Report prepared by: Geostrategic Studies Team
The al-Shar’ Government Between the Nightmare of Integration and the Coercion of Ideology: Could the Inclusion of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces Mark the End of the Salafist Emirate Dream in Damascus?
Since Damascus shifted under the rule of the al-Shar’ authority led by al-Jolani, the Syrian capital has turned into the center of a political experiment unlike anything in the country’s modern history. After the collapse of the Ba’athist-Assad regime that dominated Syria for decades, the country did not simply fall into a vacuum but rather moved from one form of authoritarianism—Ba’athist nationalism—into a new structure shaped by a hybrid Salafist framework. This authority seeks to present itself as a transitional option, even a state-like administration, yet at its core it remains ideologically tethered to the project of an Islamic emirate. While it attempts to build functional state institutions, its legitimacy is grounded in a narrow Sunni-Salafist reference point, inherently incompatible with any vision of a pluralistic nation—especially the vision represented by the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who today stand as a central actor in shaping Syria’s future.
The critical question now is whether the al-Shar’ government dares to accept a genuine integration of the Kurds and the SDF into state institutions, or whether it remains captive to its rigid ideological framework that perceives pluralism as an existential threat. The matter extends far beyond simple military coordination or power-sharing; it cuts to the heart of how the Syrian state’s identity is defined, and how citizenship and sovereignty can be reimagined on the basis of genuine partnership among its components. Here lies the essence of the fear, for real integration would dismantle the very foundation upon which the al-Shar’ authority has been constructed: the dream of a Salafist emirate, with Damascus as its center, anchored in religious exclusivity and hostile to diverse identities.
The Kurds are no longer a marginal or suppressible community as they were in past decades. Their experience in North and East Syria—through the SDF and the Autonomous Administration—has created a new political and military reality that is difficult to ignore. This reality is built on recognizing languages, ensuring cultural rights, empowering women in governance, and establishing relatively democratic local institutions. Thus, even the idea of integrating the SDF into Syria’s political and military institutions would mean bringing these values into the heart of the state itself. For the al-Shar’ authority, this is not a minor administrative challenge but an existential nightmare: such integration would erode and eventually eliminate the emirate dream at the core of its project.
The government in Damascus today operates on a fragile balance: projecting pragmatism and administrative competence to both local and international audiences, while simultaneously preserving a rigid Salafist discourse to satisfy its ideological base. The integration question exposes this contradiction in its starkest form. How can a regime that grounds itself in religious exclusivity accept a Kurdish identity founded upon language, culture, and national rights? How can a power structure that centralizes sharia as its source of legitimacy acknowledge a political project that institutionalizes gender equality and grants minorities a meaningful role in governance?
This contradiction places the al-Shar’ government in a historical paradox. By rejecting integration, it risks repeating the same cycle of exclusion and conflict that has defined Syria’s political history, inevitably leading to renewed fragmentation. Yet by accepting integration, it would have to abandon its founding ideological premises, effectively dismantling the dream of a Salafist emirate. Integration, therefore, is both impossible and unavoidable: impossible through the lens of ideology, yet unavoidable through the imperatives of political reality.
Regional dynamics deepen the crisis further. Should Damascus integrate the SDF, it would inevitably face direct confrontation with Turkey, which regards any recognition of Kurdish autonomy or power as a threat to its own internal order. At the same time, refusing integration would place Damascus at odds with the United States and its Western allies, who see the SDF as a central partner in the fight against terrorism. Thus, the al-Shar’ government finds itself trapped between contradictory pressures: the need for international legitimacy that compels openness to the Kurds, and the regional alliances that dictate hostility toward them.
The fundamental question, then, is not merely whether Damascus fears integrating the Kurds and the SDF, but whether this government can transcend its own ideological DNA to evolve into a genuine national state. Syria’s political history since independence has been one of tension between exclusionary projects—whether nationalist or religious—and the stubbornly pluralistic reality of its society. Every attempt to enforce a singular model of identity has ended in conflict and collapse. Today, the al-Shar’ authority seems poised to repeat this historical cycle, insisting on a Salafist project in a diverse society, while standing before an unavoidable test: recognizing the Kurds and the SDF as full national partners.
Integration, therefore, is not a technical policy question but a litmus test for whether Damascus can transform into a truly national capital. Rejecting it will condemn the city to remain imprisoned within the Salafist emirate vision, a vision doomed by its own exclusivity. Accepting it, however, would initiate a difficult transformation, but one that alone offers the possibility of saving the Syrian state from fragmentation. What the al-Shar’ government fears most is not the SDF’s military capability, but the ideas they embody: pluralism, equality, partnership. If these ideas penetrate Damascus, they will forever extinguish the emirate dream that depends on denial and exclusion.
The struggle over integration is thus, at its core, a struggle over identity and existence. It is a contest between two visions of Syria: a closed, monolithic Salafist emirate envisioned by the al-Shar’ government, and an open, pluralistic state envisioned by the Kurds, the SDF, and other components of society. The outcome of this struggle will not only determine the shape of the Syrian state but also redefine Damascus’s place in history. Will it remain a hostage to the Salafist emirate dream, or will it emerge as a national capital reflective of Syria’s irreducible plurality? The answer to this question will script the next chapter of Syrian history and decide the fate of the al-Shar’ government and the fragile dream it clings to in the shadow of the integration nightmare.
The al-Shar’ Government Between the Nightmare of Integration and the Coercion of Ideology: Could the Inclusion of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces Mark the End of the Salafist Emirate Dream in Damascus?
Since Damascus shifted under the rule of the al-Shar’ authority led by al-Jolani, the Syrian capital has turned into the center of a political experiment unlike anything in the country’s modern history. After the collapse of the Ba’athist-Assad regime that dominated Syria for decades, the country did not simply fall into a vacuum but rather moved from one form of authoritarianism—Ba’athist nationalism—into a new structure shaped by a hybrid Salafist framework. This authority seeks to present itself as a transitional option, even a state-like administration, yet at its core it remains ideologically tethered to the project of an Islamic emirate. While it attempts to build functional state institutions, its legitimacy is grounded in a narrow Sunni-Salafist reference point, inherently incompatible with any vision of a pluralistic nation—especially the vision represented by the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who today stand as a central actor in shaping Syria’s future.
The critical question now is whether the al-Shar’ government dares to accept a genuine integration of the Kurds and the SDF into state institutions, or whether it remains captive to its rigid ideological framework that perceives pluralism as an existential threat. The matter extends far beyond simple military coordination or power-sharing; it cuts to the heart of how the Syrian state’s identity is defined, and how citizenship and sovereignty can be reimagined on the basis of genuine partnership among its components. Here lies the essence of the fear, for real integration would dismantle the very foundation upon which the al-Shar’ authority has been constructed: the dream of a Salafist emirate, with Damascus as its center, anchored in religious exclusivity and hostile to diverse identities.
The Kurds are no longer a marginal or suppressible community as they were in past decades. Their experience in North and East Syria—through the SDF and the Autonomous Administration—has created a new political and military reality that is difficult to ignore. This reality is built on recognizing languages, ensuring cultural rights, empowering women in governance, and establishing relatively democratic local institutions. Thus, even the idea of integrating the SDF into Syria’s political and military institutions would mean bringing these values into the heart of the state itself. For the al-Shar’ authority, this is not a minor administrative challenge but an existential nightmare: such integration would erode and eventually eliminate the emirate dream at the core of its project.
The government in Damascus today operates on a fragile balance: projecting pragmatism and administrative competence to both local and international audiences, while simultaneously preserving a rigid Salafist discourse to satisfy its ideological base. The integration question exposes this contradiction in its starkest form. How can a regime that grounds itself in religious exclusivity accept a Kurdish identity founded upon language, culture, and national rights? How can a power structure that centralizes sharia as its source of legitimacy acknowledge a political project that institutionalizes gender equality and grants minorities a meaningful role in governance?
This contradiction places the al-Shar’ government in a historical paradox. By rejecting integration, it risks repeating the same cycle of exclusion and conflict that has defined Syria’s political history, inevitably leading to renewed fragmentation. Yet by accepting integration, it would have to abandon its founding ideological premises, effectively dismantling the dream of a Salafist emirate. Integration, therefore, is both impossible and unavoidable: impossible through the lens of ideology, yet unavoidable through the imperatives of political reality.
Regional dynamics deepen the crisis further. Should Damascus integrate the SDF, it would inevitably face direct confrontation with Turkey, which regards any recognition of Kurdish autonomy or power as a threat to its own internal order. At the same time, refusing integration would place Damascus at odds with the United States and its Western allies, who see the SDF as a central partner in the fight against terrorism. Thus, the al-Shar’ government finds itself trapped between contradictory pressures: the need for international legitimacy that compels openness to the Kurds, and the regional alliances that dictate hostility toward them.
The fundamental question, then, is not merely whether Damascus fears integrating the Kurds and the SDF, but whether this government can transcend its own ideological DNA to evolve into a genuine national state. Syria’s political history since independence has been one of tension between exclusionary projects—whether nationalist or religious—and the stubbornly pluralistic reality of its society. Every attempt to enforce a singular model of identity has ended in conflict and collapse. Today, the al-Shar’ authority seems poised to repeat this historical cycle, insisting on a Salafist project in a diverse society, while standing before an unavoidable test: recognizing the Kurds and the SDF as full national partners.
Integration, therefore, is not a technical policy question but a litmus test for whether Damascus can transform into a truly national capital. Rejecting it will condemn the city to remain imprisoned within the Salafist emirate vision, a vision doomed by its own exclusivity. Accepting it, however, would initiate a difficult transformation, but one that alone offers the possibility of saving the Syrian state from fragmentation. What the al-Shar’ government fears most is not the SDF’s military capability, but the ideas they embody: pluralism, equality, partnership. If these ideas penetrate Damascus, they will forever extinguish the emirate dream that depends on denial and exclusion.
The struggle over integration is thus, at its core, a struggle over identity and existence. It is a contest between two visions of Syria: a closed, monolithic Salafist emirate envisioned by the al-Shar’ government, and an open, pluralistic state envisioned by the Kurds, the SDF, and other components of society. The outcome of this struggle will not only determine the shape of the Syrian state but also redefine Damascus’s place in history. Will it remain a hostage to the Salafist emirate dream, or will it emerge as a national capital reflective of Syria’s irreducible plurality? The answer to this question will script the next chapter of Syrian history and decide the fate of the al-Shar’ government and the fragile dream it clings to in the shadow of the integration nightmare.
