Report prepared by: Geostrategic Studies Team
In the aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse and the consolidation of power by Ahmad al-Sharʿa (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), Syria has entered a transformative phase in which the intersection of regional and international interests plays a decisive role. This paper explores how Turkey, Qatar, and selective Western actors have shaped — and continue to influence — the new power configuration in Damascus. It argues that this emergent system represents neither a total victory of Islamist governance nor a purely nationalist revival, but rather a hybrid order born from geopolitical negotiation and controlled instability.
In the aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse and the consolidation of power by Ahmad al-Sharʿa (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), Syria has entered a transformative phase in which the intersection of regional and international interests plays a decisive role. This paper explores how Turkey, Qatar, and selective Western actors have shaped — and continue to influence — the new power configuration in Damascus. It argues that this emergent system represents neither a total victory of Islamist governance nor a purely nationalist revival, but rather a hybrid order born from geopolitical negotiation and controlled instability.
Introduction
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime marked the end of a long era defined by autocratic continuity and the beginning of a turbulent reconfiguration of authority in the Levant. Over the past eleven months, Ahmad al-Sharʿa, widely known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has emerged as the central figure commanding the political and military apparatus that now governs Damascus and much of former regime territory.
However, this transition was neither organic nor purely domestic. The new power equation in Syria is deeply embedded within a broader web of regional competition and external manipulation, particularly from Turkey, Qatar, and — albeit more discreetly — certain Western actors.
Turkey’s Strategic Calculus
Turkey’s involvement in the post-Assad landscape stems from its long-standing security doctrine centered on preventing Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. Ankara’s political accommodation with al-Jolani’s administration reflects a pragmatic repositioning rather than an ideological alignment.
By providing intelligence coordination, logistical backing, and economic facilitation, Turkey has effectively woven the new Syrian authority into its regional architecture. This alignment allows Ankara to maintain a forward buffer zone against Kurdish expansion while simultaneously ensuring that the emergent Syrian leadership remains dependent on Turkish channels for survival.
In Ankara’s strategic vision, al-Jolani’s Damascus serves as both a containment mechanism and a bargaining chip — a controlled center of power that prevents the crystallization of alternative forces, whether Kurdish or Western-backed, capable of shifting the regional balance of power.
Qatar’s Ideological and Strategic Leverage
Qatar’s influence is rooted in its historical sponsorship of Sunni Islamist movements across the Middle East. Its approach to the new Syrian order combines ideological sympathy with geopolitical calculation. Through financial patronage, humanitarian outreach, and extensive media coverage, Doha has sought to legitimize al-Jolani’s authority as a stabilizing Sunni alternative in a fractured regional landscape.
Unlike Turkey, Qatar’s calculus is less about territorial security and more about sustaining ideological relevance and political leverage. By embedding itself within the new governance structures, Qatar seeks to extend its soft power — projecting the narrative that Islamist-inspired governance can coexist with international legitimacy if it demonstrates stability and moderation.
The Ambiguous Role of Western Actors
While Western powers have refrained from publicly recognizing al-Jolani’s administration, multiple intelligence leaks and policy signals indicate the gradual normalization of quiet engagement. For several European and American policymakers, the emergence of a consolidated authority in Damascus — even one with Islamist origins — presents an opportunity to counterbalance both Iranian entrenchment and Russian ambitions in the region.
Covert dialogue, limited security coordination, and exploratory diplomatic overtures reflect a growing Western acceptance of the post-Assad reality. The new Damascus is increasingly viewed not as a threat, but as a potential stabilizer within a controlled framework of influence — one that could eventually serve Western interests in counterterrorism and migration management.
Conclusion
The Syrian political order that has taken shape under Ahmad al-Sharʿa is not a spontaneous revolutionary product but the outcome of calculated regional engineering. Turkey’s security-driven pragmatism, Qatar’s ideological investment, and Western geopolitical adaptation have converged to produce a fragile yet functional hybrid system.
This “new Damascus” represents a paradox: it embodies both the defeat of the old Baathist state and the survival of regional dependency. The balance of influence that sustains al-Jolani’s authority ensures that Syria’s sovereignty remains conditional — shaped by the competing ambitions of Ankara, Doha, and selective Western capitals.
The long-term sustainability of this model will depend on whether the new power structure can transform external dependency into internal legitimacy — a challenge that may define the next decade of Syrian politics.
