The Kurds in the New Regional Order: Is It Time to Move from
Geography to Decision-Making?
Strategic Report – Geo-Strategic Studies Foundation
Strategic Report – Geo-Strategic Studies Foundation
An Open Regional Moment and the Reshaping of Power Dynamics
The Middle East is no longer experiencing a conventional phase of political and security instability. Rather, it has entered a far more complex period in which military transformations intersect with the realignment of alliances, centres of influence, energy corridors, and trade routes. The old regional order is increasingly unable to produce stable balances, while the contours of a viable alternative capable of establishing new rules governing relations among regional states remain uncertain. From the transformations in Syria and the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, to the intensifying Turkish-Israeli rivalry and shifting security calculations in Iraq and the Gulf, the region has entered a strategic landscape open to multiple possibilities. These developments cannot be understood through isolated readings of individual events, but rather through an analysis of the relationship between geography, power, and international interests.
At the heart of these transformations lies the Kurdish question, one of the central issues where regional national security calculations intersect with international interests and competing projects for rebuilding the Middle Eastern state system. The Kurds, geographically distributed across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, occupy a geopolitically significant position. Their areas of presence extend across the borders of several states and lie close to strategic corridors, energy resources, and major centres of regional competition. Yet the strategic importance of this geographical position has not been translated into an equivalent level of unified political capacity or sustainable strategic influence. This raises a fundamental question: Can the Kurds capitalise on international and regional transformations to move from being a factor affected by regional balances to becoming an actor capable of influencing their formation?
The answer to this question does not depend solely on the level of international support or the nature of relations with the United States and Europe. More fundamentally, it depends on the ability of Kurdish political forces to redefine their shared interests, overcome partisan and geographical divisions, and develop a strategic vision that approaches the Kurdish question as an interconnected political and regional issue, while respecting the distinct political, legal, and institutional circumstances of each part of Kurdistan.
The Middle East is no longer experiencing a conventional phase of political and security instability. Rather, it has entered a far more complex period in which military transformations intersect with the realignment of alliances, centres of influence, energy corridors, and trade routes. The old regional order is increasingly unable to produce stable balances, while the contours of a viable alternative capable of establishing new rules governing relations among regional states remain uncertain. From the transformations in Syria and the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, to the intensifying Turkish-Israeli rivalry and shifting security calculations in Iraq and the Gulf, the region has entered a strategic landscape open to multiple possibilities. These developments cannot be understood through isolated readings of individual events, but rather through an analysis of the relationship between geography, power, and international interests.
At the heart of these transformations lies the Kurdish question, one of the central issues where regional national security calculations intersect with international interests and competing projects for rebuilding the Middle Eastern state system. The Kurds, geographically distributed across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, occupy a geopolitically significant position. Their areas of presence extend across the borders of several states and lie close to strategic corridors, energy resources, and major centres of regional competition. Yet the strategic importance of this geographical position has not been translated into an equivalent level of unified political capacity or sustainable strategic influence. This raises a fundamental question: Can the Kurds capitalise on international and regional transformations to move from being a factor affected by regional balances to becoming an actor capable of influencing their formation?
The answer to this question does not depend solely on the level of international support or the nature of relations with the United States and Europe. More fundamentally, it depends on the ability of Kurdish political forces to redefine their shared interests, overcome partisan and geographical divisions, and develop a strategic vision that approaches the Kurdish question as an interconnected political and regional issue, while respecting the distinct political, legal, and institutional circumstances of each part of Kurdistan.
The Transformation of the Regional Order and the Opportunity to Redefine the Kurdish Position
The current phase is characterised by the absence of a stable regional balance. The arrangements that governed the Middle East over previous decades are no longer sufficient to explain the full scope of emerging developments. The United States is reassessing the instruments of its military and political presence; Israel is seeking to establish new security arrangements extending beyond its immediate borders; Turkey is working to expand its strategic reach and strengthen its regional role; while Iran faces military, economic, and political pressures that place the future of its regional influence under unprecedented scrutiny. Meanwhile, major Arab powers are attempting to prevent these conflicts from developing into a permanent state of instability that threatens regional security, energy supplies, and economic interests.
These transformations do not necessarily indicate that the region is moving towards a more stable new order. Rather, they may open the way to an extended period of competition and redistribution of influence. In such an environment, actors possessing strategically important geographical positions, stable institutions, and the capacity to establish partnerships are more likely to become influential in international calculations. This is where one of the strategic opportunities for the Kurds emerges. However, this opportunity is neither automatic nor guaranteed simply by possessing an important geographical position or maintaining relations with international powers.
Previous experiences have demonstrated that international interest in the Kurds has often been linked to specific circumstances, including the fight against ISIS, containing Iranian influence, or managing security balances in Iraq and Syria. Yet these interests can change whenever international priorities shift. This requires Kurdish political forces to move beyond relying on the importance of temporary international circumstances and instead build lasting political and institutional relevance, making cooperation with them a long-term strategic choice rather than a temporary response to a security crisis.
The current phase is characterised by the absence of a stable regional balance. The arrangements that governed the Middle East over previous decades are no longer sufficient to explain the full scope of emerging developments. The United States is reassessing the instruments of its military and political presence; Israel is seeking to establish new security arrangements extending beyond its immediate borders; Turkey is working to expand its strategic reach and strengthen its regional role; while Iran faces military, economic, and political pressures that place the future of its regional influence under unprecedented scrutiny. Meanwhile, major Arab powers are attempting to prevent these conflicts from developing into a permanent state of instability that threatens regional security, energy supplies, and economic interests.
These transformations do not necessarily indicate that the region is moving towards a more stable new order. Rather, they may open the way to an extended period of competition and redistribution of influence. In such an environment, actors possessing strategically important geographical positions, stable institutions, and the capacity to establish partnerships are more likely to become influential in international calculations. This is where one of the strategic opportunities for the Kurds emerges. However, this opportunity is neither automatic nor guaranteed simply by possessing an important geographical position or maintaining relations with international powers.
Previous experiences have demonstrated that international interest in the Kurds has often been linked to specific circumstances, including the fight against ISIS, containing Iranian influence, or managing security balances in Iraq and Syria. Yet these interests can change whenever international priorities shift. This requires Kurdish political forces to move beyond relying on the importance of temporary international circumstances and instead build lasting political and institutional relevance, making cooperation with them a long-term strategic choice rather than a temporary response to a security crisis.
Kurdish Geography Between Strategic Value and the Limitations of Political Decision-Making
One of the fundamental paradoxes of the Kurdish question is that the very geography that gives the Kurds strategic importance is also what makes their areas of presence arenas of competition among neighbouring states. Kurdish-inhabited territories extend across a geographical space connecting Anatolia, Mesopotamia, the Iranian Plateau, and northern Syria. They are situated near vital energy, trade, water, and overland transportation routes. This position gives them significance beyond the borders of the states within which they are located. However, geographical importance does not automatically provide control over resources, corridors, or sovereign decision-making.
Political geography does not become power merely through possession; it becomes power through the ability to manage and utilise it within a clear political, economic, and security framework. A strategic location can become a source of influence when accompanied by effective institutions, a productive economy, internal stability, and balanced relations with neighbouring countries. In the absence of these elements, the same geography may become a source of vulnerability, leaving Kurdish-inhabited areas exposed to pressure, intervention, and bargaining among more organised and powerful actors.
Therefore, the Kurdish challenge is not to demonstrate the geographical importance of Kurdish areas, since this importance is already recognised by regional and international powers. The real challenge is to transform that importance into political, economic, and negotiating leverage that enables the Kurds to participate in shaping decisions concerning the future of their territories, rather than merely awaiting the outcomes of arrangements negotiated about them without adequate participation.
One of the fundamental paradoxes of the Kurdish question is that the very geography that gives the Kurds strategic importance is also what makes their areas of presence arenas of competition among neighbouring states. Kurdish-inhabited territories extend across a geographical space connecting Anatolia, Mesopotamia, the Iranian Plateau, and northern Syria. They are situated near vital energy, trade, water, and overland transportation routes. This position gives them significance beyond the borders of the states within which they are located. However, geographical importance does not automatically provide control over resources, corridors, or sovereign decision-making.
Political geography does not become power merely through possession; it becomes power through the ability to manage and utilise it within a clear political, economic, and security framework. A strategic location can become a source of influence when accompanied by effective institutions, a productive economy, internal stability, and balanced relations with neighbouring countries. In the absence of these elements, the same geography may become a source of vulnerability, leaving Kurdish-inhabited areas exposed to pressure, intervention, and bargaining among more organised and powerful actors.
Therefore, the Kurdish challenge is not to demonstrate the geographical importance of Kurdish areas, since this importance is already recognised by regional and international powers. The real challenge is to transform that importance into political, economic, and negotiating leverage that enables the Kurds to participate in shaping decisions concerning the future of their territories, rather than merely awaiting the outcomes of arrangements negotiated about them without adequate participation.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Test of Building Strength from Within
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq represents the most advanced Kurdish experience in terms of constitutional recognition, political and administrative institutions, and international representation within the Iraqi state. This status has provided the Kurds with a historic opportunity to build a political model capable of managing internal interests and engaging with the regional and international environment. Nevertheless, this experience is now facing a critical test: whether the principal political forces can protect institutions from partisan fragmentation and place the public interest above calculations of political competition.
The political crisis that intensified between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in November 2026, accompanied by the Patriotic Union's withdrawal from the regional government and threats of a renewed dual-administration structure, cannot be treated merely as an administrative disagreement or a conventional struggle over positions. The issue concerns the very ability of the Kurds to manage their autonomous governing experience and present it as a stable political model in a region undergoing profound transformations. Any renewed institutional division could weaken the Region's negotiating position vis-à-vis Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, and Washington, while providing external actors with greater opportunities to influence its internal balance.
The paradox is that the Region possesses constitutional institutions, economic resources, international relations, and accumulated political experience, yet it continues to struggle to transform these assets into a unified decision-making system. Political strength is not measured solely by parliamentary representation or the scale of foreign relations. It is also determined by the ability of institutions to function consistently and by the extent to which public decision-making remains independent of partisan polarisation. Without addressing this structural challenge, the Region's political experience will continue to fall short of the potential offered by its constitutional and geographical position.
The objective should not be to eliminate political pluralism or bypass democratic competition. Rather, it should be to establish institutional rules that guarantee continuity in governance and prevent partisan disputes from turning into crises that threaten the unity of decision-making, administration, and security. A stable and influential Kurdistan Region can serve as an important foundation for a broader Kurdish strategic vision, whereas a divided Region loses a significant part of its capacity to influence the future of the Middle East.
Rojava: From Self-Administration to the Equation of Rights and National Partnership
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Syria has undergone profound political and security transformations. The Kurdish question in the north and east of the country has entered a phase different from the one in which the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces originally emerged. The understandings reached during 2025 and 2026 concerning the integration of military and administrative institutions into the structures of the new Syrian state have shifted the debate from consolidating territorial control towards negotiating the structure of the state, constitutional and political rights, and the position of the Kurds within it.
Here, it is essential to distinguish between institutional integration and the protection of national and political rights. Reorganising military and administrative institutions within the framework of the state does not necessarily resolve the Kurdish question. Likewise, recognising the Kurdish language or providing cultural guarantees alone is insufficient to establish a balanced national partnership. The issue requires a clear constitutional framework guaranteeing equal citizenship, recognition of national and cultural diversity, genuine political representation, educational and administrative rights, and a fair distribution of powers and resources.
The future of the Kurds in Syria will not be determined solely by their ability to preserve the achievements of the previous phase, but by their capacity to transform those achievements into legal and institutional rights that are difficult to reverse. This requires a flexible political vision capable of negotiating with Damascus, building understandings with other Syrian communities, and avoiding the transformation of political disagreements into open confrontations that could weaken Kurdish society and endanger its stability.
The success of the Syrian experience also requires Kurdish political forces to recognise that building a national partnership does not contradict the protection of Kurdish identity and distinctiveness. Nor should state unity become a justification for eliminating diversity or monopolising power. A strong state is not necessarily a rigidly centralised state; rather, it is one whose legitimate institutions can accommodate its constituent communities and manage their differences within a clear constitutional framework.
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Syria has undergone profound political and security transformations. The Kurdish question in the north and east of the country has entered a phase different from the one in which the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces originally emerged. The understandings reached during 2025 and 2026 concerning the integration of military and administrative institutions into the structures of the new Syrian state have shifted the debate from consolidating territorial control towards negotiating the structure of the state, constitutional and political rights, and the position of the Kurds within it.
Here, it is essential to distinguish between institutional integration and the protection of national and political rights. Reorganising military and administrative institutions within the framework of the state does not necessarily resolve the Kurdish question. Likewise, recognising the Kurdish language or providing cultural guarantees alone is insufficient to establish a balanced national partnership. The issue requires a clear constitutional framework guaranteeing equal citizenship, recognition of national and cultural diversity, genuine political representation, educational and administrative rights, and a fair distribution of powers and resources.
The future of the Kurds in Syria will not be determined solely by their ability to preserve the achievements of the previous phase, but by their capacity to transform those achievements into legal and institutional rights that are difficult to reverse. This requires a flexible political vision capable of negotiating with Damascus, building understandings with other Syrian communities, and avoiding the transformation of political disagreements into open confrontations that could weaken Kurdish society and endanger its stability.
The success of the Syrian experience also requires Kurdish political forces to recognise that building a national partnership does not contradict the protection of Kurdish identity and distinctiveness. Nor should state unity become a justification for eliminating diversity or monopolising power. A strong state is not necessarily a rigidly centralised state; rather, it is one whose legitimate institutions can accommodate its constituent communities and manage their differences within a clear constitutional framework.
Turkey, Iran, and the Dual Challenge Facing the Future of the Kurdish Question
Turkey approaches the Kurdish question as one of the central issues connected to its national security, territorial integrity, and regional influence. Political developments surrounding efforts to end the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party during 2025 and 2026 have opened a new window for a possible transition from armed confrontation towards a more comprehensive political and legal process. However, the success of this process will depend on the extent to which the Turkish state is prepared to address the political and legal roots of the issue rather than limiting itself to security arrangements and disarmament.
Any settlement that fails to include clear political, legal, and cultural guarantees may succeed in reducing armed confrontation without necessarily providing a sustainable solution to the Kurdish question. Conversely, a genuine political settlement could positively affect stability in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, while redefining the relationship between the state and Kurdish society on new foundations.
In Iran, the Kurdish question has become increasingly sensitive within the security calculations associated with regional confrontation and tensions with the United States and Israel. Iran's Kurdish regions occupy a strategically sensitive geographical position bordering Iraq and Turkey and are home to Kurdish political movements with different organisational structures and external relationships. As the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Tehran intensified during 2026, concerns resurfaced over the possible use of national communities in military and political calculations concerning the future of the Iranian system.
However, it would be a strategic mistake to reduce the Kurdish question in Iran to scenarios of military confrontation or expectations of state collapse. The future of the Kurds there is also connected to accumulated political, legal, and social demands, which cannot be guaranteed through external power struggles alone. Turning the Kurds into an instrument in regional conflicts could expose their territories and communities to considerable risks without guaranteeing sustainable political gains.
The real challenge for Kurdish forces in Turkey and Iran is to develop political approaches that balance national aspirations and constitutional rights with the requirements of internal stability and regional transformations, while rejecting the use of Kurdish communities as arenas for settling scores between competing states.
Turkey approaches the Kurdish question as one of the central issues connected to its national security, territorial integrity, and regional influence. Political developments surrounding efforts to end the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party during 2025 and 2026 have opened a new window for a possible transition from armed confrontation towards a more comprehensive political and legal process. However, the success of this process will depend on the extent to which the Turkish state is prepared to address the political and legal roots of the issue rather than limiting itself to security arrangements and disarmament.
Any settlement that fails to include clear political, legal, and cultural guarantees may succeed in reducing armed confrontation without necessarily providing a sustainable solution to the Kurdish question. Conversely, a genuine political settlement could positively affect stability in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, while redefining the relationship between the state and Kurdish society on new foundations.
In Iran, the Kurdish question has become increasingly sensitive within the security calculations associated with regional confrontation and tensions with the United States and Israel. Iran's Kurdish regions occupy a strategically sensitive geographical position bordering Iraq and Turkey and are home to Kurdish political movements with different organisational structures and external relationships. As the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Tehran intensified during 2026, concerns resurfaced over the possible use of national communities in military and political calculations concerning the future of the Iranian system.
However, it would be a strategic mistake to reduce the Kurdish question in Iran to scenarios of military confrontation or expectations of state collapse. The future of the Kurds there is also connected to accumulated political, legal, and social demands, which cannot be guaranteed through external power struggles alone. Turning the Kurds into an instrument in regional conflicts could expose their territories and communities to considerable risks without guaranteeing sustainable political gains.
The real challenge for Kurdish forces in Turkey and Iran is to develop political approaches that balance national aspirations and constitutional rights with the requirements of internal stability and regional transformations, while rejecting the use of Kurdish communities as arenas for settling scores between competing states.
The United States and International Powers: From Security Partnership to Political Recognition
The future of the Kurdish question cannot be understood without analysing the relationship with the United States, which has been one of the most influential factors shaping Kurdish political and strategic balances over recent decades, particularly in Iraq and Syria. However, the historical experience of this relationship reveals a fundamental reality: Washington approaches its partnerships through the lens of changing strategic interests rather than permanent commitments to local allies. At different stages, it has cooperated with Kurdish forces to pursue objectives related to counterterrorism, containing regional rivals, and maintaining stability. Yet it has also reassessed its priorities whenever its political and security calculations have changed.
Developments in Syria during 2026 have demonstrated that a security partnership, regardless of its importance, does not by itself provide a permanent political guarantee. Changes in the American position towards the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside arrangements for their integration into the institutions of the new Syrian state, reflect the balance between American considerations and relations with Turkey and the new Syrian authorities. This requires Kurdish political forces to reassess the concept of international alliance and move beyond dependence on American military involvement towards building political and institutional relations at multiple levels.
Europe possesses different instruments of influence, particularly through political, economic, and human rights institutions, as well as its relations with Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurds can utilise this space by developing an institutional political discourse centred on democracy, pluralism, human rights, and regional stability, rather than limiting external engagement to security demands or reactions to crises.
The objective should not be to search for an alternative international patron, but to establish a balanced network of relations with the United States, the European Union, and regional states, based on shared interests and mutual respect. A partner with stable institutions and the ability to make a meaningful contribution to security, economic development, and regional stability is better positioned to protect its interests than an actor whose influence depends primarily on temporary political circumstances.
VII. Kurdish Division: The Obstacle That Threatens to Turn Opportunity into Strategic Loss
Despite the different political and legal circumstances across the parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish division remains one of the most significant factors limiting the ability to influence regional equations. The issue is not the existence of political pluralism or differences in political programmes, since these are natural features of political societies. Rather, the problem emerges when differences turn into conflicts over legitimacy, representation, and influence, or when partisan calculations take precedence over broader societal and strategic interests.
Experience has demonstrated that regional and international powers can engage with multiple Kurdish actors. Indeed, the existence of several centres of decision-making may provide some of these powers with opportunities to expand their influence within the Kurdish political landscape. Conversely, the absence of even a minimum level of coordination weakens negotiating positions and makes each party more vulnerable to political, economic, and security pressure.
It is essential, however, not to confuse unity of strategic vision with the unification of political parties or institutions into a single political entity. The objective is not to eliminate the distinctiveness of each part of Kurdistan or impose a uniform political model on societies operating under different conditions. Rather, it is to establish a framework for strategic coordination that identifies shared interests, prevents internal disagreements from being exploited to weaken the Kurdish position, and creates opportunities for cooperation on issues extending beyond existing political borders.
This minimum level of coordination could include the protection of national and cultural rights, the exchange of political and diplomatic expertise, cooperation in development, education, and media, and the development of a common approach towards regional issues affecting the future of the Kurds. Disputed matters specific to each part should remain subject to its own political circumstances, institutions, and the choices of its society.
The future of the Kurdish question cannot be understood without analysing the relationship with the United States, which has been one of the most influential factors shaping Kurdish political and strategic balances over recent decades, particularly in Iraq and Syria. However, the historical experience of this relationship reveals a fundamental reality: Washington approaches its partnerships through the lens of changing strategic interests rather than permanent commitments to local allies. At different stages, it has cooperated with Kurdish forces to pursue objectives related to counterterrorism, containing regional rivals, and maintaining stability. Yet it has also reassessed its priorities whenever its political and security calculations have changed.
Developments in Syria during 2026 have demonstrated that a security partnership, regardless of its importance, does not by itself provide a permanent political guarantee. Changes in the American position towards the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside arrangements for their integration into the institutions of the new Syrian state, reflect the balance between American considerations and relations with Turkey and the new Syrian authorities. This requires Kurdish political forces to reassess the concept of international alliance and move beyond dependence on American military involvement towards building political and institutional relations at multiple levels.
Europe possesses different instruments of influence, particularly through political, economic, and human rights institutions, as well as its relations with Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurds can utilise this space by developing an institutional political discourse centred on democracy, pluralism, human rights, and regional stability, rather than limiting external engagement to security demands or reactions to crises.
The objective should not be to search for an alternative international patron, but to establish a balanced network of relations with the United States, the European Union, and regional states, based on shared interests and mutual respect. A partner with stable institutions and the ability to make a meaningful contribution to security, economic development, and regional stability is better positioned to protect its interests than an actor whose influence depends primarily on temporary political circumstances.
VII. Kurdish Division: The Obstacle That Threatens to Turn Opportunity into Strategic Loss
Despite the different political and legal circumstances across the parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish division remains one of the most significant factors limiting the ability to influence regional equations. The issue is not the existence of political pluralism or differences in political programmes, since these are natural features of political societies. Rather, the problem emerges when differences turn into conflicts over legitimacy, representation, and influence, or when partisan calculations take precedence over broader societal and strategic interests.
Experience has demonstrated that regional and international powers can engage with multiple Kurdish actors. Indeed, the existence of several centres of decision-making may provide some of these powers with opportunities to expand their influence within the Kurdish political landscape. Conversely, the absence of even a minimum level of coordination weakens negotiating positions and makes each party more vulnerable to political, economic, and security pressure.
It is essential, however, not to confuse unity of strategic vision with the unification of political parties or institutions into a single political entity. The objective is not to eliminate the distinctiveness of each part of Kurdistan or impose a uniform political model on societies operating under different conditions. Rather, it is to establish a framework for strategic coordination that identifies shared interests, prevents internal disagreements from being exploited to weaken the Kurdish position, and creates opportunities for cooperation on issues extending beyond existing political borders.
This minimum level of coordination could include the protection of national and cultural rights, the exchange of political and diplomatic expertise, cooperation in development, education, and media, and the development of a common approach towards regional issues affecting the future of the Kurds. Disputed matters specific to each part should remain subject to its own political circumstances, institutions, and the choices of its society.
Geography to Decision-Making: What Does the Kurdish Project Need?
Moving from geography to decision-making is not a political slogan. It is a strategic process requiring several interconnected conditions. Foremost among these are the establishment of political institutions capable of representing society and managing differences, the development of a productive economy that reduces dependence on external actors, and the creation of a clear diplomatic vision capable of transforming international relations into sustainable partnerships.
Building strength is not limited to military or security capabilities. It also requires investment in knowledge, scientific research, education, technology, and media. Societies capable of producing knowledge, analysing transformations, and developing alternatives are better positioned to participate in policymaking. This highlights the importance of developing Kurdish strategic research centres, strengthening communication between researchers, intellectuals, and policymakers, and producing knowledge that moves beyond partisan discourse towards an analysis of regional and international interests.
Economically, Kurdish-inhabited territories should be viewed as a potential space for connecting markets, trade corridors, and energy and transportation projects between East and West. However, this requires political stability, an investment-friendly legal environment, economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, and a commitment to preventing resources from becoming instruments of internal competition.
Diplomatically, the coming phase requires a realistic and balanced Kurdish political discourse capable of engaging international capitals through the language of interests, law, and stability while maintaining national and political rights. Legitimate demands require political and institutional instruments capable of defending them. International relations, meanwhile, are not built on sympathy alone, but on mutual interests and the capacity to honour partnerships.
There is also a growing need to develop a long-term Kurdish strategic vision that remains consistent despite changes in governments or political leadership. Such a vision should identify shared priorities, assess risks and opportunities, and establish multiple scenarios for responding to regional transformations. Societies that lack a clear vision of their future often find themselves compelled to adapt to the visions of others.
Moving from geography to decision-making is not a political slogan. It is a strategic process requiring several interconnected conditions. Foremost among these are the establishment of political institutions capable of representing society and managing differences, the development of a productive economy that reduces dependence on external actors, and the creation of a clear diplomatic vision capable of transforming international relations into sustainable partnerships.
Building strength is not limited to military or security capabilities. It also requires investment in knowledge, scientific research, education, technology, and media. Societies capable of producing knowledge, analysing transformations, and developing alternatives are better positioned to participate in policymaking. This highlights the importance of developing Kurdish strategic research centres, strengthening communication between researchers, intellectuals, and policymakers, and producing knowledge that moves beyond partisan discourse towards an analysis of regional and international interests.
Economically, Kurdish-inhabited territories should be viewed as a potential space for connecting markets, trade corridors, and energy and transportation projects between East and West. However, this requires political stability, an investment-friendly legal environment, economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, and a commitment to preventing resources from becoming instruments of internal competition.
Diplomatically, the coming phase requires a realistic and balanced Kurdish political discourse capable of engaging international capitals through the language of interests, law, and stability while maintaining national and political rights. Legitimate demands require political and institutional instruments capable of defending them. International relations, meanwhile, are not built on sympathy alone, but on mutual interests and the capacity to honour partnerships.
There is also a growing need to develop a long-term Kurdish strategic vision that remains consistent despite changes in governments or political leadership. Such a vision should identify shared priorities, assess risks and opportunities, and establish multiple scenarios for responding to regional transformations. Societies that lack a clear vision of their future often find themselves compelled to adapt to the visions of others.
Possible Scenarios for the Future of the Kurdish Role
The future of the Kurdish role in the new regional order can be examined through three principal scenarios. These should not be understood as inevitable predictions, but rather as possible trajectories whose likelihood depends on the political decisions made by Kurdish forces and the positions adopted by regional and international states.
The future of the Kurdish role in the new regional order can be examined through three principal scenarios. These should not be understood as inevitable predictions, but rather as possible trajectories whose likelihood depends on the political decisions made by Kurdish forces and the positions adopted by regional and international states.
Transformation into an Influential Regional Actor.
This scenario could emerge if Kurdish forces succeed in building stable institutions, developing balanced relations with international and regional powers, and overcoming the divisions that undermine their negotiating capacity. Under such circumstances, the Kurds could gradually become partners in matters of security, energy, development, and state reconstruction, gaining greater influence over decisions affecting the future of their territories and the rights of their communities.
This scenario could emerge if Kurdish forces succeed in building stable institutions, developing balanced relations with international and regional powers, and overcoming the divisions that undermine their negotiating capacity. Under such circumstances, the Kurds could gradually become partners in matters of security, energy, development, and state reconstruction, gaining greater influence over decisions affecting the future of their territories and the rights of their communities.
The Continuation of Fragmented Influence and External Dependence.
This scenario would involve the continuation of political divisions, differences in foreign relations among Kurdish forces, and the absence of a shared strategy. In such a situation, certain Kurdish actors might continue to enjoy local influence or significant international relationships, but they would remain unable to transform these assets into cohesive political power. Their gains would continue to depend on shifting regional balances and circumstances largely determined by more influential states.
This scenario would involve the continuation of political divisions, differences in foreign relations among Kurdish forces, and the absence of a shared strategy. In such a situation, certain Kurdish actors might continue to enjoy local influence or significant international relationships, but they would remain unable to transform these assets into cohesive political power. Their gains would continue to depend on shifting regional balances and circumstances largely determined by more influential states.
The Erosion of Gains Under the Pressure of Regional Competition.
This represents the most dangerous possibility if Kurdish-inhabited territories become arenas of confrontation between states, or if political forces fail to protect internal stability and establish national understandings with their surrounding communities. Such developments could lead to the erosion of political and institutional achievements and the re-emergence of dependence and marginalisation, despite the strategic importance of Kurdish geography.
The difference between these trajectories will not be determined by international transformations alone. It will depend to a considerable extent on the ability of the Kurds to manage their internal affairs, develop their institutions, and transform challenges into sustainable political and economic opportunities.
This represents the most dangerous possibility if Kurdish-inhabited territories become arenas of confrontation between states, or if political forces fail to protect internal stability and establish national understandings with their surrounding communities. Such developments could lead to the erosion of political and institutional achievements and the re-emergence of dependence and marginalisation, despite the strategic importance of Kurdish geography.
The difference between these trajectories will not be determined by international transformations alone. It will depend to a considerable extent on the ability of the Kurds to manage their internal affairs, develop their institutions, and transform challenges into sustainable political and economic opportunities.
Conclusion: Geography Creates the Opportunity, but Decision-Making Determines Political Standing
The transformations taking place across the Middle East do not offer automatic guarantees to any actor. However, they create opportunities to redefine political and strategic roles and positions. Within this context, the Kurds face a moment that extends beyond the immediate political and military developments, because it raises a fundamental question about their future position in the regional order: Will they remain part of equations shaped beyond their influence, or will they succeed in developing the political and institutional instruments necessary to participate in shaping those equations?
Possessing strategic geography is not sufficient to generate influence. Nor do international relations automatically translate into political guarantees, and recognition of the Kurds' importance in regional security calculations does not necessarily translate into recognition of their political rights. Genuine standing is built through institutions, stability, economic capacity, knowledge, and negotiating power, alongside a realistic political project capable of reconciling national rights with the requirements of regional stability and partnership with neighbouring societies.
Perhaps the most important lesson of the current phase is that the Kurds need to move from a policy of crisis management towards a policy of future-building; from waiting for international transformations towards preparing to influence them; and from treating geography as a contested arena towards transforming it into an instrument of strength in development, connectivity, and regional stability.
The historic opportunity does not lie in the collapse of one state or the weakening of another, nor in the victory of one regional bloc over its rival. Rather, it lies in the ability of the Kurds to develop a political and institutional project grounded in societal legitimacy, supported by a long-term strategic vision, and capable of managing internal pluralism and international balances with the mindset of institutions and statecraft.
Geography may place the Kurds at the heart of the regional equation, but unity of vision, institutional strength, and realistic decision-making will determine whether they become participants in shaping the future of the Middle East or remain, once again, an object of competition among the powers seeking to redraw it.
