Foresight of Events – Geostrategic Studies Team
The meeting between Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Washington (late September 2025) revived warmth in Ankara–Washington relations. It was accompanied by a public statement from Trump praising Erdoğan and referring to him in terms that implied he was “responsible for Syria,” according to media-circulated quotes. This U.S.–Turkish rapprochement opened a new window for Ankara to redesign its policies toward northeastern Syria (the areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces – SDF).
In this article, I analyze Ankara’s motivations, possible military and political options against the SDF, the constraints it may face, and potential reactions from the SDF and regional actors — with a clear distinction between verified information and analytical projections based on available data.
The meeting between Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Washington (late September 2025) revived warmth in Ankara–Washington relations. It was accompanied by a public statement from Trump praising Erdoğan and referring to him in terms that implied he was “responsible for Syria,” according to media-circulated quotes. This U.S.–Turkish rapprochement opened a new window for Ankara to redesign its policies toward northeastern Syria (the areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces – SDF).
In this article, I analyze Ankara’s motivations, possible military and political options against the SDF, the constraints it may face, and potential reactions from the SDF and regional actors — with a clear distinction between verified information and analytical projections based on available data.
Political Context and the Operational Push Behind Turkish Policy
First, the outcomes of the Washington meeting should be read within a series of issues: the armament file (the F-35 dispute and other arms deals), Turkey’s pursuit of regional diplomatic legitimacy (a role in the Gaza settlement and meetings with regional leaders), and Erdoğan’s desire to convert diplomatic gains into practical influence on Syrian ground. Statements from both sides after the meeting spoke of broad understandings on regional issues, while media reports noted Syria was part of the talks.
This context suggests Ankara may feel it now has — at least tangentially — greater room to maneuver regarding its security priorities (especially the “threat” it perceives from PKK/YPG extensions) if it senses U.S. acceptance or at least lack of active opposition.
Ankara’s Drivers for Targeting the SDF Now
Domestic Security: Security concerns rooted in Turkish agencies’ perception of SDF elements as extensions of the PKK. This argument is routinely used to justify cross-border operations.
Geopolitical/Diplomatic Gains: Leveraging rapprochement with Washington to demand concessions (revival of defense programs like the F-35 or easing sanctions) in exchange for concessions in Syria.
Weakening Kurdish Self-Administration: Undermining the autonomous Kurdish project in northeastern Syria and reshaping the balance of power in Ankara’s and its local allies’ favor.
Practical Scenarios for Ankara Against the SDF (from Likely to Less Likely)
A. Limited and Ongoing Border Operations (most likely):
Limited air/artillery strikes, raids by special forces or drones, and intensified reliance on Syrian National Army factions under Ankara’s influence to conduct limited incursions along the border. Turkey has pursued this pattern several times since 2016 (Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring). The historical precedent supports this scenario, which applies pressure without large-scale occupation.
B. Pushing Damascus to Launch an Operation Against the SDF with Turkish Support (increasingly likely):
Reports and Turkish statements point to Ankara’s readiness to support a broad Syrian regime move against the SDF if the latter refuses to disarm or integrate into state institutions. Analysts note a potential for “tactical cooperation” — not necessarily a long-term alliance — between Ankara and Damascus against their shared priority of combating the Kurdish armed project. This would give Ankara cover (Syrian sovereignty) while reducing direct political costs.
C. Broader Ground Operations/Limited Occupation (high risk):
A wider ground campaign deep into SDF territory is technically possible but carries high political and international costs (U.S./Western backlash, possible isolation, impacts on defense deals). Erdoğan knows such an incursion could provoke congressional opposition in Washington or sanctions that threaten Turkey’s economic/strategic goals.
D. Intelligence Warfare and Political/Economic Pressure:
Extensive intelligence efforts to fracture SDF leadership, exploit internal divisions, support local Arab groups to escalate against the SDF, and diplomatic campaigns to delegitimize the SDF internationally. A lower-cost, long-term strategy.
E. Joint Operations with Regional/International Partners (Russia/Iran/Local actors):
Limited coordination with players like Russia or facilitating leadership exits/power reconfigurations could be part of Ankara’s play if political arrangements with Damascus and Moscow materialize.
Core Constraints Preventing a Decisive Option
International Political Costs: Confrontation with Washington/Congress could undermine Turkey’s gains (defense deals, economic concessions). There are limits to U.S. tolerance for large-scale Turkish campaigns in Syria.
Operational Complexity on the Ground: SDF-held areas are not demographically homogenous; local Arab populations and minorities mean operations could face local resistance, security vacuums, or ISIS resurgence.
SDF’s Partial International Support: U.S. protection may be fragile, but a strong Turkish offensive could trigger renewed international attention and destabilize the region. Analysts point to political integration between the SDF and Damascus as one potential de-escalation path, though complex.
How the SDF Might Respond – Realistic Adaptation Strategies
Accelerating Political Solutions (integration/local governance deals): International pressure exists to fold the SDF into Syrian state structures, though resisted internally due to fears over Kurdish rights.
Bolstering Local Defense and Counterattack Readiness: Enhancing irregular military structures, fortifying urban positions, and building broader local alliances.
Diplomatic Hedging: Diversifying security guarantees (U.S., Russia, Europe) and seeking regional arrangements to deter Turkish moves.
Preparing for “Damascus with Turkish Backing” Scenario: Readiness for containment and rapid political repositioning in case of regime-Turkish joint offensives.
Expected Scenarios and Probability Assessments (Analytical Estimate)
Border/limited operations + sustained pressure (diplomatic/economic):
Probability: Highest (≈50–65%).
Summary: Ankara continues mixing limited cross-border strikes, symbolic operations, and non-military pressure, while avoiding costly large-scale occupation.
Pushing Damascus into a major move against the SDF (tactical cooperation):
Probability: Medium to high (≈25–40%).
Summary: Turkey nudges Damascus to act militarily, while supporting with logistics, intelligence, and diplomatic cover.
Full-scale Turkish invasion/occupation:
Probability: Low (≈5–15%).
Summary: Possible under sudden shifts (collapse of U.S. position, green light from a third party, internal SDF crisis), but highly costly.
Timeline and Escalation Pathways
Near-term (weeks–months): Symbolic statements, diplomatic pressure, limited strikes, secret understandings with Damascus, media campaigns.
Medium-term (months–1 year): Limited ground incursions with Damascus’ help, political settlement efforts, implementation of training/equipment deals.
Long-term/emergency: Full-scale invasion if the strategic environment shifts drastically.
Secondary Risks to Monitor
Local resistance networks or ISIS resurgence amid security vacuums.
Large-scale displacement and humanitarian crises triggering international intervention.
Shifts in regional power balances (Russian–Turkish cooperation or disputes) accelerating or stalling scenarios.
Conclusion – Expanded Insights
The Washington meeting gave Ankara new diplomatic leeway it may convert into operational pressure against the SDF. Yet any full-scale military venture faces a difficult equation: short-term territorial/political gains vs. long-term international costs. Most likely, Ankara will pursue a calibrated mix — sustained diplomatic/economic pressure, limited border operations, and nudging Damascus into heavier lifting. This blend maximizes gains while minimizing direct exposure, leaving Ankara flexible to escalate or retreat depending on U.S. and international signals.
Early Indicators to Track Closely
Washington’s official messaging: Do U.S. statements lean toward supporting the SDF, or tolerating more pressure on them?
Turkish–Syrian agreements (training/arms deals): If Ankara openly equips or trains Syrian units, Damascus-backed action grows likelier.
Cross-border strikes/incidents: An uptick in size/frequency signals a shift from symbolic pressure to operational tactics.
Syrian troop mobilization east of the Euphrates: New deployments or units formed for operations.
Regional power positions (Russia/Iran/Israel): Any major stance shift redraws red lines in the theater.
