Geostrategic Studies Team
Syria is no longer merely an open arena for competing regional and international powers. It is gradually becoming one of the most important battlegrounds over the shape of the emerging regional order in the Middle East. After years of war that turned Syrian territory into a theater for multiple interventions, a new phase now appears to be taking shape, defined above all by growing competition between Turkey and Israel over the boundaries of influence and the type of power that will ultimately establish itself inside Syria and across its wider regional environment.
The most dangerous development in this trajectory came on August 18, when Israel carried out eight airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, targeting runways and facilities at the base. The significance of the strikes, however, was not primarily the extent of the physical damage or the absence of reported casualties, but the political and military message they conveyed. The strikes came amid Israeli concerns over the possibility of Turkish forces being deployed at the base, while Ankara rejected the Israeli narrative and condemned the strikes as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
What makes the Abu al-Duhur incident more than another Israeli strike inside Syria is its timing and broader context. Sources revealed that on August 14, Mossad Director Roman Gofman held a call with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, only four days before the strikes. The Turkish military presence in Syria was reportedly among the central issues discussed, including Turkish military assistance, equipment, and drones provided to Syrian forces. The subsequent Israeli strike therefore suggested that the issue had moved beyond political concern and into the realm of direct security and military calculations.
Syria Is No Longer a Peripheral Arena in the Regional Struggle
Syria matters to both Turkey and Israel not simply because it is a neighboring country, but because whoever establishes a durable position there can influence a much broader set of Middle Eastern power equations.
For Turkey, Syria represents the southern depth of its national security. At the same time, it offers Ankara an opportunity to rebuild a broader regional influence, particularly following the political transformation that followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The close relationship between Ankara and Syria's new authorities has given Turkey considerable leverage over security and defense affairs and over the rebuilding of Syrian military institutions. Any expansion of Turkish military facilities and infrastructure in Syria therefore becomes part of a broader restructuring of the Syrian state rather than merely temporary military cooperation.
Israel, however, views the situation through a fundamentally different lens. Following the collapse of the previous Syrian regime, Israel did not treat the emerging Syrian order simply as a vacuum that could be left to stabilize on its own. Instead, it approached the new environment as a security space that needed to be contained before it could generate new threats.
Consequently, the growing Turkish military presence in Syria raises Israeli concerns that extend beyond the nature of the Syrian government itself. From the Israeli perspective, the question is not only who governs Damascus, but who possesses the military capacity to shape Syrian decision-making and establish forces close to Israel's strategic environment.
This helps explain why the Abu al-Duhur strike can be interpreted as a message directed at more than one actor: Damascus, Ankara, and potentially the wider group of powers attempting to shape Syria's future.
Ankara Is Moving Through Multiple Strategic Channels
Turkey's actions in Syria cannot be understood separately from its broader regional strategy. Ankara is no longer relying on a single instrument of influence. Instead, it is combining diplomatic mediation, regional partnerships, military capabilities, and economic and political influence.
On Iran, Turkey has sought to maintain channels with Tehran while simultaneously engaging Washington. Ankara, together with Egypt and Pakistan, has emerged as one of the regional actors seeking to preserve diplomatic channels and prevent further escalation. This does not necessarily mean that Turkey is attempting to protect the Iranian regime or determine its future. Rather, it reflects Ankara's desire to prevent major regional transformations from taking place without Turkey having a meaningful role in shaping them.
At the same time, Turkey has taken a more visible step toward building a wider regional network. On August 7, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement based on the principle that aggression against one of the three would be regarded as aggression against all, while also establishing mechanisms for political and military coordination and cooperation in areas including drones, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and defense industries.
Turkey is therefore not acting in Syria in isolation. Its Syrian policy forms part of a broader attempt to establish a stronger position within a regional system undergoing major transformation, amid the weakening of some traditional arrangements and the emergence of new strategic partnerships.
This is precisely where Israel begins to view Turkish activity as something larger than Syrian policy.
Israel Is Facing a Different Turkey
Israel's concern is not simply that Turkey has interests in Syria. Those interests have existed for years. The deeper concern is that Turkish interests are increasingly being transformed into political and military capabilities capable of influencing the future of the Syrian state.
The more Ankara supports the Syrian military establishment and expands its ability to use strategic military facilities, the greater Turkey's influence becomes over Syria's future security architecture. This explains the sensitivity surrounding any potential Turkish deployment at strategic bases such as Abu al-Duhur.
The dispute, therefore, is not merely about where Turkish forces might be stationed. It is about a much larger question:
Who will control the keys to Syria's security architecture in the coming phase?
If Turkey succeeds in establishing a durable military presence in Syria, supported by a close political relationship with the new authorities in Damascus, it will become an actor that cannot easily be excluded from any future Syrian security arrangement.
For Israel, this would mean confronting a major regional power with an advanced military and NATO membership, rather than dealing with a weak and fragmented Syrian state as it had during much of the previous period.
This is where the rules of the game begin to change.
Israel is no longer looking only at Syria's borders as an area that must be secured. It is increasingly looking at who will fill the strategic vacuum created by the transformation of Syria.
Abu al-Duhur: A Strike or the Drawing of a Red Line?
From this perspective, the Abu al-Duhur strike carries greater significance than its military map alone would suggest.
Israel has argued that Damascus was moving toward allowing a Turkish military presence at the base, while Turkey rejected that claim. Damascus also reportedly informed Israel that there were no plans to establish a Turkish base there. Nevertheless, the strike took place.
This raises an important possibility: Israel may not be waiting for a Turkish military presence to become fully established. It may instead be attempting to prevent the creation of a new strategic reality in the first place.
If this interpretation proves correct, Israel has begun drawing boundaries around Turkish influence inside Syria. This would be highly sensitive for Ankara, which is unlikely to easily accept Israeli strikes against Syrian facilities linked to the rebuilding of the Syrian military establishment that Turkey supports.
For this reason, Ankara's response went beyond a routine diplomatic condemnation. Turkey treated the strike as an unacceptable escalation. At the same time, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack described the strike as an unnecessary escalation, while Washington has been working toward a mechanism designed to prevent friction between Turkey, Israel, and Syria.
This reveals the scale of the danger: Washington is not treating the issue merely as a political disagreement between two allies. It is treating it as a potential military confrontation that needs to be contained.
Could Syria Become the New Arena of Confrontation?
The most dangerous scenario is not necessarily a direct Turkish-Israeli war, which neither side currently appears to favor. A more plausible and potentially prolonged scenario is for Syria to become a theater of indirect and sustained confrontation between the two powers.
Turkey is likely to continue consolidating its influence within Syrian institutions and deepening its political and military relationship with Damascus. Israel, meanwhile, will seek to prevent the emergence of any military infrastructure that it considers a threat to its security environment.
Damascus will consequently find itself caught between competing pressures. It needs Turkish support to rebuild state institutions and the military, while at the same time it cannot ignore Israel's military reach inside the Syrian arena or Washington's efforts to prevent Syria from becoming the next major theater of regional confrontation.
Syria could therefore become, for the first time in years, an arena where two major regional powers equipped with advanced military capabilities compete directly over influence, rather than merely a battlefield where others settle their disputes.
For the Kurds, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and northeastern Syria, this transformation carries equally significant implications. Any change in the relationship between Ankara and Damascus, between Turkey and Israel, or in Washington's position within this equation will directly affect the future political and security arrangements in northeastern Syria.
The central question is therefore no longer simply: What does Israel want from Syria? Or what does Turkey want from Syria?
The more consequential question is: Has Syria become the arena in which the boundaries of Turkish and Israeli influence—and perhaps the contours of the new Middle Eastern order—will ultimately be drawn?
The most dangerous development in this trajectory came on August 18, when Israel carried out eight airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, targeting runways and facilities at the base. The significance of the strikes, however, was not primarily the extent of the physical damage or the absence of reported casualties, but the political and military message they conveyed. The strikes came amid Israeli concerns over the possibility of Turkish forces being deployed at the base, while Ankara rejected the Israeli narrative and condemned the strikes as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
What makes the Abu al-Duhur incident more than another Israeli strike inside Syria is its timing and broader context. Sources revealed that on August 14, Mossad Director Roman Gofman held a call with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, only four days before the strikes. The Turkish military presence in Syria was reportedly among the central issues discussed, including Turkish military assistance, equipment, and drones provided to Syrian forces. The subsequent Israeli strike therefore suggested that the issue had moved beyond political concern and into the realm of direct security and military calculations.
Syria Is No Longer a Peripheral Arena in the Regional Struggle
Syria matters to both Turkey and Israel not simply because it is a neighboring country, but because whoever establishes a durable position there can influence a much broader set of Middle Eastern power equations.
For Turkey, Syria represents the southern depth of its national security. At the same time, it offers Ankara an opportunity to rebuild a broader regional influence, particularly following the political transformation that followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The close relationship between Ankara and Syria's new authorities has given Turkey considerable leverage over security and defense affairs and over the rebuilding of Syrian military institutions. Any expansion of Turkish military facilities and infrastructure in Syria therefore becomes part of a broader restructuring of the Syrian state rather than merely temporary military cooperation.
Israel, however, views the situation through a fundamentally different lens. Following the collapse of the previous Syrian regime, Israel did not treat the emerging Syrian order simply as a vacuum that could be left to stabilize on its own. Instead, it approached the new environment as a security space that needed to be contained before it could generate new threats.
Consequently, the growing Turkish military presence in Syria raises Israeli concerns that extend beyond the nature of the Syrian government itself. From the Israeli perspective, the question is not only who governs Damascus, but who possesses the military capacity to shape Syrian decision-making and establish forces close to Israel's strategic environment.
This helps explain why the Abu al-Duhur strike can be interpreted as a message directed at more than one actor: Damascus, Ankara, and potentially the wider group of powers attempting to shape Syria's future.
Ankara Is Moving Through Multiple Strategic Channels
Turkey's actions in Syria cannot be understood separately from its broader regional strategy. Ankara is no longer relying on a single instrument of influence. Instead, it is combining diplomatic mediation, regional partnerships, military capabilities, and economic and political influence.
On Iran, Turkey has sought to maintain channels with Tehran while simultaneously engaging Washington. Ankara, together with Egypt and Pakistan, has emerged as one of the regional actors seeking to preserve diplomatic channels and prevent further escalation. This does not necessarily mean that Turkey is attempting to protect the Iranian regime or determine its future. Rather, it reflects Ankara's desire to prevent major regional transformations from taking place without Turkey having a meaningful role in shaping them.
At the same time, Turkey has taken a more visible step toward building a wider regional network. On August 7, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement based on the principle that aggression against one of the three would be regarded as aggression against all, while also establishing mechanisms for political and military coordination and cooperation in areas including drones, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and defense industries.
Turkey is therefore not acting in Syria in isolation. Its Syrian policy forms part of a broader attempt to establish a stronger position within a regional system undergoing major transformation, amid the weakening of some traditional arrangements and the emergence of new strategic partnerships.
This is precisely where Israel begins to view Turkish activity as something larger than Syrian policy.
Israel Is Facing a Different Turkey
Israel's concern is not simply that Turkey has interests in Syria. Those interests have existed for years. The deeper concern is that Turkish interests are increasingly being transformed into political and military capabilities capable of influencing the future of the Syrian state.
The more Ankara supports the Syrian military establishment and expands its ability to use strategic military facilities, the greater Turkey's influence becomes over Syria's future security architecture. This explains the sensitivity surrounding any potential Turkish deployment at strategic bases such as Abu al-Duhur.
The dispute, therefore, is not merely about where Turkish forces might be stationed. It is about a much larger question:
Who will control the keys to Syria's security architecture in the coming phase?
If Turkey succeeds in establishing a durable military presence in Syria, supported by a close political relationship with the new authorities in Damascus, it will become an actor that cannot easily be excluded from any future Syrian security arrangement.
For Israel, this would mean confronting a major regional power with an advanced military and NATO membership, rather than dealing with a weak and fragmented Syrian state as it had during much of the previous period.
This is where the rules of the game begin to change.
Israel is no longer looking only at Syria's borders as an area that must be secured. It is increasingly looking at who will fill the strategic vacuum created by the transformation of Syria.
Abu al-Duhur: A Strike or the Drawing of a Red Line?
From this perspective, the Abu al-Duhur strike carries greater significance than its military map alone would suggest.
Israel has argued that Damascus was moving toward allowing a Turkish military presence at the base, while Turkey rejected that claim. Damascus also reportedly informed Israel that there were no plans to establish a Turkish base there. Nevertheless, the strike took place.
This raises an important possibility: Israel may not be waiting for a Turkish military presence to become fully established. It may instead be attempting to prevent the creation of a new strategic reality in the first place.
If this interpretation proves correct, Israel has begun drawing boundaries around Turkish influence inside Syria. This would be highly sensitive for Ankara, which is unlikely to easily accept Israeli strikes against Syrian facilities linked to the rebuilding of the Syrian military establishment that Turkey supports.
For this reason, Ankara's response went beyond a routine diplomatic condemnation. Turkey treated the strike as an unacceptable escalation. At the same time, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack described the strike as an unnecessary escalation, while Washington has been working toward a mechanism designed to prevent friction between Turkey, Israel, and Syria.
This reveals the scale of the danger: Washington is not treating the issue merely as a political disagreement between two allies. It is treating it as a potential military confrontation that needs to be contained.
Could Syria Become the New Arena of Confrontation?
The most dangerous scenario is not necessarily a direct Turkish-Israeli war, which neither side currently appears to favor. A more plausible and potentially prolonged scenario is for Syria to become a theater of indirect and sustained confrontation between the two powers.
Turkey is likely to continue consolidating its influence within Syrian institutions and deepening its political and military relationship with Damascus. Israel, meanwhile, will seek to prevent the emergence of any military infrastructure that it considers a threat to its security environment.
Damascus will consequently find itself caught between competing pressures. It needs Turkish support to rebuild state institutions and the military, while at the same time it cannot ignore Israel's military reach inside the Syrian arena or Washington's efforts to prevent Syria from becoming the next major theater of regional confrontation.
Syria could therefore become, for the first time in years, an arena where two major regional powers equipped with advanced military capabilities compete directly over influence, rather than merely a battlefield where others settle their disputes.
For the Kurds, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and northeastern Syria, this transformation carries equally significant implications. Any change in the relationship between Ankara and Damascus, between Turkey and Israel, or in Washington's position within this equation will directly affect the future political and security arrangements in northeastern Syria.
The central question is therefore no longer simply: What does Israel want from Syria? Or what does Turkey want from Syria?
The more consequential question is: Has Syria become the arena in which the boundaries of Turkish and Israeli influence—and perhaps the contours of the new Middle Eastern order—will ultimately be drawn?
