Ghadi Eisenkot’s Strategy for Addressing the Issues Handled
by Netanyahu If He Wins the Election
A Change of Leadership Does Not Necessarily Mean a Change in Israel’s Security DoctrineGeoStrategic Studies Team
The Israeli election held on October 27, 2026, has raised the possibility of a transfer of power from Benjamin Netanyahu to Ghadi Eisenkot, the former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and leader of the Yashar party. However, the significance of this possibility lies not merely in a change of prime minister, but in the approach Eisenkot might adopt toward the security, military, and regional issues that have dominated Netanyahu’s tenure. These include Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as relations with the United States and Europe and the internal political balance within Israel. Any assessment remains conditional on the actual formation of a government and the policies it ultimately adopts, since preliminary election projections alone cannot determine who will govern or whether a new administration will be able to implement its commitments.
It would be misleading to assume that Eisenkot’s arrival in the prime minister’s office would automatically produce a fundamental transformation of Israel’s security doctrine. Eisenkot comes from the military establishment and served as IDF Chief of Staff from 2015 to 2019. His background places him within a strategic tradition that emphasizes threat assessment, the balance of power, and the use of military force when considered necessary. The potential differences between him and Netanyahu are more likely to emerge in how military power is employed, how military operations are connected to political objectives, how international alliances are managed, and how the consequences of war for Israeli society and state institutions are addressed. The central question, therefore, is not whether Eisenkot would abandon the instruments of force used by Netanyahu, but whether he would employ them within a strategy that defines its objectives and desired outcomes more clearly.
The Israeli election held on October 27, 2026, has raised the possibility of a transfer of power from Benjamin Netanyahu to Ghadi Eisenkot, the former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and leader of the Yashar party. However, the significance of this possibility lies not merely in a change of prime minister, but in the approach Eisenkot might adopt toward the security, military, and regional issues that have dominated Netanyahu’s tenure. These include Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as relations with the United States and Europe and the internal political balance within Israel. Any assessment remains conditional on the actual formation of a government and the policies it ultimately adopts, since preliminary election projections alone cannot determine who will govern or whether a new administration will be able to implement its commitments.
It would be misleading to assume that Eisenkot’s arrival in the prime minister’s office would automatically produce a fundamental transformation of Israel’s security doctrine. Eisenkot comes from the military establishment and served as IDF Chief of Staff from 2015 to 2019. His background places him within a strategic tradition that emphasizes threat assessment, the balance of power, and the use of military force when considered necessary. The potential differences between him and Netanyahu are more likely to emerge in how military power is employed, how military operations are connected to political objectives, how international alliances are managed, and how the consequences of war for Israeli society and state institutions are addressed. The central question, therefore, is not whether Eisenkot would abandon the instruments of force used by Netanyahu, but whether he would employ them within a strategy that defines its objectives and desired outcomes more clearly.
Iran: Between Military Pressure and Avoiding an Open-Ended War
Iran is likely to remain one of the principal challenges facing any Israeli government led by Eisenkot. Both men regard Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities, and network of regional allies as major strategic concerns for Israeli security. Their potential differences, however, may lie in their assessment of the means required to confront these challenges and the limits beyond which military escalation becomes counterproductive. Netanyahu has presented the confrontation with Iran as an existential struggle requiring sustained military pressure. Eisenkot, by contrast, has been associated with a more cautious assessment of the possibility of overthrowing the Iranian regime through military force, alongside a potential preference for combining economic pressure, diplomacy, intelligence, and targeted military action when deemed necessary.
If Eisenkot becomes prime minister, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is likely to remain a central Israeli objective. However, the pursuit of that objective could become more closely tied to clearly defined and achievable outcomes, while seeking to avoid an open-ended war whose consequences would be difficult to control. His government might seek closer coordination with Washington on intelligence, defence, and economic pressure, while retaining the military option against facilities or capabilities regarded as direct threats. Such an approach would not necessarily signify an abandonment of deterrence or a retreat from the use of force. Rather, it could represent an attempt to place military pressure within a broader political strategy instead of allowing escalation to become an end in itself.
Relations with the United States would be decisive in this regard. Israel depends heavily on American military, technological, and political support, but that dependence can also constrain its freedom to act unilaterally during periods of escalation. Eisenkot might seek to reorganise this relationship around advance coordination and clearly identified shared interests, while preserving a degree of independence in Israeli decision-making. Nevertheless, disagreements with Washington over Iran, the timing of military strikes, or the conditions required to end a war could become an early test of his ability to reconcile Israeli security ambitions with international constraints.
Gaza: Military Objectives and the Dilemma of the Day After
Eisenkot’s potential premiership would not necessarily mean abandoning the objective of weakening Hamas’s military capabilities or preventing the movement from rebuilding its strength. His military background and security outlook do not point towards an unconditional withdrawal or acceptance of a return to the previous situation in Gaza. The potential difference from Netanyahu may instead concern the transition from conducting military operations to establishing a political and administrative framework for the post-war period, as well as avoiding an indefinite military campaign without a clear path towards ending the conflict or reorganising the governance of the territory.
The war has demonstrated that military superiority alone cannot resolve the questions of governance, security, and reconstruction. Weakening Hamas militarily does not automatically determine who will administer Gaza, what the future of its civilian institutions will be, or how renewed instability and the emergence of new armed groups will be prevented. Eisenkot might therefore seek an arrangement combining continued security pressure with border monitoring, restrictions on the rearmament of armed groups, and a civilian administration operating outside Hamas’s control. Such a framework could involve Palestinian actors, regional governments, and international institutions. A role for the Palestinian Authority, or an administrative arrangement linked to it, could form part of this discussion. However, the viability of any option would depend on Palestinian political dynamics, the nature of the security guarantees, and Israel’s willingness to accept political arrangements extending beyond direct military control.
It is important, however, not to confuse the search for an alternative administration in Gaza with support for a comprehensive political settlement of the Palestinian question. Eisenkot is not widely identified with a clearly defined programme guaranteeing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as part of a final settlement. His security outlook continues to place the protection of Israel among its principal priorities. Consequently, any change in this file could initially be administrative and tactical rather than a fundamental transformation of Israel’s position on Palestinian national rights. The decisive indicators would be his government’s policies on reconstruction, civilian freedom of movement, military withdrawal, control of the territory, and the extent to which it accepts a meaningful Palestinian political role.
Lebanon and Hezbollah: Deterrence and Border Arrangements
Lebanon represents another major test of Eisenkot’s ability to translate military superiority into long-term security. Confrontations with Hezbollah have weakened elements of the group’s military capabilities and leadership structure, but they have not necessarily eliminated the political and military conditions that could allow it to rebuild its strength or resume hostilities. Continued strikes alone cannot guarantee that future escalation will be prevented, particularly if border tensions persist and no reliable mechanism exists to implement security understandings.
Eisenkot could focus on establishing a deterrence framework that prevents Hezbollah from rebuilding offensive capabilities near the Israeli border, while making use of the United States, France, and the United Nations to monitor and support security arrangements. Potential measures could include strengthening the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces, monitoring border areas, and establishing mechanisms to limit weapons transfers and the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near the frontier. These options, however, face significant challenges. The Lebanese state’s ability to enforce its authority is constrained by complex domestic political balances, while Hezbollah is not simply an isolated military organisation but an actor embedded in Lebanon’s political system.
The potential difference between Eisenkot and Netanyahu may therefore concern the relationship between deterrence and negotiated arrangements, rather than a willingness to abandon military force. A government that relies on military operations without a sustainable political or security framework may find itself facing repeated rounds of escalation. More durable arrangements would require mutual commitments, effective monitoring mechanisms, and a degree of international coordination. Nevertheless, no agreement can be guaranteed merely by a change of leadership in Israel. Its prospects would continue to depend on Hezbollah, the Lebanese state, and the international actors involved.
Syria: Border Security and the Redefinition of the Rules of Engagement
Syria remains an exceptionally sensitive file because changes in its political and security structures, alongside shifting regional balances, create several possible paths for Israel. These range from limited security understandings to continued military intervention intended to prevent threats from emerging near Israeli-controlled territory. An Eisenkot government could approach Syria through a conventional security framework focused on preventing the transfer of advanced weapons to hostile actors, monitoring military movements in southern Syria, and preserving Israel’s freedom of air and intelligence operations. Turning these priorities into a more stable policy, however, would require a careful assessment of developments inside Syria and the positions of the regional and international powers operating there.
An Israeli government could have an interest in exploring arrangements that reduce the risk of confrontation along the border, particularly if understandings could be reached concerning military deployments, heavy weapons, and the use of Syrian territory to launch attacks against Israel. This does not mean that a ready-made agreement exists or that Eisenkot has publicly presented a comprehensive plan for a settlement with Damascus. Security arrangements remain a possibility shaped by conditions on the ground, the position of the Syrian authorities, and the roles of the United States, Russia, and Türkiye, as well as Israel’s own assessment of the threats it faces.
The Israeli military presence in certain Syrian areas, including elevated positions and locations close to the separation line, is particularly significant. Such positions may provide leverage in negotiations or be viewed as necessary security measures, but they can also become a persistent source of tension. If a new government seeks to reduce the risk of confrontation, it will have to determine whether these positions represent temporary security requirements or part of a longer-term policy. Without formal decisions and clear statements from the government, it would be premature to conclude that Eisenkot would choose withdrawal, negotiations, or the continuation of the existing military presence.
Türkiye: Regional Competition Without the Necessity of Direct Confrontation
Relations with Türkiye intersect with the future of Syria and the broader regional balance of power. Ankara has its own security and political interests in Syrian territory and seeks to influence the emerging regional security order. Israel, meanwhile, wants to preserve its military freedom of action and prevent the emergence of capabilities that could restrict its operations or alter the balance of power. An expanded Turkish role in Syria could generate direct or indirect friction, particularly if military activities overlap or if new defence arrangements limit Israel’s ability to conduct air operations.
An Eisenkot government would likely assess this issue through military and diplomatic calculations, while seeking to keep communication channels with Washington open to prevent friction between two countries that maintain important relationships with the United States. Yet regional competition does not necessarily have to develop into direct confrontation between Israel and Türkiye. The potential costs of such a clash would be considerable for both sides, while American and European interests could encourage efforts to contain disagreements. The trajectory would depend on the scale and nature of Türkiye’s presence, the rules governing military operations in Syria, and the willingness of both governments to accept understandings that reduce the risk of escalation.
Eisenkot’s challenge would therefore extend beyond limiting Turkish influence. It would also involve preventing that influence from becoming a permanent source of regional confrontation. This could require distinguishing between Turkish interests that can be managed through diplomatic arrangements and actions Israel regards as direct security threats. Any assessment of his policy towards Türkiye should ultimately be based on government decisions and concrete measures rather than assumptions that his military background would inevitably lead to escalation.
The Kurdish Question: Overlapping Interests Do Not Necessarily Mean Shared Objectives
The Kurdish question occupies an important position in the strategic calculations of Syria, Türkiye, Iraq, and Iran. However, it requires a cautious assessment when considering the potential policies of any Israeli government. Israeli interests may overlap with those of certain Kurdish actors on issues involving regional rivals or the influence of particular powers. Such overlap, however, is not sufficient evidence that an Eisenkot government would adopt a political programme supporting Kurdish national rights or an independent Kurdish state. Official policy cannot be assessed solely through statements or temporary tactical contacts; it must be evaluated by determining whether those contacts develop into an explicit and sustained political commitment.
If Eisenkot takes office, important indicators will include his government’s position on the future of north-eastern Syria, the rights of local communities, governance and security arrangements in Kurdish areas, and Israel’s relations with Türkiye and the United States. Israel may regard organised Kurdish forces as a factor in the regional balance of power, but its decisions will continue to be shaped by broader security priorities and international relationships. Any opening towards Kurdish actors would also depend on their ability to manage relations with regional powers, developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and Washington’s approach to the future of the region.
It is essential to distinguish between support for Kurdish rights as a national and political issue and the instrumental use of the Kurdish question within regional competition. Interests may converge during one period and diverge when strategic priorities change. For Kurdish political actors, the most important criterion is therefore not simply the identity of Israel’s prime minister, but the existence of clear political commitments, respect for Kurdish rights, and the durability of any arrangement in the face of shifting regional balances. Without such commitments, tactical convergence should not be mistaken for a lasting strategic partnership.
The United States and Europe: Recalibrating Alliances
Relations with the United States would be among the principal determinants of Eisenkot’s foreign policy if he becomes prime minister. The challenges involving Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria cannot be addressed independently of Washington’s position, whether in terms of military assistance, intelligence cooperation, or diplomatic support. Eisenkot might seek to improve coordination with the United States and reduce disagreements over the management of conflicts, while demonstrating that Israeli decisions are based on a clearly defined strategic assessment rather than being driven solely by domestic political considerations.
Improved relations would not necessarily mean identical positions. Differences could emerge over the timing of military operations, the conditions required to end wars, the future of Gaza, or the degree of American involvement needed to contain Iran. Relations with Europe would likewise remain closely linked to developments in the Palestinian territories, the humanitarian situation, and the Israeli government’s willingness to pursue arrangements that reduce the intensity of the conflict. A change in leadership could offer Israel an opportunity to rebuild some of the trust lost with European capitals, but this would require tangible measures rather than a change in diplomatic rhetoric alone.
Eisenkot might therefore seek to expand Israel’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre, moving beyond a foreign policy dominated by traditional security alliances and the management of successive crises. Nevertheless, any meaningful shift in international relations would depend on the substance of Israeli decisions, not simply on the prime minister’s public image or military background. If the policies that generate the greatest international disagreements remain unchanged, the results of a diplomatic reset could be limited.
Israel’s Domestic Front: Investigating the October 7 Failures and Rebuilding Public Trust
Foreign and security policy cannot be separated from Israel’s internal challenges. The October 7, 2023, attack profoundly damaged public confidence in the country’s political and security institutions and raised questions about responsibility for the failures that preceded the attack, as well as the subsequent management of the war. Eisenkot has made accountability and the restoration of public trust important elements of his political message. If his government is formed, this could lead to the establishment of a formal inquiry mechanism and a clearer examination of political and security responsibilities, including decisions made before the attack and during the war.
Another major challenge is the question of Haredi military conscription, which has generated deep divisions within Israeli society and among parties participating in governing coalitions. Eisenkot may place the expansion of military or civilian service on the agenda, arguing that it concerns the fair distribution of obligations among citizens and the IDF’s personnel requirements. Implementing such a policy, however, would encounter resistance from religious parties and would be shaped by the compromises required to form a government. Judicial independence, the relationship between state institutions, the cost of living, and the restoration of social cohesion would also remain central tests of the new administration’s ability to deliver tangible change.
Political commitments to reform, however, are not the same as the ability to implement them. Israel’s parliamentary system relies on coalitions, and Eisenkot may have to make concessions to his partners to keep the government in office. If those concessions undermine the issues he has promised to address, they could become an early source of political weakness. His domestic success would therefore depend not simply on replacing Netanyahu, but on maintaining a cohesive government and implementing a clear programme across security, institutional, and social policy.
Coalition Arithmetic: The Limits of the Change Eisenkot Could Deliver
The structure of Israel’s political system imposes direct constraints on any potential policy transformation. Members of the Knesset are elected, while the formation of a government depends on securing sufficient parliamentary support. In a contest between Netanyahu’s camp and the forces seeking to replace him, smaller parties and groups that have not committed themselves to either side could become decisive in coalition negotiations. Eisenkot’s popularity or strong performance in certain opinion polls would therefore not, by itself, demonstrate that he could form a stable government.
Differences among opposition parties could also limit Eisenkot’s ability to implement his programme, even if he succeeds in becoming prime minister. These parties do not necessarily share the same positions on the Palestinians, military conscription, relations with Arab parties, or the nature of a regional settlement. Differences between centrist, left-wing, and right-wing factions within a potential coalition could force compromises that narrow the scope of change. Forming a government would consequently mark the beginning of the political struggle rather than its conclusion.
Any assessment of Eisenkot’s strategy must therefore distinguish between what he wants to achieve, what he can negotiate with coalition partners, and what he can actually implement. His rhetoric and approach to accountability or international coordination may differ from Netanyahu’s, yet he could find himself compelled to preserve substantial elements of existing security policy if the survival of his government depends on parties committed to a hard-line position. The composition of the coalition, the distribution of ministerial portfolios, and the agreements published by its members would be essential indicators of the government’s actual direction.
Possible Scenarios for Eisenkot’s Policy
The first scenario would involve a change in management style while preserving Israel’s fundamental security objectives. Under this approach, Israel could maintain its deterrence policies towards Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas while seeking closer coordination with the United States, defining the objectives of military operations more clearly, and exploring political or security arrangements that could prevent renewed confrontation. This would amount primarily to an adjustment in the management of Israeli power rather than a fundamental transformation of the country’s security doctrine.
The second scenario would involve the new government succeeding in opening limited negotiating channels on certain issues, such as border arrangements with Lebanon, security understandings in Syria, or a framework for governing Gaza after the war. Such efforts could reduce tensions on some fronts, but they would not necessarily lead to a comprehensive settlement of regional conflicts. Their success would depend on the agreement of the other parties, the existence of enforceable guarantees, and Israel’s willingness to accept commitments extending beyond declarations of security objectives.
The third scenario would be the continuation of confrontation and regional tensions despite the change in leadership. This could occur if negotiations fail, security threats persist, or coalition constraints prevent the government from adopting policies substantially different from those of its predecessor. Eisenkot could then find himself facing many of the same circumstances as Netanyahu, with differences in political rhetoric and international relations management but no fundamental change in conditions on the ground.
Conclusion: The Real Test Lies in Decisions, Not Promises
If Ghadi Eisenkot becomes Israel’s prime minister, his arrival in office will not necessarily mark the end of the policies associated with Benjamin Netanyahu. The challenges involving Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, together with relations with Türkiye, the United States, and Europe, are shaped by strategic and military factors that extend beyond the individual holding the premiership. Nevertheless, a change in leadership could create opportunities to reorder priorities, improve coordination with allies, link the use of force to more clearly defined political objectives, and address domestic issues that have undermined confidence in Israeli institutions.
The real measure of change will not be campaign statements or promises to rebuild the state, but the decisions taken by the new government after it is formed. The key questions will concern its approach to Gaza’s future, the terms of confrontation with Iran, security arrangements in Lebanon and Syria, its position on the Palestinian question, and its willingness to manage disagreements with allies rather than turn them into additional crises. Eisenkot’s ability to implement any strategy will also depend on coalition cohesion and the regional and international circumstances surrounding Israel.
The most realistic expectation, therefore, is not an immediate transition from a policy of force to a policy of settlement, but an assessment of whether the new leadership reorganises the use of force and connects it to more sustainable political and diplomatic processes. Such a difference could be significant in crisis management, but it would not, by itself, constitute a comprehensive strategic transformation. The Middle East does not change simply because a prime minister changes; it changes when the calculations governing conflict shift and when political and security conditions emerge that make more stable arrangements possible.
