Balance of Power: The Geostrategic Studies Team
Analytical Introduction
In 2025, Syria witnessed one of the most significant strategic transformations in its modern history: the complete collapse of the central regime that had governed the country since the mid-20th century. This collapse led to the disintegration of the state’s security and military institutions and the withdrawal of Iranian-backed militias, which had formed the ideological and military backbone of the regime. This downfall was not the result of a direct external military intervention but rather the outcome of accumulated internal crises, political and military fragmentation, and a regional and international consensus on the impossibility of the regime’s survival as a perpetual source of chaos and instability.
This transformation occurred within a complex context, combining societal exhaustion from prolonged conflict, ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the overlapping geopolitical agendas of regional and international powers operating on Syrian soil. With the withdrawal of Iranian forces and their affiliated militias—which had represented the axis of Shiite regional influence stretching from Tehran to Beirut—the balance of power within Syria began shifting in favor of new formations, most of which are either local or backed by regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, or international players like the United States.
At this transitional moment, Syria is no longer the centralized state it was historically known to be. Instead, it now leans toward a fragmented model composed of spheres of influence administered by armed factions with varying ideological, ethnic, and sectarian backgrounds. This emerging reality can best be described as a military–political mosaic, where rival forces intersect in interests yet are compelled to coexist within the boundaries of a new status quo.
The current landscape does not feature a unified army, a central authority, or even a cohesive national vision. Instead, it consists of a map of active military entities functioning as de facto authorities, each with its own security, administrative, judicial, and economic systems. In effect, Syria has entered a phase of “post-state” or “multi-centered statehood.”
These forces can be categorized into three main backgrounds:
Local forces that emerged from popular uprisings or splinters of former factions—such as the New Syrian Army or the Druze factions in Sweida.
Regional powers playing direct roles on the ground, such as the Turkish military, which oversees opposition-held areas in the north.
International powers imposing their influence via limited military presence or logistical and political support, as the U.S. does through its backing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the international coalition.
This complexity is further deepened by identity-based local forces, such as the Druze in Sweida, who have successfully built an independent defensive force that refuses to engage in sectarian or political conflicts. This force presents a unique model of armed neutrality focused on protecting the local community without aligning with any regional agenda.
Understanding this changing landscape requires a detailed study of these forces in terms of their military capabilities, geographical distribution, funding sources, organizational structures, political narratives, and future trajectories. The military equation in Syria is no longer measured solely by the sophistication of weaponry, but also by the resilience, adaptability, and legitimacy each force can establish in its area of control.
This study seeks to present a detailed comparative analysis of the primary military actors in post-regime Syria in order to understand the mechanisms of control and to deconstruct the complex balance of forces shaping Syria’s present and potentially its future—be it federalism, partition, or a prolonged state of unresolved instability.
The New Military Landscape in Syria Is Shaped by Seven Main Forces:
1. The New Syrian Arab Army (Led by Ahmad al-Sharaa)
Formation: Emerged after Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly al-Jolani) split from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, establishing a new centralized opposition force with national ambitions.
Size and Deployment: Approximately 70,000 fighters in Damascus, Daraa, Homs, Hama, Quneitra, and parts of rural Sweida and southern Aleppo.
In 2025, Syria witnessed one of the most significant strategic transformations in its modern history: the complete collapse of the central regime that had governed the country since the mid-20th century. This collapse led to the disintegration of the state’s security and military institutions and the withdrawal of Iranian-backed militias, which had formed the ideological and military backbone of the regime. This downfall was not the result of a direct external military intervention but rather the outcome of accumulated internal crises, political and military fragmentation, and a regional and international consensus on the impossibility of the regime’s survival as a perpetual source of chaos and instability.
This transformation occurred within a complex context, combining societal exhaustion from prolonged conflict, ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the overlapping geopolitical agendas of regional and international powers operating on Syrian soil. With the withdrawal of Iranian forces and their affiliated militias—which had represented the axis of Shiite regional influence stretching from Tehran to Beirut—the balance of power within Syria began shifting in favor of new formations, most of which are either local or backed by regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, or international players like the United States.
At this transitional moment, Syria is no longer the centralized state it was historically known to be. Instead, it now leans toward a fragmented model composed of spheres of influence administered by armed factions with varying ideological, ethnic, and sectarian backgrounds. This emerging reality can best be described as a military–political mosaic, where rival forces intersect in interests yet are compelled to coexist within the boundaries of a new status quo.
The current landscape does not feature a unified army, a central authority, or even a cohesive national vision. Instead, it consists of a map of active military entities functioning as de facto authorities, each with its own security, administrative, judicial, and economic systems. In effect, Syria has entered a phase of “post-state” or “multi-centered statehood.”
These forces can be categorized into three main backgrounds:
Local forces that emerged from popular uprisings or splinters of former factions—such as the New Syrian Army or the Druze factions in Sweida.
Regional powers playing direct roles on the ground, such as the Turkish military, which oversees opposition-held areas in the north.
International powers imposing their influence via limited military presence or logistical and political support, as the U.S. does through its backing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the international coalition.
This complexity is further deepened by identity-based local forces, such as the Druze in Sweida, who have successfully built an independent defensive force that refuses to engage in sectarian or political conflicts. This force presents a unique model of armed neutrality focused on protecting the local community without aligning with any regional agenda.
Understanding this changing landscape requires a detailed study of these forces in terms of their military capabilities, geographical distribution, funding sources, organizational structures, political narratives, and future trajectories. The military equation in Syria is no longer measured solely by the sophistication of weaponry, but also by the resilience, adaptability, and legitimacy each force can establish in its area of control.
This study seeks to present a detailed comparative analysis of the primary military actors in post-regime Syria in order to understand the mechanisms of control and to deconstruct the complex balance of forces shaping Syria’s present and potentially its future—be it federalism, partition, or a prolonged state of unresolved instability.
The New Military Landscape in Syria Is Shaped by Seven Main Forces:
1. The New Syrian Arab Army (Led by Ahmad al-Sharaa)
Formation: Emerged after Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly al-Jolani) split from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, establishing a new centralized opposition force with national ambitions.
Size and Deployment: Approximately 70,000 fighters in Damascus, Daraa, Homs, Hama, Quneitra, and parts of rural Sweida and southern Aleppo.
Capabilities:
Medium-level armament (captured armored vehicles, artillery, combat vehicles)
No air force
Organized security apparatus
Funding: Turkish–Qatari financing, with political support from certain international actors
Strengths: Moderate political discourse, good organization, field legitimacy
Challenges: Potential conflict with the SDF, Druze local rejection, tensions with secular factions
2. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Formation: A Kurdish–Arab coalition led by the YPG, supported by the United States.
Size and Deployment: Approximately 100,000 fighters in Hasakah, Raqqa, eastern Deir ez-Zor, Kobani, and Manbij.
Capabilities:
Medium American weaponry, armored vehicles, reconnaissance drones
Full U.S. air support
Funding: U.S. support and self-generated revenues from oil and taxation
Strengths: Military discipline, effective civil administration
Challenges: Arab–Kurdish tensions, Turkish threats, political isolation
3. Turkish-Backed Syrian National Army
Formation: Unified Syrian opposition factions under Turkish oversight
Size and Deployment: 45,000 fighters in al-Bab, Azaz, Afrin, Tal Abyad, Ras al-Ayn; many integrated into Damascus’s Ministry of Defense
Capabilities:
Light to medium Turkish arms, Turkish armored vehicles
Intelligence and logistical support from Turkish military
Funding: Fully funded by Turkey
Strengths: High mobility, limited air support
Challenges: Weak central command, factional chaos, human rights violations
4. Turkish Military Forces Inside Syria
Size: Approximately 18,000 troops
Deployment: Bases in Idlib, Azaz, Tal Abyad, Ras al-Ayn
Capabilities: Tanks, heavy artillery, Bayraktar drones, surveillance systems
Strengths: Advanced air coverage, intelligence dominance
Challenges: Sensitive engagement with SDF and U.S. forces, international scrutiny
5. International Coalition Forces (Led by the U.S.)
Size: About 1,500 American soldiers, plus British and French special forces
Deployment: Bases in Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, al-Shaddadi, al-Tanf
Capabilities: F-16 fighter jets, MQ-9 drones, special forces, satellite intelligence
Strengths: Technological and intelligence superiority
Challenges: Limited ground force, domestic U.S. pressure to exit mission
6. Druze Factions in Sweida
Formation: Local groups such as Men of Dignity, Counter-Terrorism Force, and a local military council
Size and Deployment: Around 20,000 fighters across Sweida province
Capabilities:
Light to medium arms, mountain-based defensive advantages, strong popular backing
Funding: Diaspora remittances, local resources
Leadership: Locally-based collective leadership
Strengths: Social cohesion, strategic terrain, relative neutrality
Challenges: Weak armament, political isolation, potential marginalization if Damascus reaches deals with Israel
Summary Comparison Table
| Force | Troop Size | Deployment | Armament | Funding Source | Strengths | Challenges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Syrian Army | 70,000 | Damascus, South, Homs | Medium | Turkey–Qatar | Alternative governance project | Tensions with SDF, secular rejection |
| SDF | 100,000 | East & Northeast Syria | US Medium | US, oil revenues | Civil administration, US air support | Arab–Kurd tensions, isolation |
| Syrian National Army | 45,000 | Northern Syria | Turkish Medium | Turkey | Turkish military support | Factionalism, human rights issues |
| Turkish Forces | 18,000 | Northern bases | Advanced Tech | Turkish state | Intelligence dominance | Potential clashes with SDF, US pressure |
| U.S.-led Coalition Forces | 1,500 | Eastern Syria | Air superiority | U.S. government | Intelligence & precision strikes | No strong ground presence |
| Druze Factions (Sweida) | 20,000 | Sweida | Light–Medium | Diaspora, locals | Social cohesion, neutrality | Political marginalization, weak firepower |
Final Conclusions
Post-regime Syria is now divided among multiple military–political projects, each reflecting a distinct regional, ethnic, or ideological identity.
Iran’s withdrawal has reshaped the power map, reestablishing Turkey–Qatar–U.S. as the main players.
The “New Syrian Army” is a strong candidate for leading a future political project but faces major internal and regional obstacles.
The Sweida model showcases the rise of local defensive identities—potentially inspiring similar formations elsewhere.
No decisive military solution is on the horizon; rather, cold balances of power may gradually pave the way for political compromises or a de facto long-term partition.
Post-regime Syria is now divided among multiple military–political projects, each reflecting a distinct regional, ethnic, or ideological identity.
Iran’s withdrawal has reshaped the power map, reestablishing Turkey–Qatar–U.S. as the main players.
The “New Syrian Army” is a strong candidate for leading a future political project but faces major internal and regional obstacles.
The Sweida model showcases the rise of local defensive identities—potentially inspiring similar formations elsewhere.
No decisive military solution is on the horizon; rather, cold balances of power may gradually pave the way for political compromises or a de facto long-term partition.
