by Balan Kadro / Member of the Analysis Team at the Geostrategy Studies Network
The death of Fethullah Gulen, the Turkish cleric and opposition figure residing in the United States, may open the door to some changes in dynamics between Ankara and Washington. However, analyzing Turkish-American relations must take into account several key issues beyond this individual. Relations between the two countries have been strained for several years and are influenced by a range of strategic, economic, and political factors. Gulen was part of these issues, but not the sole component, and therefore his death will not directly resolve all tensions or lead to an immediate improvement in relations.
1. Fethullah Gulen and Previous Tensions:
Gulen has been a point of contention between Turkey and the U.S. since the failed 2016 coup attempt, for which the Turkish government blamed him and his movement. Turkey repeatedly demanded his extradition, but Washington refused based on U.S. legal standards requiring strong evidence for extradition. This issue added tension to bilateral relations, but the underlying problem is far deeper than just Gulen. While his death may remove one of these obstacles, there are major strategic issues that overshadow the bilateral relationship.
2. The Kurdish Issue in Syria: The Core Problem:
The primary issue obstructing the improvement of Turkish-American relations is the U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey considers an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the U.S. While Washington views the Kurds as a key ally in the fight against ISIS, Turkey sees this support as a direct threat to its national security, fearing it could lead to the establishment of an independent or semi-independent Kurdish entity along its southern border.
Although the U.S. has attempted to ease Turkish concerns through steps like temporary buffer zones or limiting certain weapons provided to the Kurds, American support for the YPG persists. Strategically, Washington sees the armed Kurdish presence in northeastern Syria as a tool for balancing power dynamics in Syria and the region, as well as a means to contain Iranian and Russian influence.
Thus, even if the Gulen issue ends with his death, U.S. support for the Kurds will remain the primary factor impeding improved relations. This issue is fundamentally linked to the U.S.’s broader strategic vision for the Middle East, not just a bilateral dispute with Turkey.
3. Wider Geopolitical Dimensions:
Beyond the Kurdish issue, other geopolitical factors deepen the divide between the two countries:
Turkey’s Closer Ties with Russia: Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system dealt a significant blow to relations with Washington. The U.S. viewed this move as a threat to NATO security, resulting in Turkey’s removal from the F-35 fighter jet program and the imposition of sanctions under the CAATSA law. While Ankara has tried to balance its relations between the West and Russia, this step sent clear signals to Washington that Turkey is shifting away from the Western bloc.
Eastern Mediterranean Policy: Turkey’s dispute with Greece and Cyprus over gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is another source of tension, with the U.S. supporting Greece’s and Cyprus’ rights to exclusive economic zones in the region.
Turkey’s Role in Libya and Azerbaijan: Turkey’s military interventions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh (supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia) have attracted U.S. attention. While not major points of contention, these interventions demonstrate Turkey’s ambitions for a greater role in areas traditionally aligned with U.S. interests.
4. Economic Interests:
Economically, tensions also arise from tariffs, protectionist policies, and U.S. sanctions on Turkey in connection with the 2018 crisis over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Although the crisis was resolved, it highlighted the fragility of the economic relationship between the two nations.
5. Possibility of Improvement:
After Gulen's death, there may be an opportunity to improve relations, but in the short and medium term,, but in the short to medium term, the Kurdish issue will remain dominant. Ankara and Washington may attempt to ease tensions through renewed negotiations over spheres of influence in Syria or by enhancing cooperation on other tactical issues such as counterterrorism or trade. However, as long as U.S. support for the Kurds continues, Turkey will feel it is facing a serious national security threat, limiting any significant rapprochement.
6. Future Expectations:
The most likely scenario is the continuation of strained Turkish-American relations, with intermittent efforts to improve cooperation in specific areas such as NATO or energy issues. However, the core strategic issues will persist and will hinder any full rapprochement.
Turkey remains a vital player in the region, seeking greater autonomy in its foreign policy, which at times leads to clashes with U.S. interests. On the other hand, the U.S. views Ankara as a difficult but essential ally within NATO and in countering Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, Gulen’s death will not be sufficient to significantly improve Turkish-American relations. Deeper issues, such as U.S. support for the Kurds in Syria and Turkey’s relations with Russia, will remain central in shaping the course of the bilateral relationship.
