Special/Editorial Board of Geostrategic Studies
We all agree that the blow suffered by the Justice and Development Party and its ally, the Turkish National Movement, in the recent municipal elections was contributed by the Kurdish parties, whether within the Kurdish regions or in the major Turkish cities, especially by directing their supporters in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, and other influential cities, to vote in favor of the Republican People’s Party, Who developed his speech and changed some of his positions towards the Kurds in order to strengthen the opposition in the face of the regime.
The loss of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s popular majority constituted a real concern for the future of Turkey’s policies according to the perspective of the Justice and Development Party, due to the Nationalist Movement, even if it was allied with him, but the size of the popularity of this movement does not exceed 5% of the Turkish public, and this means the loss that the Justice and Development Party suffered will not It is compensated by an alliance with any other party, because the Kurdish parties will not ally with it in light of the presence of the Nationalist Movement on its side, as well as Erdogan’s anti-Kurdish policies, while the Republican People’s Party is leading the political process to end the authority of political Islam in Turkey in favor of the nationalist approach that it has followed for many decades.
The road to the abyss
Erdogan realizes that the international public mood is no longer conducive to the policies he has expressed against the Kurds on one side, and the process of restricting freedoms and democracy, and that the nationalist movement has implicated his regime in narrow projects at the international and regional levels as well as internally, as opinion polls indicate a significant decline in Turkish relations. During the past eight years, Turkey has raised a number of deep problems with some pivotal Arab countries, as well as an indirect clash with the European Union and the United States of America on issues related to European security, whether in the Greek-Cypriot issue or related to Turkish ambitions in fossil wealth in the Eastern Mediterranean. As well as the Libyan issue and the Turkish military intervention, in conjunction with the occupations of northern Syria, entering into crises with the Arabian Gulf through Qatar’s gate, destabilizing the security and stability of the Gulf Shield and political life in Egypt, and contributing to the empowerment of political Islam movements in the Arab region, in exchange for threatening the security and stability of Europe.
These sensitive issues, which Erdogan's government helped raise, pushed the surroundings to an almost rupture, at least a retreat from strategic relations with Turkey. Moreover, the United States of America took a negative stance on Turkish actions, and this contributed to a significant decline in American-Turkish relations, after long decades of the Turkish state acting as NATO’s border policeman.
Internal conditions and the giant's egg
Many may be surprised that the Kurds constitute the valve of Turkish policies or the bread and butter in the process of disentangling and linking the Turkish political parties. If any Turkish political force allies with the Kurdish parties inside Turkey, it can reach the rule of Turkey. Erdogan had previously taken this path through religious employment and co-opting the Kurdish street to enable his presence and rule, but the significant decline he showed in the last ten years caused Kurdish aversion to his anti-Kurdish policies.
At a time when the opposition Republican People's Party and its leader Imamoglu realized that the path to ruling Turkey passed through the Kurds, Erdogan was building models of hatred and disagreements with the Kurds, as he threw the Turkish reconciliation project to the ground and threw Kurdish leaders, mayors, as well as parliamentarians, academics, jurists, etc. into obscurity. Detainees, which caused a significant decline in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party.
Even if Erdogan won the recent presidential elections, the path to his popular overthrow lies in pulling the rug from under his feet through the municipal elections, as developments have changed the Kurdish face towards voting for his parties within the Kurdish region in exchange for voting for the Republican Party and the opposition against Erdogan in the major Turkish cities that are filled with millions of Kurds.
Beginning of disassembly
The Turkish nationalist movement did not help Erdogan's ambitions during the recent elections, and the popularity of this movement declined significantly within the Turkish street. The recent elections showed the nature of the general mood of the Turkish-Kurdish street regarding the policies of this movement, the official partner of Erdogan's government.
Meanwhile, the political groups dissident from Erdogan influenced the popularity of his party, and large segments that had previously voted for him now oppose him and rally around the new parties (Al-Mustaqbal, led by Davutoglu, the leader who defected from Erdogan, and the Democracy and Progress Party, led by Ali Baba Can, who defected from Erdogan). Members and supporters of both parties are from the origins of the Justice and Development Party.
Thus, the basic elements in the formation of the Justice and Development Party and Erdogan are out of his control, and the popularity of the nationalist movement will certainly not rise at a time when Erdogan’s popularity is rooted among those who are dissatisfied with his economic policies and those who reject his repressive methods.
Return to the Kurdish portal
There is nothing left for Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party but to rebuild the map of his two peoples from the Kurdish portal, as this popularity had a major impact on the elections, as more than 30% of the votes he obtained from the Kurdish regions, and his leadership of the political Islam discourse and the deception of the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood, and this popularity. At the moment I have completely backed down. If he works to restore these votes, he needs to return to dialogue with the Kurds. . If he works to restore these votes, he needs to return to dialogue with the Kurds. However, this will not be achieved easily after the Kurdish street has lost confidence in Erdogan’s policies, and the extent of the hostility he has formed in the region against the Kurdish issue, and it will not be easy even to dialogue with the Kurds, and it may require many practical actions in order to restore the confidence of the Kurds again, and the first of those steps is restoring Serious dialogue with the Kurds, releasing detainees, and ending its occupation of some Kurdish areas in Syria.
In order for him to move forward in building confidence, he must meet with the Kurds, and his visits may come to the Iraqi Kurdistan region to pave the way with the Kurds in calming the atmosphere, especially since the recent statements issued by the region were promising for building ways of rapprochement with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as he stated The Minister of Interior of the Kurdistan Region said that the Kurdistan Workers' Party organization is not on the terrorist list, and that the Kurdistan Region's view of this organization is that it is liberal and struggles to achieve Kurdish demands in Turkey. Without this option, Erdogan and his party will falter between internal bankruptcy and external pressures. If we accept the position of the Kurdish parties inside Turkey, which will not easily trust Erdogan’s policies, this means they will not easily engage in dialogue with him without real guarantees, because the Turkish opposition is on the rise, and the fate of Erdogan and his party is not guaranteed, and the opposition’s speeches and rapprochements are much better than Erdogan’s.
