Special/Geostrategic Studies Team
The outcomes of the Syrian crisis suggest many dramatic shifts in the course of confrontations, solutions, and alignments, especially the new rapprochements between the warring parties, and the divergences resulting from opposing interests. The developments prompt us to read the scene by anticipating the events.
(1)
It will be agreed to open the gates between the areas of the Syrian regime and the areas of the Turkish occupation, with the process of building adaptation between the regime and the armed groups of the opposition, under Turkish-Russian supervision, with the profits and interests from the gates going to four parties, one for the Russians and another for the regime, in addition to distributing the second half to the Turks. And a small section for the Syrian mercenary groups that will remain in control of the interior regions in coordination with the security and military operations room that has currently been established between Syrian and Turkish intelligence, under Iraqi sponsorship and Russian supervision.
( 2 )
The Turkish state will threaten the Autonomous Administration areas, on the basis of launching a new military operation, and this may be before the US presidential elections, due to the Americans’ preoccupation with the presidential elections and the intense competition that is getting stronger as the elections approach.
This process will push the Russians to intervene as an intermediary between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian regime, on the basis of the redeployment of the regime’s forces in the remaining border areas, in exchange for stopping the Turkish operation. Thus, Assad’s forces will regain control over all border crossings, whether actually or formally, without Intervention in the Autonomous Administration areas administratively and militarily in the first stage.
The Samalka-Fish Khabour gateway with the Kurdistan Region may be outside the plan due to the American presence, or it may be being restricted by Turkey. We would not be surprised if it was closed by the Kurdistan Region under Turkish pressure to accept the return of regime forces to the region.
( 3 )
The Americans will have two options, not a third: either take the full decision to support the current situation in the regions of northern and eastern Syria, or abandon them completely in favor of the Russians. Most likely, if Donald Trump returns to the presidency of the United States, he may enter into a deal with the Turks in which the Turks will abandon the Russians. In exchange for the American abandonment of the Autonomous Administration areas, here comes the Russian-Iranian role, which will be the logical alternative to the Americans in dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces. The Turks will effectively lose any agreements with the Syrian regime, in addition to Russian-Iranian support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party inside Turkey, and the acceptance of the Syrian regime. Special status for the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration.
( 4 )
The Iranians cannot be excluded from the Syrian scene at all, and no matter how much there is Russian-Iranian competition to control the entrances and paths of the Syrian situation, the size of the Iranian presence is far greater than the Russian influence. Even the Americans and Israelis when they bomb Iranian sites in Syria, but with the help of the Russians, and the most likely possibility is that The Russians have and continue to provide the Israelis with Iranian presence sites, in order to mitigate its presence in favor of clear Russian expansion.
( 5 )
The Arab countries, led by the Gulf states, are fully aware of the extent of the contradictions, balance, and multiple paths controlled by the intervening forces in Syria, and that the loss of presence in Syria will constitute in the future a real threat to the security and stability of the Arabian Gulf, because Iranian control means placing a Shiite belt around the Sunni Arab Gulf, not Especially since the Western countries, led by the United States of America and recently the Russians, are very keen on Iran continuing as a major actor in creating conflicts, confrontations and chaos, which in turn helps in producing new control markets within the Middle East. Therefore, Iran cannot be abandoned in heating up the public scene. Perhaps the Iraqi experience after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the emergence of Iran as the largest victor and controller may be repeated in Syria if the United States of America leaves the region, because the scale of Iranian expansion at the level of tool manufacturing is much greater than the Russian strategy of deep presence inside the Middle East from the Syrian gate.
Therefore, we believe that the Arab Gulf will have a path through relations with the regime, in addition to being present with the coalition forces in relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces.
The Arab Gulf also realizes that the Houthi tool in Yemen helps Iran establish its presence inside Syria, meaning evacuating Syria for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia helps ease the burdens of the confrontations with the Houthis in Yemen, and large parts of these dramatic interactions have already occurred and resulted from the restoration of parts of relations. Between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
( 6 )
At this stage, the Kingdom of Jordan may be concerned with its border security with Syria and ending the drug smuggling crisis. Although Jordan receives significant assistance from the Arab Gulf in controlling the borders, the return of the regime to the Arab incubator, even if it is formal, will partially help in reducing the introduction of Captagon into the Arabian Gulf through the gate. Jordan.
Mid-July 2024
