Prepared by: The Geostrategic Working Group for Studies
In light of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the German government took a turn in foreign policy. After years of disarmament, she now wants to create a debt-financed "special fund" for the Bundeswehr. The Bundestag voted on the necessary amendment to the Basic Law and the Special Fund. But what exactly does the 100 billion package mean?
With Russia's attack on Ukraine, Germany's view of her country's ability to defend itself and as an ally changed. Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) announced in his government's statement on February 27 of this year a special spending of 100 billion euros for the German army. He also emphasized that in the future Germany would invest 2% of its GDP in defense.
It was necessary to make an amendment to the Basic Law to create the so-called Special Fund, which would be financed by borrowing new debts. The Basic Law can only be changed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. In the vote in the Bundestag on 3 June, the Traffic Signals Alliance obtained the necessary opposition votes. Deputies voted by a large majority to include a new Article 87a in the German constitution. There were 567 yes votes - 491 would have been enough. Then a large majority voted in favor of establishing the Special Fund. 593 deputies voted in favor, 80 against and seven abstained. As decided by the Federal Council on 10.
In addition to being entrenched in the Basic Law, the traffic light parties had previously agreed with the federation - as required by the CDU and CSU - that the 100 billion package would benefit the Bundeswehr alone.
Measures to protect against cyber attacks, for example, at the request of the Green Party, should not be financed from private expenditures, but from the federal budget. German Foreign Minister Annalena Barbock of the Green Party spoke on the Deutschlandfunk website about a good compromise.
Amending the Basic Law
- Barbuk (the Greens) welcomes the agreement on the Bundeswehr special fund
German Foreign Minister Annalina Barbock (Green Party) said in an interview with Delph that there are major gaps in the alliance and defense capabilities. It is therefore important that the special fund of 100 billion for the Bundeswehr be enshrined in the Basic Law.
Why is it called “private assets” and not “private debts”?
- "Special fund" is a fixed budget term - it defines an additional budget or sub-budget that is independent of the total budget. In fact, the Federal Government's "Special Fund" for the Bundeswehr is additional debt exempted from debt restraint. Because this fact is not apparent to laymen from the term, many criticize its use in the general public.
- According to Rainer Holznagel of the Taxpayers Association, this is the 28th special fund.
Why does the federal government want a special fund for the Bundeswehr?
At the special session of the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) announced that the Bundeswehr should be equipped with an additional €100 billion as part of a "special fund". "We will have to invest more in the security of our country in order to protect our freedom and our democracy in this way," Schulz said in his speech in the Bundestag. "The goal is an efficient, ultra-modern and progressive Bundeswehr that reliably protects us."
At the Bundestag session at the end of April, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht noted a significant shortfall in the armed forces. The SPD politician said that the German army must eventually be equipped in such a way as to once again ensure the defense of the country and the alliance.
What role does the so-called 2% target play?
Chancellor Olaf Scholz also said in his speech in the Bundestag at the end of February that Germany would invest more than 2% of its GDP in defense every year from now on. This has led to expectations that the defense budget will also increase in addition to the 100 billion package. It is now clear that this is not the case. NATO's 2 per cent target is to be achieved with the help of the 100 billion package, so the money from the special pot will count towards the 2 per cent target.
The so-called 2% target for NATO states that member states of the Western alliance must spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. 2% of Germany's GDP is about 70 billion euros. The defense budget has risen steadily since 2015, most recently to around €50 billion in 2021.
The union initially proposed anchoring the 2% target in the Basic Law, but later moved away from this in favor of a regular statutory anchor. The agreement between the government coalition and the union now states that the 2% target will be achieved "on average over several years".
It is unclear how the 2% target will be achieved once the 100 billion package is used. In this context, SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mutzenic emphasized on Deutschlandfunk that the Bundestag decides the budget. It slams a flat 2% target. So he would have considered it wrong to write a "totally vague indication in the statute to suppose that subsequent generations always achieve 2%". The 100 billion package guarantees additional defense funds for the next four or five years. Then you have to check what is required. "What loopholes are there will be identified in the new German parliament in 2027," Mutzenich said.
In recent years, NATO secretaries-general and several NATO partners have repeatedly lobbied for compliance with the 2% target. Germany also last agreed to this NATO demand at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, that is, after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Ukraine.
Anteil der Militärausgaben am Bruttoinlandsprodukt der NATO-Staaten
How is the Special Fund created?
A new paragraph has been added to Article 87a of the Basic Law: “In order to strengthen the capabilities of the Alliance and Defense, the Federal Government may establish a special fund with its own credit mandate up to a one-time amount of up to 100 billion euros. Article 109 paragraph 3 and Article 115 paragraph 2 no Apply to fiduciary delegation. Details are subject to federal law.”
Consolidation in the Basic Law is meant to ensure that funds cannot be used for other purposes
As a second step after amending the Basic Law, the Traffic Light Alliance plans to enact a law to create a special vessel. All that is needed for this is a simple majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The law aims to provide that the responsible Federal Ministry of Finance may obtain loans to the Special Fund and that it must provide information on income and expenditures once a year. This fate will be dissolved once his finances are exhausted.
What weapons should be purchased?
The "special fund" aims to enable large-scale arms purchases. According to the list of purchases approved by the Bundestag Defense Committee, most of the funds, amounting to about 41 billion euros, will be used for the Air Force, including American F-35 combat aircraft and transport helicopters from the American manufacturer. Also planned for Boeing, a Eurofighter version of electronic warfare and armament of the Heron drone. In addition, new corvettes and at least one frigate were planned for the Navy, as well as the successors to the Mardier armored personnel carrier and the Fox personnel carrier.
What is the relationship of the Special Fund to Curb Debt?
The debt-financed "special fund" was not planned by the Traffic Light Coalition as part of annual budget negotiations and should be available for several years after its creation. The federal government hopes this will facilitate military spending planning. The bill corresponding to the creation of the Special Fund states: "The instrument of the Special Fund is chosen because this financing task will be very broad and will take a longer duration." Moreover: “It is not possible to achieve the amount of financing in this framework. It is from the rule of debt.”
Thus, the so-called Special Fund is not part of the current budget for 2022. It is a burden on Germany's national debt, but its loans must be relieved from the debt brake, which will be committed again from 2023. Because the "Special Fund" is managed in a way that Separate from the budget, critics see it as a shadow budget and criticize the fact that the actual budget situation in the Federal Republic is opaque.
"Reservoir Discount" or "Private Assets"
Why do the media often grapple with political buzzwords
Politicians often convey their ideas with catchy headlines. If the media is talking about it, they should question and critically classify the terms.
What is the status of the German army?
Until now, Germany has always been able to meet NATO's demands by collecting equipment from all units of the troops. Of the total 200 tanks in the Bundeswehr, he drives only a good half, sometimes more, sometimes less. For comparison: NATO partner Poland alone has more than 900 main battle tanks. In addition, Poland recently purchased 250 main battle tanks from the United States, which is more than the German tanks it has at its disposal. In plain language, this means that Poland provides a large part of the conventional deterrence on the eastern side of NATO. This undermines alliance solidarity and has long been criticized by Polish governments.
But alliance solidarity is what made NATO the most successful defense alliance in history. The Allies have criticized the German position of placing the burden of defense and deterrence on others for years. As early as 2014, US President Barack Obama spoke of Germany as a military "free rider".
The share of military spending in Germany's GDP. The defense budget has increased steadily since 2015 (Statista/SIPRI).
Here's how Germany's military spending has evolved:
Equipment shortages in the German army have been the subject of debates for years. For example, some major weapons systems are only operational in three-quarters of them, 60 percent of helicopters are currently unable to fly, and submarines cannot sail. The acquisition of the Puma infantry fighting vehicle has been delayed since 2010 due to persistent defects and should not be completed until 2030. The procurement office of the Bundeswehr in Koblenz has long been considered ineffective. Processes that must be completed in a few years sometimes take decades.
So Federal Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht declared that "the Procurement Office will be given the bases so that it can operate faster". Among other things, the award of 20 per cent of future "special" contracts and the ability to deviate from European public procurement law in matters of national security. In addition, the minister wants to "rely more on market availability" when buying, as was the case recently with the decision to use the US-made Chinook as a transport helicopter.
Defense experts in politics, science and the media have known this for a long time. Many others were surprised by the harsh criticism of the highest-ranking German army officer on the day of the Russian attack on Ukraine. Army Inspector Alphonse Meese complained that the troops were not adequately prepared for NATO obligations and to defend Germany in the event of an alliance. After years of austerity, the German army is "more or less empty" and has only limited options towards Russia, the general wrote on one of the social networks.
The F-35 is the world's newest combat aircraft - and can serve as a nuclear weapons carrier (dpa / picture alliance / MAPPPP)
Although Russia's war against Ukraine has changed its attitude towards armament investments in Germany, the impotence of the German army cannot be immediately compensated. In addition, the primary mission of national defense (enshrined in Article 87a of the Basic Law) has fallen into the background in recent years. Former General Harald Kugat complains that Germany has focused only on overseas missions for more than ten years. "This means that the overall scope of the German army, its armament and equipment is no longer carried out with the aim of carrying out the constitutional mandate of the Bundeswehr - that is, the defense of the country and the alliance," Kogat said.
Defense spending is used for this:
Expenditure in the German federal budget for the Federal Ministry of Defense in 2021 (target values; in million euros):
Approval and criticism
Before the vote in the Bundestag on the 100 billion package for the Bundeswehr, there were heated discussions between the opposition and the ruling parties about the use of the money - however, the Union faction expressed its agreement with this.
Skeptics within the ruling parties also declared their support. Sebastian Roloff of the "Democratic Left" within the SPD has justified this in the LDP by the fact that important issues such as procurement reform will now be addressed. “So far, the German army has not suffered from a lack of funding, at least not in recent years. But it is clear that the funds did not always get where they should be. And at least this has been achieved.”
However, there has been constant criticism of the "special fund" plans. Some deputies had clearly expressed their disapproval. Contrary to the line of his parliamentary group, Frank Bisirsek, a Green Party member and former head of the Verdi trade union, criticized the agreement reached on Deutschlandfunk. It creates the "first fiscal base" for defense spending for many years to come. He described this as "completely counterproductive" and that it had nothing to do with other reforms agreed in the alliance agreement, such as environmental and social reforms.
The AfD and the left-wing faction also refuse to amend the Basic Law
A broad front of science defense and foreign policy experts had already welcomed the rain of money for the Bundeswehr after Chancellor Olaf Schultz's first announcement: the approval came from the German Science and Policy Foundation (SWP), the German Association for Foreign Policy (DGAP), the German Marshall Fund or the Kiel Institute for Security Policy (ISPK), to name a few. However, time and time again, the reservation could be heard, especially from the scientific community, that the Bundeswehr's procurement system would have to fundamentally reform so that the money could be spent efficiently.
More than 600 representatives of politics and science as well as celebrities have publicly criticized the Special Fund. "The massive upgrade of the Bundeswehr will not help the people of Ukraine," the initiators wrote on their website. The alliance calls for a broad social debate "over the highest increase in arms spending since World War II" and "a 180-degree shift in German foreign policy".
Criticism also comes from the Taxpayers' Association. Its chief, Rainer Holznagel, believes that it is right that the German army is better equipped, but the path of the other "shadow budget" is wrong. According to Holznagel, private expenditures threaten to cause further financial problems: although the "Special Fund" has created relief for investments, future maintenance and repair costs are not accounted for in the regular budget of the Bundeswehr.
Is the German army really underfunded?
There has been talk of underfunding the German army for years. Every year, reports by military representatives put their fingers in the wound and drew attention to equipment shortages. At first glance, this is surprising, because defense spending is in Germany at about 53.1 billion euros estimated by NATO, almost at the level of France (48.2 billion). Instead of looking at absolute numbers, look at the distribution of expenses. It should be noted that Bundeswehr materials are in heavy use and outdated by many international missions, but preservation of the materials prevents new acquisitions. The NATO comparison shows that the Bundeswehr spent much less of its budget on new acquisitions than its allies. For example, while France spent 27.8% or Spain 22.7% of their defense budgets on new acquisitions and research and development, Germany's figure was only 18.6% - the second lowest figure after Canada (17.7%).
But more money alone is not enough. The German military is stuck in over-regulated and controlled procurement that raises the costs of individual projects and prevents soldiers from getting the materials they need in time. Military commissioners have repeatedly referred to this grievance in recent years. Under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen and Annegret Kamp-Karrenbauer, there were attempts to reform the procurement system - without success so far. Procurement is currently handled centrally by the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support. Apparently, this centralization is the bottleneck in addition to the complex and restrictive procurement law, hampering flexibility and quick purchasing decisions. Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht had already announced in January that she would fundamentally overhaul the procurement system. The pressure to succeed has only increased this time around.
The reform of the procurement system is essential to the effective and efficient use of the Special Fund.
Even if the creation of this special fund raises some fundamental rights issues.
- Should the "Special Bundeswehr Fund" be enshrined in the Basic Law?
The creation of a special fund of 100 billion euros to equip the German army is not just a defense and security policy decision. It is a major infringement on the scale in matters of budget strictly balanced by the Basic Law. Despite the unity shown in the Bundestag session on February 27, 2022, a look at constitutional history shows that the power issues associated with it have a high potential for conflict. Without changing the Basic Law, such a special fund would be unconstitutional. In principle, the Debt Curb Basic Law permits the creation of a special fund in “exceptional emergencies outside the control of the State” (Article 109(3) Sentence 2 and Article 115(2)(2) Sentence 6 GG). In contrast to the armed attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, which violates international law, the structural lack of funding for the Bundeswehr is not an emergency of this kind, but an accepted situation for years. It is generally permitted to amend the Basic Law for this purpose within the limits and on the basis of the procedure laid down in Article 79 of the Basic Law. However, such an approach is constitutionally unprecedented. In essence, the Special Fund is a direct constitutional trust authorization and occurs—if the constitutional amendment is passed—as an exceptional provision along with debt brakes. But about a case that has been accepted for years. It is generally permitted to amend the Basic Law for this purpose within the limits and on the basis of the procedure laid down in Article 79 of the Basic Law. However, such an approach is constitutionally unprecedented. In essence, the Special Fund is a direct constitutional trust authorization and occurs—if the constitutional amendment is passed—as an exceptional provision along with debt brakes. But about a case that has been accepted for years. It is generally permitted to amend the Basic Law for this purpose within the limits and on the basis of the procedure laid down in Article 79 of the Basic Law. However, such an approach is constitutionally unprecedented. In essence, the Special Fund is a direct constitutional trust authorization and occurs—if the constitutional amendment is passed—as an exceptional provision along with debt brakes.
Therefore, careful implementation is required. This includes not only a meticulously crafted constitutional amendment. Instead, an equally precise enforcement law is needed, which defines the purpose and administration of the special fund and the manner in which the loan is to be repaid. In addition, there are provisions under European and international law, which must take into account that a special fund will be allocated to the state sector that is taken up there. Finally, for reasons of the principle of democracy, care must be taken to ensure that the organ's primary responsibilities for budgetary issues are not permanently prejudiced and that Parliament's budgetary authority over the defense budget is curtailed.
What are Germany's defense policy priorities?
As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, defense policy priorities shifted to national defense and alliance defense. In particular, the perception of the threat by eastern NATO partners has risen again dramatically. Despite the importance and validity of securing NATO's eastern borders militarily and relying on deterrence, it is also necessary for an integrated security strategy and the resulting reforms of the German military to also take into account the global dimension of the current and multilateral unrest. Within the framework of the United Nations and the European Union.
To live up to its responsibility for NATO's credibility and operational capacity, Germany will have to expand its military capabilities in three areas: national defense, alliance defense, and deterrence. These dimensions are closely interrelated and must be strategically integrated. In light of the militarily unstable situation of the Baltic states and other Eastern European alliance states, securing mobility and deployability becomes a central task of national defense. Germany is the framework country for the NATO Logistics Command established in Ulm in 2018, which aims to ensure, among other things, that troops and materials can be rapidly deployed to the eastern side of the alliance. In addition, it is about expanding the infrastructure for admission and express transportation of American units in particular, but also of German units that are already in operation and equipped with the latest technology. In order to strengthen the Alliance's defense, Germany will have to fully equip the army units and other branches of the armed forces, shorten mobilization times and expand material storage. In addition, Germany should contribute to the defense of the alliance with the permanent stationing of larger units in the eastern member states. This seems to be justified
Does Europe need its nuclear option?
In light of Vladimir Putin's - albeit vague - threat to use nuclear weapons, the challengers are once again talking about the "nuclear option of the Europeans". Like the earlier call for a German atomic bomb, recent advances appear to have been driven more by a desire to attract media attention than by intelligent analysis of security policy. After all, European nuclear weapons are not on the agenda and would conflict with the Federal Government's ongoing efforts to ensure non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Aside from the fact that the EU would not be so active in security and defense policy for the foreseeable future that it would be able to take any crisis-related decisions in the shortest possible time, there were considerations for a long time that France would have to put its potential deterrent “into the service” of European interests. However, it may be difficult to reconcile this offer with the abandonment of nuclear weapons agreed to by other EU countries (Austria, Ireland and Malta) under the United Nations Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
More important than thinking about the nuclear armament of Europe is to have an open dialogue with partners on the question of how to reasonably strengthen European and transatlantic deterrence in general and what contribution Germany can make for this purpose. Under these circumstances, the much discussed end of German participation in NATO's nuclear reinsurance ("nuclear engagement") is no longer on the agenda. However, this should not prevent the federal government from working to reduce the nuclear component of defense planning in the medium to long term - while at the same time being prepared to take on greater responsibility in the conventional sphere. Within the alliance, Germany must work to establish strict limits on the use of nuclear weapons.
Are assignments abroad still relevant?
In addition to national and alliance defense, Germany should also be able in the future to contribute to global security and stability within the framework of UN peacekeeping missions, expanded peacekeeping missions under the umbrella of the European Union or NATO or in cooperation with other regional organizations. This task will not become less important because the effects of the Russian war in Ukraine are not confined to Europe. Russia sees itself (again) as a power with global reach, using regional instability and pursuing its goals, as is currently the case in Mali, with mixed means (Wagner Forces) and disinformation campaigns. In addition, it is expected that due to the shortage of grain crops in Ukraine, entire regions (especially in the Middle East and North Africa) will experience political turmoil and instability. Also in light of this challenge, the stabilization and strengthening of state and social flexibility in non-European third countries remains an important task of German foreign and security policy.
In this context, airlift capabilities are required for their own formations or as a service for multinational units as part of United Nations missions embedded in a global logistics network. In addition, a military component is required to secure humanitarian corridors and refugee camps or deliver aid, which also includes airspace security and special forces on the ground. Ultimately, the hybrid nature of conflict dynamics, including electronic warfare, requires close interaction with intelligence agencies and the police - a collaboration that includes not only the latest expertise in digital communications, but also close parliamentary control. In general, it must be borne in mind that the experiences of the past two decades have shown this.
What role do civilian components play in security policy?
The current focus on equipping the Bundeswehr should not preclude necessary investments in development cooperation, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and the prevention of civil crises. In the alliance agreement, the Traffic Lights Alliance agreed to increase spending on “crisis prevention, humanitarian aid, AKBP [foreign cultural and educational policy] and development cooperation [...] on an individual basis with defense spending as the basis for the 2021 budget. Although That this coupling does not apply to an additional 100 billion to the Bundeswehr, investment in the civilian components of peace and security policy must also be increased.
Even before the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Association for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (VENRO) identified the additional need for financing for development cooperation and humanitarian aid to be 31.2 billion euros by 2025. While investments in the German Foreign Ministry and the prevention of civil crises are to move financially in other frameworks, from What is important at the moment is to provide these policy areas with a sufficient number of staff, to support this with the necessary funds in the long term and to use these funds in a meaningful manner within the interdepartmental policy strategies. Within the framework of the planned objectives announced by the Federal Government to implement the guidelines “Prevent crises, overcome conflicts and promote peace”, the focus will be, among others, on mediation for peace, strengthening actors involved in civil conflict management, such as the Civil Peace Service and local civil society organisations. In addition, expenditures on personnel and resources in EU and UN peacekeeping missions should be increased. To ensure that much-needed funds for humanitarian assistance in Ukraine are not at the expense of other countries and especially “forgotten crises” and to mitigate the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of the war, such as food shortages in other parts of the world, Germany should also significantly increase humanitarian aid. In particular, unearmarked, multi-year funds are needed. In addition, expenditures on personnel and resources in EU and UN peacekeeping missions should be increased. To ensure that much-needed funds for humanitarian assistance in Ukraine are not at the expense of other countries and especially “forgotten crises” and to mitigate the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of the war, such as food shortages in other parts of the world, Germany should also significantly increase humanitarian aid. In particular, unearmarked, multi-year funds are needed. In addition, expenditures on personnel and resources in EU and UN peacekeeping missions should be increased. To ensure that much-needed funds for humanitarian assistance in Ukraine are not at the expense of other countries and especially “forgotten crises” and to mitigate the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of the war, such as food shortages in other parts of the world, Germany should also significantly increase humanitarian aid. In particular, unearmarked, multi-year funds are needed. To ensure that much-needed funds for humanitarian assistance in Ukraine are not at the expense of other countries and especially “forgotten crises” and to mitigate the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of the war, such as food shortages in other parts of the world, Germany should also significantly increase humanitarian aid. In particular, unearmarked, multi-year funds are needed. To ensure that much-needed funds for humanitarian assistance in Ukraine are not at the expense of other countries and especially “forgotten crises” and to mitigate the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of the war, such as food shortages in other parts of the world, Germany should also significantly increase humanitarian aid. In particular, unearmarked, multi-year funds are needed.
Will sanctions remain a means of security policy?
The broad sanctions against Russia are unprecedented in many ways. Firstly, it was determined in a few days, secondly, it was imposed on a major (at least military) power and thirdly on a G-20 country closely integrated into the global economy. The degree of cooperation between the European Union, the United States and a large number of other partner countries in this context is also extraordinary. However, expectations for the sanctions package should not be overstated. Sanctions alone cannot solve a crisis. They should always be part of a larger strategy. Diplomacy and mediation, and especially in this case, the supply of arms to the Ukrainian government are also important.
The chances of sanctions succeeding in a few weeks are clearly slim (coercion), given that Vladimir Putin will give up in the short term. The Russian government and its military are likely to be restricted in the medium and long term for 3-4 months and more (restrictions). However, the political signal that stems from the united action of the USA, the European Union, the G7 and many other countries should not be underestimated that Russia's violation of international law will not be tolerated (signal). The federal government must publicly state these various goals. It is not about a collective punishment of the Russian population, nor a change of government in Moscow. It is about reducing Russia's war capacity and ending aggressive wars.
As for the turning point in German peace and security policy, it is important to note that sanctions are a complex, expensive and sometimes risky tool. From a German domestic policy perspective, the survey values emerge because there is currently strong support for sanctions against the Russian government on all sides (beyond AVA for Germany) - even if energy prices are rising, there is a shortage of energy and German companies suffer from disadvantages. However, it is important to socially mitigate the secondary effects of sanctions on society so that support remains high and the long-term credibility of German sanctions policy is ensured. In addition, the federal government and its international partners should also monitor the potential humanitarian consequences of sanctions in third countries - for example through failed grain deliveries - and set up assistance programs to mitigate them.
What does it mean that energy policy is also a security policy?
The war in Ukraine is seen as a shock to energy security. The conflict exposes the dependence on Russian energy supplies. With more or less obvious threats to reduce or completely stop oil and gas supplies, Russia has attempted to limit Germany's political space for maneuver. Until now, energy imports from Russia were not part of the strict sanctions imposed by the West, since the security of supply for the German population would not be guaranteed. Delivery from other regions of the world is not possible at short notice, and is usually also associated with political risks. The idea put forward in the discussion to extend the operating periods of coal and nuclear power plants is not recommended by the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Climate and Environment, and the operators themselves also see significant obstacles to such a strategy, as it is associated with high economic risks. Such a move would only be justified if Russia did cut off its energy supplies or if Europe agreed to a ban.
In a special statement, Leopoldina showed how energy supplies can be secured even if Russian gas supplies are stopped at short notice. Immediate measures have been proposed by the European Union and Germany to buy liquid gas in the short term from other sources as well as to generate electricity from coal in order to reduce gas demand. In the medium term, energy sources must be diversified, and in the long term, the shift to climate neutrality must be promoted. In general, there is no alternative to using this shock as a springboard to invest heavily in the expansion of renewable energy sources. The announced investments of €200 billion by 2026 are a necessary step in this direction. In general, even this will not be enough to ensure a secure energy supply independent of Russia in the coming years.
In political communications, it will also be important to more clearly communicate the need to save energy and provide incentives to do so. The expansion of renewable energies along with efforts to save energy is also an opportunity for Germany to move closer to its climate goals, although additional electricity generation from coal initially correlates with more emissions. In this context, it will also be important to examine the investments from the special fund in the Bundeswehr to determine the emissions associated with them and the emissions that can be avoided.
A new diplomatic imperative for a new security system
Even if the war in Ukraine is still going on, it is already necessary to think about the "beyond". With the aggressive war against Ukraine, Russia broke the structures of the common security system in Europe: the Paris Pact, with its commitment to territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the promotion of democracy and human rights, is on the rocks, as is the more pragmatic law establishing NATO and Russia, but Also the OSCE process. Even after the end of hostilities and some kind of peace agreement, there would be no direct path back to this. Alternatively, a divided security system can be assumed in Europe in the short and medium term, in which the old rules and institutions still exist in the EU region and NATO member states (territorial integrity, duty to settle disputes by peaceful means, joint commitment to and promotion of democracy and human rights ), but outside this region there is an emerging system in which Russia establishes bases for its dependent states. Among these policy areas, the focus will initially be on establishing and stabilizing reliable mutual deterrence. But even to achieve this, new forums must be created in which the parties can communicate with each other (the hotline) as well as enter into negotiations in order to re-establish a sustainable security system for the continent. This includes, first of all, the development of arms control forums in order to avoid as much as possible uncontrolled arms races, which often occur in phases of mutual threats. This also includes forums regulating mutual trade and cultural exchange, because this must also be secured.
In the current situation, economic disengagement with Russia is at the forefront for many, and some believe that the Ukrainian war has buried the idea of rapprochement through trade. But this ignores the facts. The principle of convergence through trade has always been based on the fact that convergence is protected, firstly, by a framework of security policy (deterrence), and secondly, that trade is mutually beneficial without one party being able to blackmail the other. This is not the case in highly asymmetric domains of interconnectedness or in highly integrated supply chains.
In other words: there is a need to decouple in areas of economic activity where there are large disparities. However, at the same time, care must be taken to ensure that this disconnect does not spread unfettered to other areas and also destroy contacts there that are beneficial to both sides and that can help in the future as crystallization points to create new trust. This applies even more beyond economic interdependence in areas such as science, culture and art. Unnecessarily blocking interconnections here means reducing understanding between each other and fueling the alienation of societies that is already taking place, counterproductive for future peaceful coexistence. So it's at most a "controlled disassembly" process.
------------------------------------
Information sources:
- Markus Bindor, Stefan Dettgen, Konstanz Bielski, Frank Capellan, Nina Voigt, German Bundestag, Agence France-Presse, dpa).
- Deutschlandfunk
- Military research on Brooke Bluff Agency: Sarah Brockmeier, Christopher Daase, Nicole Deitelhoff, Matthias Dembinski, Caroline Fehl, Julian Junk, Stefan Kroll, Thilo Marauhn, Anton Peez und Niklas Schörnig
