Syrian Democratic Forces.
We are facing a geopolitical scene that is developing significantly in the American military movements within its areas of influence in Syria, and it may witness a military return to areas that it had previously withdrawn from, including the central areas of the Autonomous Administration in northern and eastern Syria. The path may be rapprochements between the Syrian opposition groups in order to put more pressure on the Syrian regime, meaning turning the Syrian arena into a process of reducing Russian influence.
On the other hand, Russia has some influence, whether in its relations with Turkey or coordinating with Iranian militias, to prevent any development in the Syrian opposition arena, as well as to pose a constant threat to the American presence in Syria and Iraq.
Here we will witness the Turks in the path of holding the stick from the middle, as the Syrian opposition groups linked to Turkish interests will not be able to coordinate with the United States of America to clamp down on the Syrian regime, because the agreements that Turkey signed with the Russians, Iranians and the Syrian regime force them to continue in the Astana and Sochi path. Abandoning this path requires a Western response to the Turkish demands, and this is not possible because the strategic military ally of the Western forces in Syria is the Syrian Democratic Forces, and therefore the Turkish demand here is not achievable.
Consequently, we are facing a new chapter of the Syrian crisis and dramatic transformations, and we may witness violent confrontations between the Syrian parties motivated by international powers, or a reconciliation that is imposed by force on the condition that both American and Russian interests are guaranteed.
Is the new Turkish operation on the Kurdish region in Syria feasible?
It is clear that it will not be easy for Turkey to carry out a new invasion of the Autonomous Administration region, similar to its previous operations in which it occupied 65% of the map of the Kurdish region in Syria, because the conditions for preparing for such operations require international consensus, especially the countries involved in the Syrian crisis. Therefore, it is not limited to Turkish internal factors only, as some imagine, but also in light of the current international conditions and the labors caused by the Corona pandemic and the results of the Ukrainian war, which changed many international and economic relations, and the direct entry of Western powers into open confrontations at the political and economic level, and to some degree confrontations The military, by its nature, has produced many changes on the international scene and in the Middle East in particular, given that the Syrian file is no longer dependent on the Western power on the Russian presence, but rather the paths have changed and the Western powers are returning their influence extensively to the region to prevent the Russians from expanding in the Middle East.
Turkish time
The Turkish regime is watching all the dramatic changes around it, especially the new Western rapprochement with the Autonomous Administration as part of strengthening NATO’s influence in the face of Russian expansion in Syria, in addition to the process of expanding the axis against Turkish policies within NATO, meaning the conditions within the alliance will not be in the favor of the good. The future of Turkey, especially since Sweden and Finland are more resolute than France towards Turkish ambitions in Syria, and therefore all the variables resulting from the Ukrainian crisis are not in the interest of the Turkish regime on the security and economic level.
The Turkish option until this moment, despite the international alignments between the Western powers and the Russians, has not been determined, and the Turkish regime, which entered into the process of special deals with the Turkish regime, contributed to building a political and military puzzle that is not easy to disengage with the Russians, and this means that the Turkish position will not be similar to Western policies towards Russia, because taking a serious stance against Russia will naturally result from Russian support for the Kurds in Syria, and this is what Turkey frankly fears.
Therefore, the Turkish position will oscillate between maintaining interests with Russia and at the same level with the Western powers, and pressure towards obstructing the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO without obtaining the pacification of Western pressures regarding its direction in the file of the Kurds in Syria.
The reality of the Syrian regime
As for the Syrian regime, despite attempts to return it to the Arab world, as well as to rehabilitate it by Russia and Iran, it is confined within the context of joint Russian-Iranian interests. It cannot negotiate with the Kurds and the Autonomous Administration because this needs a Russian decision, and the Russians are in agreement with the Turks and therefore no Kurdish-regime consensus can be achieved. The Syrian regime, which means that the regime's failure to yield to real negotiations and the resolution of problems with the Autonomous Administration is caused by Russia, not by the Syrian regime, as some believe.
The Autonomous Administration project is in fact the process of dismantling the dictatorship in Syria, so the Syrian regime stresses the possibility of negotiating with the Kurds only and granting them some possible rights within the specified context, and rejecting any negotiation with the Autonomous Administration, and the Autonomous Administration does not accept any negotiation with the Syrian regime on the Kurdish situation, but rather Focuses on the issue of implementing the management project in all of Syria. Therefore, during the next stage, we will witness a continuation of the process of oscillation between continuous dialogues without practical and real results, and we may witness some military understandings and the increase of the Syrian regime’s army in some Kurdish areas, but this will be temporary and according to specific interests and in certain areas.
Difficult equation (the situation remains as it is)
All geopolitical changes portend the continuity of the Syrian situation without making any significant development, and Turkey will continue to threaten every period in carrying out invasions against the Kurds, in return for the continuation of negotiations between the Autonomous Administration and the regime and short-term understandings in specific locations related to military matters only. And there will be no agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian armed groups occupying the Kurdish region, because the negotiations must be between the Kurds and Turkey, in other words, between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Turkish regime, because the Syrian armed groups affiliated with the Turkish occupation are just operational tools in the hands of Turkish intelligence.
As for the American presence in Syria, it will not decline, rather it is likely to increase, and this is not related to the Kurds or the Autonomous Administration, but rather a natural product of the outcome of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, and the necessity of restricting Russian interests in the Middle East.
The path of Sweden and Finland’s accession, and the fate of the Turkish veto, will be resolved within economic, not political, contexts. Sweden and Finland will guarantee some Turkish concerns, and will open the way for them in economic roaming. Europe will pay some money again to Turkey within the contexts of refugees or other issues.
29.05.2022
