Report prepared by: Geostrategic Studies Team
In the aftermath of the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Ahmad al-Shar’a, formerly known as "Abu Muhammad al-Julani," emerged as the transitional leader of Syria. Under his leadership, the “New Syrian Army” was formed, sparking widespread controversy due to the appointment of several foreign commanders—some with extremist backgrounds—to top military and security positions. This report examines the actors behind the recruitment of these individuals, focusing on Turkey's role, the international response, and the broader security implications.
Foreign Commanders in the New Syrian Army
Appointments in the New Syrian Army have shown a significant reliance on foreign commanders, including:
Abdul Rahman al-Khatib (Abu Hussein al-Urduni): A Jordanian doctor and a former senior figure in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), appointed as the head of the new Republican Guard.
Omar Muhammad Ghaftchi (Mukhtar al-Turki): A Turkish national and shadow commander within HTS, appointed as the commander of the Damascus military division.
Other commanders: Including an Albanian, a Tajik, and a Uyghur affiliated with the Turkistan Islamic Party, appointed to high-ranking military and security positions.
This reliance on foreign commanders raises questions about Shar’a’s motives in preferring them over local leadership, particularly in sensitive roles.
Turkey’s Role in Shaping the New Syrian Army
Turkey plays a central role in supporting and shaping the New Syrian Army, as evidenced by:
Military and logistical support: Ankara is reportedly considering building military bases in Syria and providing weapons and training to the New Syrian Army.
Political relations: Turkey declared its willingness to support Syria in “combating all forms of terrorism” and emphasized its strategic partnership with the new Syrian government.
Influence on appointments: Reports indicate that some foreign commanders, such as “Mukhtar al-Turki,” have maintained close ties with Turkish intelligence (MIT), reflecting Ankara’s influence in shaping the Army’s leadership structure.
This Turkish involvement raises concerns about Syria’s political independence during the transitional phase and the potential use of the New Syrian Army to advance Turkish regional interests.
International Response to the Recruitment of Foreign Extremists
United States:
The U.S. approved Syria’s plan to integrate around 3,500 former foreign fighters into the national army, provided the process remains transparent. These fighters, many of them Uyghurs previously aligned with HTS, are now seen as loyal to Syria’s new leadership following Assad’s removal. This marks a significant shift in U.S. policy since former President Donald Trump’s recent Middle East tour and the appointment of Thomas Barrack as special envoy to Syria.
While some Western states called for excluding foreign fighters due to security concerns, Syrian officials argued that integration is safer than risking renewed radicalization. The Turkistan Islamic Party, which included many Uyghur fighters, announced its dissolution and integration into Syria’s Ministry of Defense. However, China remains wary of their continued presence. Interim President Ahmad al-Shar’a has suggested these fighters could be granted citizenship in recognition of their role in toppling Assad.
China:
China expressed concern over the presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria and urged the Syrian government to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism in response to international concerns.
Risks of Recruiting Foreign Extremists
The recruitment of extremist elements into the New Syrian Army presents several risks:
Threat to regional security: The presence of extremist leaders in top positions could lead to the spread of radical ideologies to neighboring countries, threatening regional stability.
Undermining the transitional process: Shar’a’s reliance on foreign leaders may weaken the legitimacy of the transitional government and raise doubts about its commitment to building a democratic civil state.
Fueling internal strife: Favoring foreign commanders over local ones could generate tensions within the army, leading to divisions that threaten its cohesion.
Actors Supporting the Recruitment Process
The network supporting the recruitment of foreign extremist elements into the New Syrian Army consists of several international and regional actors with intersecting geopolitical interests, including:
1. Turkey – The Primary Regional Sponsor
Turkish Intelligence (MIT): MIT has long supported the Turkistan Islamic Party (Uyghur militants), providing training camps in Idlib and northern Aleppo. It offered political and logistical cover for their continued presence in HTS before facilitating their integration into the New Syrian Army.
Turkish Military: Provided security for the movement of foreign commanders across opposition-held areas and helped relocate many from Idlib to military positions in northeast Syria and around Aleppo.
Disguised Relief Organizations: Turkish humanitarian organizations operated as channels for funding and sheltering foreign fighters, particularly in refugee camps that later became recruitment and indoctrination centers.
2. Qatar – Financial and Diplomatic Support
Funding channels: Through charitable organizations and Salafi-linked foundations, Qatar financed numerous jihadist factions in the past, including the Turkistan Islamic Party. These funds were later redirected—covertly—to support the New Syrian Army, ensuring Salafi elements remained embedded in the core of the new regime.
Diplomatic leverage: Qatar used its close ties with the U.S. and Europe to promote the “new moderation” represented by the Shar’a government, despite the continued presence of former al-Qaeda leaders. This narrative facilitated a degree of implicit international acceptance of jihadist integration—provided they transform into regular army personnel.
3. United States – Strategic Tolerance
CIA: According to The Washington Post, U.S. intelligence was briefed in advance on plans to integrate up to 3,500 foreign fighters and approved the move on two conditions: international monitoring and a guarantee that these fighters would not threaten coalition interests.
CENTCOM: Preferred a unified military structure—even one including former extremists—over the risk of power vacuums that could enable a resurgence of ISIS or similar factions.
Political acceptance: Evident during Ahmad al-Shar’a’s visit to the U.S. and his meeting with Trump, alongside statements by special envoy Thomas Barrack praising the move as a “smart plan to defuse jihadist threats by reabsorbing them into state structures.”
4. Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Central Asian States
These countries provided indirect cover for their nationals in Syria—either by turning a blind eye or enabling religious-nationalist networks (like Tajik or Chechen channels) to help recruit fighters from former Soviet Islamic republics. Intelligence reports suggest extremist missionary networks received funding from wealthy Caucasian donors based in Istanbul and Doha.
5. Transnational Muslim Brotherhood Networks
These networks offered ideological and organizational support to facilitate the integration of former fighters into the state’s new institutions and built extensive relationships with influential Syrians within the transitional government.
The Web of Overlapping Interests
The recruitment of former extremists into the New Syrian Army is not the result of a single strategy but of intersecting interests among various actors:
Actor Strategic Interest
Turkey Securing long-term influence within Syria's new state structure
Qatar Ensuring allied Islamic figures remain in power
United States Stabilizing Syria, preventing state collapse, and countering Iran
Shar’a Government Building a loyal, obedient military after mistrust in local factions
Former Jihadists Gaining protection and impunity through state reintegration
Expanded Conclusion
The support received by Ahmad al-Shar’a’s government in recruiting former foreign fighters was not an isolated event. It stemmed from a complex web of international and regional alliances centered around one goal: ensuring the stability of the new regime in Damascus—regardless of the cost, including the incorporation of former extremists.
While this approach may appear functional from a geopolitical standpoint, it poses serious risks to the identity of Syria’s new state. Embedding ideologically driven individuals into the military and defense ministry revives the specter of an "ideologized state" and undermines the prospects for genuine democratic transformation.
If clear legal and institutional limits are not placed on this phenomenon, Syria could end up with a hybrid state—a faux "new civil government" cloaked in Salafi authoritarianism, legitimized by an international community that prioritizes “rigid stability” over true freedom.
Final Conclusion
Evidence suggests that the recruitment of foreign extremist fighters into Ahmad al-Shar’a’s New Syrian Army is supported and coordinated by regional powers—chiefly Turkey. This strategy raises serious concerns about Syria’s future security and stability and threatens to reignite cycles of violence and extremism at a time when the nation should be focused on reconstruction and national reconciliation.
Sources:
1. Reuters: U.S. approves integration of foreign jihadists into Syrian Army
2. The Washington Post: Shar’a faces challenge of foreign fighters who aided his rise
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