What Comes After the Suwayda Clashes?
A Strategic Outlook on Syria’s Future and the Emergence of a New Regime
Future events: The Geostrategic Studies Team
The violent clashes that erupted in Suwayda between local Druze communities and tribal forces aligned with the so-called "New Syrian Regime" under the leadership of Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) have reshuffled the Syrian scene once again. These were not mere military confrontations, but a pivotal episode in redrawing the map of Syria’s future. This report offers a wide-ranging strategic analysis that goes beyond the visible conflict to explore the deeper transformations: the shape of the post-war Syrian state, the role of minorities, regional balances, and the nature of external sponsorships.
The violent clashes that erupted in Suwayda between local Druze communities and tribal forces aligned with the so-called "New Syrian Regime" under the leadership of Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) have reshuffled the Syrian scene once again. These were not mere military confrontations, but a pivotal episode in redrawing the map of Syria’s future. This report offers a wide-ranging strategic analysis that goes beyond the visible conflict to explore the deeper transformations: the shape of the post-war Syrian state, the role of minorities, regional balances, and the nature of external sponsorships.
The Military Landscape: From Armed Conflict to a National Litmus Test
The conflict erupted after Julani-led forces — composed of tribal militias and Islamist formations — attempted to expand into southern Syria. What they faced in Suwayda, however, was a highly organized and community-based resistance. The Druze population, invoking a sense of historical dignity and autonomy, organized local defense under a unifying banner of civil resistance.
This wasn’t just a military battle; it was a test of political legitimacy. The resistance in Suwayda symbolized a categorical rejection of being absorbed into “Julani’s Syria,” sending a clear message: southern Syria will not be another proxy zone for authoritarian religious governance masquerading as national unity.
The conflict erupted after Julani-led forces — composed of tribal militias and Islamist formations — attempted to expand into southern Syria. What they faced in Suwayda, however, was a highly organized and community-based resistance. The Druze population, invoking a sense of historical dignity and autonomy, organized local defense under a unifying banner of civil resistance.
This wasn’t just a military battle; it was a test of political legitimacy. The resistance in Suwayda symbolized a categorical rejection of being absorbed into “Julani’s Syria,” sending a clear message: southern Syria will not be another proxy zone for authoritarian religious governance masquerading as national unity.
The "New Regime": Expansion or Rebranding?
The emerging regime under Julani is attempting to present itself as a national alternative to Assad’s exhausted central rule. It draws legitimacy from a mixture of counter-corruption rhetoric, selective modernization, and Islamist social control — all underpinned by Turkish protection and partial international toleration.
The regime’s tools include:
Sunni tribal alliances for social depth and territorial spread.
Domination of northern Syria, especially Idlib, as a centralized base.
Attempts to penetrate southern regions by inciting sectarian sentiment and exploiting fragmented loyalties.
Maintaining a dual discourse: anti-Assad yet not completely opposed to remnants of the former state.
The Suwayda confrontation exposed the cracks in this strategy, showing the limitations of extending an ideologically rigid governance model into pluralistic and historically autonomous regions.
The emerging regime under Julani is attempting to present itself as a national alternative to Assad’s exhausted central rule. It draws legitimacy from a mixture of counter-corruption rhetoric, selective modernization, and Islamist social control — all underpinned by Turkish protection and partial international toleration.
The regime’s tools include:
Sunni tribal alliances for social depth and territorial spread.
Domination of northern Syria, especially Idlib, as a centralized base.
Attempts to penetrate southern regions by inciting sectarian sentiment and exploiting fragmented loyalties.
Maintaining a dual discourse: anti-Assad yet not completely opposed to remnants of the former state.
The Suwayda confrontation exposed the cracks in this strategy, showing the limitations of extending an ideologically rigid governance model into pluralistic and historically autonomous regions.
III. Has the Syrian Central State Collapsed?
One of the most significant revelations of the recent events is the fragmentation of the concept of the centralized Syrian state. On the ground, there are at least four de facto authorities:
The new authority in Damascus led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra).
The Kurdish authority in the east and northeast, represented by the Autonomous Administration.
Local authorities in the south (particularly in Suwayda), building a grassroots democratic alternative.
The authority of mercenary groups affiliated with the Turkish occupation.
This fragmentation suggests that Syria is transitioning toward a pre-federal model or a form of non-statehood structured under temporary international and regional arrangements.
International Dynamics: Re-Engineering Syria
Though the Suwayda clashes appeared domestic, they stirred global attention. The U.S. made quiet diplomatic gestures supporting the Druze, while Israel sent implicit warnings regarding any jihadi proximity to its northern borders. Turkey, despite its official silence, seemed to condone Julani’s push southward as part of its broader strategy to exert pressure on Damascus and the Kurds.
Russia, curiously, remained passive, possibly reassessing its role or making room for a new geopolitical arrangement.
All these developments suggest that the so-called “New Syrian Regime” is part of a broader international project aimed at reshaping Syria — not through democracy or national unity, but through zones of influence and selective empowerment of acceptable proxies.
V. Future Scenarios: Four Strategic Possibilities
1. Consolidation of a De Facto Federal Model
With entrenched spheres of influence, Syria might drift into an unofficial federalism where regions manage their own affairs, and central coordination becomes symbolic.
2. Internal Fracture of the Julani Regime
If Julani overreaches, he risks alienating his tribal base and inciting internal dissent — especially if international pressure mounts.
3. South Syria Becomes a Proxy Battleground
Suwayda could become a theater for proxy wars between Israel and Iran, with potential for the emergence of hybrid militias backed by external actors.
Though the Suwayda clashes appeared domestic, they stirred global attention. The U.S. made quiet diplomatic gestures supporting the Druze, while Israel sent implicit warnings regarding any jihadi proximity to its northern borders. Turkey, despite its official silence, seemed to condone Julani’s push southward as part of its broader strategy to exert pressure on Damascus and the Kurds.
Russia, curiously, remained passive, possibly reassessing its role or making room for a new geopolitical arrangement.
All these developments suggest that the so-called “New Syrian Regime” is part of a broader international project aimed at reshaping Syria — not through democracy or national unity, but through zones of influence and selective empowerment of acceptable proxies.
V. Future Scenarios: Four Strategic Possibilities
1. Consolidation of a De Facto Federal Model
With entrenched spheres of influence, Syria might drift into an unofficial federalism where regions manage their own affairs, and central coordination becomes symbolic.
2. Internal Fracture of the Julani Regime
If Julani overreaches, he risks alienating his tribal base and inciting internal dissent — especially if international pressure mounts.
3. South Syria Becomes a Proxy Battleground
Suwayda could become a theater for proxy wars between Israel and Iran, with potential for the emergence of hybrid militias backed by external actors.
A Forced International Political Settlement
Should fragmentation become irreversible, major powers may push for a Dayton-style solution — an international accord that formalizes division and power-sharing.
VI. Israel’s Role: Quiet Influence and Red Lines
Israel’s involvement is strategic and indirect. Given the Druze population’s ties to Israel, and Suwayda’s proximity to the Golan Heights, Tel Aviv sees the area as a vital buffer zone.
Should fragmentation become irreversible, major powers may push for a Dayton-style solution — an international accord that formalizes division and power-sharing.
VI. Israel’s Role: Quiet Influence and Red Lines
Israel’s involvement is strategic and indirect. Given the Druze population’s ties to Israel, and Suwayda’s proximity to the Golan Heights, Tel Aviv sees the area as a vital buffer zone.
Israel’s recent actions indicate:
Unspoken diplomatic support for the Druze’s stand against Islamist expansion.
Warnings against the spread of HTS-style governance near its northern borders.
Media campaigns framing the Suwayda conflict as a defense of minorities against extremism.
Israel’s objectives are:
Preventing Iranian or Islamist encroachment near Golan.
Maintaining a buffer zone through local actors.
Avoiding the rise of a unified front that could challenge Israeli interests in the north.
In short, Israel is a silent partner in southern Syria’s strategic future.
VII. The U.S. Position: Between Containment and Fragment Management
Though less publicly involved, the U.S. is playing a calculated role:
Engagement with the Autonomous Administration continues, ensuring Kurdish leverage in the east.
Cautious outreach to Julani exists but remains unofficial and laden with preconditions.
Support for minority stability, especially in Suwayda, serves as a hedge against jihadist expansion.
Washington’s likely long-term goals:
Prevent a unified anti-American front (whether Islamist or pro-Iranian).
Promote a decentralized Syria that serves its anti-ISIS and anti-Iran strategies.
Ensure Israel’s security through control of southern dynamics.
Thus, the U.S. is not seeking to reunify Syria, but to reshape it into manageable zones with varying degrees of loyalty to Western interests.
Syria’s Next Map: Redrawn by Fire and Diplomacy
The cumulative effect of these developments is not a return to Syrian unity, but the emergence of a new, multi-centered Syria, forged through fire, negotiations, and proxy alliances. The Suwayda resistance was not just a defensive maneuver — it was a declaration that national identity cannot be rebuilt through coercion or ideology alone.
The country’s future may lie in a precarious balance of:
Local self-rule, aegional power sharing, and a fragile international consensus.
Unless a new inclusive political vision emerges from within or is externally imposed, Syria may remain a frozen conflict — fragmented, militarized, and endlessly negotiated.
Conclusion: Between New Social Contracts or Final Disintegration
Suwayda was not the end of a battle, but the beginning of a new political era. The current struggle is not merely about regime survival or opposition dynamics. It is about who gets to define the Syrian state — socially, ideologically, and geographically.
The "New Syrian Regime" may find footholds in tribal zones, but it cannot overwrite the pluralistic foundations of communities like the Druze, Kurds, or secular Alawites. The future lies not in further division or domination, but in crafting a new social contract — one that respects autonomy, balances power, and protects diversity.
Without such a vision, Syria’s future will continue to be dictated not by its people, but by those who fight proxy wars upon its ruins.
