Future events. Geostrategic Studies Team
Are We Heading Toward a Full-Scale War in the Middle East?
A Deep and Long-Term Analytical Forecast of Regional Fault Lines
As the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East undergoes what can only be described as a violent "recasting," urgent questions emerge: Are we on the brink of a comprehensive regional war that transcends proxy conflicts? Will the overlapping Kurdish-Turkish, Syrian, Iranian, and Israeli fault lines ignite a cascade of direct confrontations? With the collapse of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, and the withdrawal of the PKK from key positions, are we entering a new, more dangerous phase?
The region is no longer on a path of fragile stability. Rather, it is caught in the throes of a silent collapse of a regional order that was never fully born. As no viable alternative emerges, the vacuum is filled by excessive militarization, identity fragmentation, and geopolitical overreach.
A Post-Map Middle East: The Delayed Explosion
What we are witnessing is not a transitional phase, but the slow-motion breakdown of the old order. Regional powers—Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia—have become de facto war machines, driven not by tactical calculations, but by existential fear.
This instability is fueled by a triad of global shifts: American retrenchment, Russian decline, and Chinese opportunism. All of this is playing out on fragile ground—across fault lines laden with arms, unresolved grievances, and unmanageable demographic pressures.
In this context, the likelihood of a regional war is not remote. It is increasingly plausible, as open-ended skirmishes evolve into systemic collisions.
The Turkish-Kurdish File: From Tactical Wars to Strategic Exhaustion
Turkey's Kurdish dilemma has entered a stage of strategic stalemate. Military campaigns in northern Syria and Iraq have failed to dismantle the political and social will of Kurdish movements. With the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announcing a form of disengagement or redeployment, the landscape is shifting.
This withdrawal is not surrender. It is a recalibration. The PKK and its affiliates are not abandoning the cause but transitioning from insurgency to strategic patience, perhaps even preparing the ground for the rise of more internationally acceptable Kurdish actors.
This is precisely what Ankara fears: not armed confrontation, but a Kurdish movement that appeals to Western sensibilities through the language of human rights, self-determination, and democratic governance. In such a scenario, Turkey finds itself battling a narrative war it is ill-equipped to win.
The Kurds and Damascus: From Negotiations to the Brink
The Syrian regime has undergone a fundamental transformation over the past six months. Damascus is no longer governed by the old authoritarian apparatus in its traditional form; instead, a new power center has emerged, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), who now spearheads a project that fuses Islamist discourse with authoritarian pragmatism. This evolving authority is gradually taking hold of Damascus’s security and administrative institutions.
In this shifting landscape, the Kurdish question is entering a new and precarious phase. What was once considered a peripheral issue has now become a central bargaining chip, intersecting with a host of conflicting regional interests. Under the old regime, the Autonomous Administration was viewed as a threat to centralized security control. Today, the new de facto leadership in Damascus — despite its Islamist leanings — engages with the Kurdish political project differently: not merely as a nationalist rival, but as a political actor with significant leverage in post-state negotiations.
With the military stalemate persisting and the central government's legitimacy continuing to erode, the Autonomous Administration remains one of the few coherent models of local governance in Syria. This makes it both a potential partner in future arrangements and a structural threat to centralized rule — especially in the eyes of Iran, now the regime’s sole strategic backer following Russia’s gradual disengagement. Tehran views the Kurdish project with deep suspicion, framing it as an extension of a broader American-Israeli strategy aimed at dismantling the regional axis it leads.
Under these conditions, neither a comprehensive political agreement nor an all-out war appears likely. Instead, a slow erosion is unfolding. Damascus — whether through HTS or in coordination with it — is expected to pursue a strategy of quiet infiltration into the institutions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), facilitated by Iranian intelligence networks. The objective is clear: to fragment the Kurdish entity from within, push it into confrontation with Turkey, or provoke internal collapse by reactivating ethnic, tribal, and sectarian fault lines.
In this new political terrain, Syrian Kurds find themselves navigating a different equation — one not defined by the classic binaries of regime vs. revolution or governance vs. opposition, but by murky zones of power in which influence trumps ideology, and where the future is being reshaped not through open conflict, but through a protracted game of destabilization and co-optation.
Iraq and Iran: Shadows of Control
Iraq’s political arena remains a contested space between the state, the Shiite clerical establishment, and the sprawling militia networks aligned with Iran. Since the killing of Qassem Soleimani, Tehran has lost much of its symbolic hegemony, but not its operational reach.
The gradual withdrawal of the PKK from the Qandil Mountains and elsewhere opens new spaces, which Iran may seek to fill—either directly or through Shiite-Kurdish proxy forces. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) continue to assert their presence in key border zones, potentially setting the stage for a Turkish-Iranian showdown on Iraqi soil.
This "cold war" between Ankara and Tehran, masked by indirect proxies, may soon erupt into open hostilities, particularly if their spheres of influence begin to overlap too aggressively in Sinjar, Kirkuk, or Nineveh.
Iran vs. Israel: The War Already Underway
The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations have all but collapsed. Both sides understand this. Washington knows Tehran seeks regime survival more than economic reintegration. Tehran knows a nuclear deal won’t lift the broader sanctions architecture that is choking its economy.
This impasse has already triggered a shift toward direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. The shadow war—assassinations, drone strikes, cyberattacks—has evolved into a semi-official campaign of attrition.
Should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, or if Israel deems the threat imminent, a direct military strike becomes not only plausible—but inevitable. This will not be a limited operation. It will likely spill over into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and even the Gulf.
The PKK’s Withdrawal: An End or a Strategic Pause?
The PKK’s recent recalibration signals a major turning point. Whether it’s an actual withdrawal or a tactical repositioning, the consequences are profound. The PKK has always operated in a world of shifting allegiances and strategic betrayals. Its current move could be aimed at facilitating the rise of a new generation of Kurdish actors—less militant, more diplomatic.
This transformation may give birth to a Kurdish narrative rooted in political legitimacy rather than insurgent resistance. Turkey may find itself increasingly isolated on the international stage if it continues to treat all Kurdish aspirations as terrorist threats.
Strategic Foresight: Scenarios Ahead
1. The Delayed Regional War Becomes Reality: Multiple fault lines—Turkey vs. Kurds, Israel vs. Iran, Iran vs. Gulf states—could ignite simultaneously, triggering an unstoppable chain reaction.
2. Iran’s Internal Eruption: Should the Islamic Republic face an existential internal uprising, it may export its crisis outward—via escalation in Iraq, Lebanon, and against Israel.
3. The Internationalization of the Kurdish Issue: As militant methods wane, Kurdish diplomacy may gain traction, especially in the West, reframing the cause as a legitimate self-determination movement.
4. A Fragmented Middle East: The regional map may devolve into zones of influence—Kurdish semi-states, Shiite corridors, Sunni enclaves, and Israeli buffer zones. This fragmentation may solidify into a new, unofficial regional order.
Final Reflection
The Middle East is not simply on the edge of war—it is in its prelude. Not all wars begin with missiles. Some start with broken negotiations, abandoned alliances, or identities that refuse to remain silent. Once again, the region is rewriting its fate in the language of blood, and the only question that remains: will anyone read this history before it becomes an irreversible destiny?
