Political analysis by Ibrahim Kaban
Answering the question “Who rules Damascus?” cannot be done in conventional terms. The political and security landscape surrounding Damascus and its adjacent regions is structured within a complex web of proximate and remote influences that diffuse authority and fragment control. The state apparatus has long since collapsed as a coherent entity, giving way to a patchwork of networks – tribal, ideological, and foreign-backed – that exercise sovereignty in piecemeal and often contradictory ways.
The Illusion of Dialogue: The Case of Ahmed al-Shara
Ahmed al-Shara, frequently portrayed in media as a face of “dialogue” and “political breakthrough,” is increasingly exposed as a figurehead with little actual authority. His efforts to establish dialogue, including recent attempts to coordinate with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have been consistently undercut by extremist factions that operate autonomously and ideologically oppose pluralism.
His latest rejection of the Kurdish conference outcomes—despite their alignment with his earlier positions—exposes the reality that al-Shara has neither the mandate nor the power to implement or even maintain consistent political positions. He is surrounded by groups that believe compromise is heresy and coexistence is betrayal.
Power in Practice: The Rise of Militant Extremism
The actors that dominate the security and military scene in and around Damascus are not the political elites of the old regime nor transitional figures like al-Shara. Rather, it is the extremist, religiously driven factions—Salafi and Jihadi in orientation—that exert real control. These groups may present themselves with softened language and modernized discourse, but in practice, they hold sway over enforcement, security, and civil structures.
What’s more alarming is that many of these factions are heavily influenced—if not directly managed—by Turkish intelligence. Ankara’s deep entrenchment in the Syrian north has evolved into strategic manipulation across broader territories, allowing proxy forces to carry out policies that serve external interests rather than Syrian self-determination.
Puppet Figures in a Theater of Control
Figures like al-Shara serve more as symbolic gestures to the international community rather than as real actors within Syria’s fractured polity. Behind the curtain, power resides with ideologically motivated militias and foreign intelligence networks. Any attempt at institutionalizing dialogue or building civil consensus is quickly sabotaged by forces with zero interest in pluralism, inclusivity, or democratic frameworks.
The recent Kurdish initiative—a proposal for shared governance and local autonomy—was strategically undermined not because of its content, but because of its threat to the unitary, religiously exclusive vision held by dominant Islamist factions. These groups view Kurdish agency and democratic decentralization as existential threats to their doctrinal control.
The Real Danger: The Theocratic Turn
What Syria is now witnessing is not merely the failure of the state, but the emergence of a proto-theocracy imposed by arms and decrees. Militant Islamism has transcended the battlefield and is embedding itself in governance structures, judicial practices, and social norms. The public discourse is being shaped not by civil debate, but by fatwas and absolutist ideologies.
This theocratic drift is not self-generated—it is supported by cross-border religious networks, foreign funding, and geopolitical interests, particularly from Turkey. The so-called “reform movement” is nothing but a smokescreen for a deeper, more insidious reconfiguration of Syrian society under the banner of hardline religiosity.
Conclusion: Damascus in Captivity
It is no longer accurate to say that Damascus is governed by any singular body—be it the regime, the opposition, or a coalition of civil actors. The city, and increasingly the broader Syrian space, is governed by extremism—armed, ideologically rigid, and structurally embedded. Power lies not with those seen on podiums, but with those who operate from the shadows, backed by foreign agendas and armed networks.
Any future for Syria must confront this reality. Democratic actors, civil society, and the international community must recognize that figures like al-Shara are window dressing for a deeper entrenchment of theocratic, exclusionary rule. Without a fundamental challenge to this extremist power structure, Syria will continue to sink—not into mere authoritarianism—but into a new form of religious absolutism masked as liberation.
