Prepared by: GeoStrategic Studies Team
The Kurdish issue in Syria is no longer moving within the framework that emerged during the years of the war against ISIS, when the Syrian Democratic Forces became the United States’ most important local partner in confronting the organization and, as a result, developed an exceptional military and political relationship with Washington that enabled Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria to build extensive military and administrative institutions under a form of American protection that was never, at any point, an explicit commitment to establishing an independent Kurdish entity or a permanent federal system. The relationship was fundamentally linked to the war against ISIS and to Washington’s need for a reliable local force capable of controlling territory and confronting the organization, and therefore, as the main phase of the war came to an end and American priorities in the region changed, the strategic value of this relationship gradually changed as well. The central question for Washington was no longer how to protect an independent Kurdish military structure, but rather how to preserve its influence in Syria, prevent the return of extremist organizations, contain Iranian influence, and support the emergence of a political system with which the United States could deal without maintaining a large and permanent military presence.
The Kurdish issue in Syria is no longer moving within the framework that emerged during the years of the war against ISIS, when the Syrian Democratic Forces became the United States’ most important local partner in confronting the organization and, as a result, developed an exceptional military and political relationship with Washington that enabled Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria to build extensive military and administrative institutions under a form of American protection that was never, at any point, an explicit commitment to establishing an independent Kurdish entity or a permanent federal system. The relationship was fundamentally linked to the war against ISIS and to Washington’s need for a reliable local force capable of controlling territory and confronting the organization, and therefore, as the main phase of the war came to an end and American priorities in the region changed, the strategic value of this relationship gradually changed as well. The central question for Washington was no longer how to protect an independent Kurdish military structure, but rather how to preserve its influence in Syria, prevent the return of extremist organizations, contain Iranian influence, and support the emergence of a political system with which the United States could deal without maintaining a large and permanent military presence.
The American Shift and the Redistribution of Roles
From this perspective, Donald Trump’s approach to Syria can be understood as part of a broader American policy aimed at reducing the costs of direct involvement in the Middle East, rather than necessarily withdrawing from the region or abandoning American interests there. The United States understands that its direct military presence cannot continue indefinitely at the same level that existed during the years of the anti-ISIS campaign, and therefore it is increasingly looking for regional powers capable of carrying part of the security and political responsibilities that Washington previously had to manage directly. Turkey emerges as the most capable candidate for such a role because of its geographic position, military strength, NATO membership, long borders with Syria and Iraq, extensive relations with Syrian actors, and, above all, its ability to directly influence the Kurdish file. The emerging American approach can therefore be understood as an attempt to preserve strategic influence while reducing direct military involvement and granting Turkey greater room to manage security and political issues within its immediate sphere of influence. In this sense, Washington is not necessarily leaving Syria; rather, it is redistributing the instruments through which it maintains its presence there.
This shift also helps explain the growing American preference for a centralized Syrian state capable of exercising authority over its territory, because Washington increasingly appears more interested in having a government capable of controlling borders, preventing the return of jihadist organizations, and containing Iranian influence than in preserving the fragmented local arrangements that emerged during the war. For the United States, a centralized state provides a formal partner with whom it can deal directly and reduces the number of local actors that Washington has to manage, finance, protect, and coordinate. It also creates the possibility of dealing with Damascus as the official center of political authority, making the integration of local military forces into state institutions part of a broader process of rebuilding the Syrian state rather than simply a limited military agreement.
From this perspective, Donald Trump’s approach to Syria can be understood as part of a broader American policy aimed at reducing the costs of direct involvement in the Middle East, rather than necessarily withdrawing from the region or abandoning American interests there. The United States understands that its direct military presence cannot continue indefinitely at the same level that existed during the years of the anti-ISIS campaign, and therefore it is increasingly looking for regional powers capable of carrying part of the security and political responsibilities that Washington previously had to manage directly. Turkey emerges as the most capable candidate for such a role because of its geographic position, military strength, NATO membership, long borders with Syria and Iraq, extensive relations with Syrian actors, and, above all, its ability to directly influence the Kurdish file. The emerging American approach can therefore be understood as an attempt to preserve strategic influence while reducing direct military involvement and granting Turkey greater room to manage security and political issues within its immediate sphere of influence. In this sense, Washington is not necessarily leaving Syria; rather, it is redistributing the instruments through which it maintains its presence there.
This shift also helps explain the growing American preference for a centralized Syrian state capable of exercising authority over its territory, because Washington increasingly appears more interested in having a government capable of controlling borders, preventing the return of jihadist organizations, and containing Iranian influence than in preserving the fragmented local arrangements that emerged during the war. For the United States, a centralized state provides a formal partner with whom it can deal directly and reduces the number of local actors that Washington has to manage, finance, protect, and coordinate. It also creates the possibility of dealing with Damascus as the official center of political authority, making the integration of local military forces into state institutions part of a broader process of rebuilding the Syrian state rather than simply a limited military agreement.
Turkey Takes Over the Kurdish File
This is precisely where Turkey’s role becomes increasingly important. From the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Ankara viewed the presence of a Kurdish armed force linked politically and organizationally to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, along its southern border as a long-term strategic threat. Consequently, dismantling the independent military structure of the Syrian Democratic Forces and transforming it into part of the Syrian state represents an objective that Ankara has pursued for years, but which it was unable to achieve fully as long as American forces remained in Syria and Washington continued to provide political and military protection to the SDF. The process that has now moved toward integrating Kurdish forces into the Syrian state can therefore be interpreted as a transition from a period in which Washington managed the Kurdish file directly to a new phase in which Turkey is being given greater space to manage it through arrangements involving Damascus and Washington. In this sense, saying that the Kurdish file has effectively been handed over to Turkey describes a transformation in Turkey’s function within the broader American strategy rather than a complete American withdrawal from the Kurdish issue.
The United States no longer needs to preserve an independent Kurdish military force with the same intensity that it did during the war against ISIS, while Turkey wants to dismantle such a structure and Damascus wants to restore control over the entire country. The interests of the three parties therefore converge around the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian state, although this convergence does not mean that their interests are identical. Washington wants the new Syrian state to prevent the return of Iran and extremist organizations; Turkey wants that same state to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish military entity; and the Kurds want guarantees for their political, cultural, and administrative rights within the new state. This is where the more difficult stage begins, because military integration can resolve the question of armed formations without necessarily resolving the political question surrounding the Kurdish community and its future.
The Syrian Agreement as a Model for What Is Happening in Turkey
The most important aspect of the Syrian process is not simply the integration of the SDF, but the model that may emerge from it. Turkey is simultaneously pursuing an internal process concerning the PKK, its disarmament, and the reintegration of its members into the political and legal structures of the Turkish state. This creates an important parallel with the Syrian arrangement, because both processes appear to be moving toward the same basic formula: ending independent armed structures while opening the way for a new political and legal framework within the existing state. If this model succeeds in both Syria and Turkey, it could become a broader regional formula for dealing with the Kurdish issue, transforming it from a cross-border armed conflict into a political question to be addressed within the institutions of existing states.
For Ankara, the objective is therefore not simply to defeat the PKK as an armed organization, but to dismantle the regional environment that allows a Kurdish armed movement to operate across Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. As long as such an environment remains intact, the Kurdish issue will continue to be internationalized and will remain available as a strategic instrument for external powers seeking to pressure Turkey. By contrast, transforming the Kurdish issue into a political matter within the state reduces the ability of outside powers to exploit it. This is why Turkey may be prepared, in the next phase, to accept certain political, cultural, and legal arrangements for the Kurds in exchange for dismantling the armed structure, because the ultimate objective is to close the security file that has represented one of the most persistent sources of instability and strategic pressure on the Turkish state for decades.
Israel Enters Turkey’s New Strategic Calculations
This question becomes even more significant when viewed against the broader transformation of the Middle East and the growing competition between Turkey and Israel. Ankara increasingly sees the coming period as a struggle over influence following the weakening of Iran, while Israel is seeking to consolidate its military and security position and expand its ability to shape the regional environment. Turkey therefore has little interest in leaving unresolved issues that could later be turned against it. The Kurdish issue is particularly sensitive in this regard, not because there is necessarily a declared Israeli project to divide Turkey or use the Kurds against it, but because the existence of an independent Kurdish armed force in a geographic space stretching across Syria, Iraq, and Turkey could, under different regional circumstances, become an instrument in the hands of competing powers. Ankara therefore seeks to address the problem before it becomes part of a new and broader regional confrontation.
From this perspective, Turkey’s desire to establish a new relationship with the Kurds can be understood as an attempt to integrate them into state institutions rather than leave them as an independent force capable of becoming part of regional conflicts. Kurds who are politically and legally integrated into the Turkish or Syrian state can become a stabilizing component of the regional order, whereas continued armed conflict would keep them in a position where outside powers could attempt to exploit them. Turkey therefore has an interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish military belt that could potentially be used by Israel or another regional power against Ankara, while at the same time ensuring that Kurdish political activity remains within the political systems of the states in which Kurds live rather than developing into an independent geopolitical force operating beyond those states.
Iran’s Decline and the Rise of Turkey
None of these developments can be properly understood without considering the weakening of Iran’s regional role. Over the past two decades, Iran constructed an extensive network of influence stretching from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon, giving Tehran substantial capacity to shape regional conflicts. The weakening of Iran’s ability to operate across the region, however, is creating a strategic vacuum that will not remain empty. Turkey is one of the powers best positioned to benefit from this vacuum because it possesses the political, military, economic, and geographic instruments necessary to build a broad sphere of influence. The rise of Turkey should therefore not be understood merely as a Turkish victory over Kurdish armed structures or as the consequence of declining American involvement. It should instead be seen as part of a much broader redistribution of power in the Middle East following the weakening of Iran.
This is precisely what makes Turkey valuable to the United States. Washington does not necessarily want to leave the region open to a vacuum that could be exploited by Russia, Iran, or other competing powers, while at the same time it does not want to return to the era of large-scale American military deployments. A regional power such as Turkey, capable of performing broad security and political functions, offers Washington a more sustainable alternative. Ankara gains greater room to maneuver, while Washington gains a regional partner capable of protecting part of the Western strategic interest without requiring the United States to bear the entire cost itself. In this sense, Turkey is returning in some respects to a role resembling the security role it played for decades as a key southern pillar of NATO, but under fundamentally different circumstances. Today’s Turkey is far more autonomous in its foreign policy and far more ambitious in pursuing regional influence, meaning that it will not simply act on behalf of Washington but will use its relationship with the United States and the broader Western system to advance its own strategic project.
The Kurds Face a Different Political Phase
Against this background, the Kurds are entering a phase fundamentally different from the one that preceded it. Reliance on military power and American protection is no longer sufficient to guarantee a stable political future, just as it is no longer possible to depend on continued regional conflict as a long-term strategy. The real challenge for the Kurds is therefore to transform the political and military capital accumulated during the years of war into sustainable institutional and political influence capable of protecting Kurdish rights within the state. This requires redefining the Kurdish political project in Syria in a way that corresponds to the new circumstances. The objective should not simply be to preserve the previous form of the Autonomous Administration, but to secure a constitutional and legal position for the Kurds within a new Syria, protect their language, culture, identity, and political rights, and establish a form of local governance that prevents the return of the coercive centralization that marginalized the Kurds for decades.
At this point, the independence of Kurdish political decision-making becomes more important than ever. The greatest danger in the new phase is not necessarily the loss of an independent military structure, but the loss of the ability to make independent political decisions. If the Kurds become merely an instrument of Turkey, Washington, Damascus, or any other regional power, integration could gradually turn into political absorption. But if they are able to develop an independent political project capable of negotiating with all sides, the transition from military power to political power could become a historic opportunity to rebuild the Kurdish issue on a more sustainable foundation.
Kurdish Political Pluralism Between Strength and Fragmentation
This is why the future of the different Kurdish political currents will become increasingly important. The coming period may witness a transition from the dominance of military forces toward broader Kurdish political pluralism involving the Kurdish left, nationalist movements, Kurdish Islamic currents, civil forces, and independent political figures. Such diversity can become a source of strength if it develops into genuine political pluralism, but it can also become a source of weakness if it turns into internal conflict that regional powers can exploit to fragment Kurdish decision-making. The objective therefore should not be to unify the Kurds under a single organization or ideology, but to create a common political space in which different currents can coexist while maintaining a minimum level of shared Kurdish national interests. Political diversity itself is not the problem; the problem begins when political diversity loses its ability to produce an independent strategic decision.
In this context, the independence of the Kurdish left, Kurdish Islamic movements, nationalist forces, and other political currents from regional projects will become a decisive factor. If Turkey succeeds in ending its armed conflict with the PKK, the Kurdish political landscape in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq could undergo a significant transformation, creating new political space while also inviting different regional powers to seek influence over Kurdish actors. The ability of Kurdish political forces to preserve their autonomy and avoid becoming instruments in broader regional rivalries will therefore determine whether the coming period produces a stronger Kurdish political pluralism or merely a new form of Kurdish fragmentation.
Syria Between Centralization and Kurdish Rights
Ultimately, the success of the new Syrian model will depend on the nature of the state that emerges from these transformations. Centralization is not necessarily a problem if the state is centralized in terms of sovereignty and institutions while simultaneously recognizing political, ethnic, and cultural diversity. The problem begins when centralization becomes a mechanism for political and cultural monopolization that denies the existence of different communities. The Kurds can accept a unified Syrian state if that state is based on citizenship and guarantees the rights of all its communities. But if the new centralized state simply reproduces the old model of imposing a single national identity on everyone, the integration process will not constitute a final solution; it will merely postpone the crisis to another stage.
For this reason, the current military and security agreements should not be regarded as the end of the discussion but as the beginning of a new political process in which the relationship between the Syrian state and the Kurds is defined constitutionally and legally. Integrating armed forces can resolve the question of weapons, but it does not resolve questions of identity, political representation, local governance, language, culture, or constitutional rights. These issues will remain regardless of how military institutions are reorganized. The real test will therefore be whether Damascus can build a political framework capable of integrating the Kurds into the Syrian state without eliminating their identity and political rights, and whether the Kurds themselves can formulate a realistic political project that protects their interests without turning their relationship with the Syrian state into a permanent confrontation.
The Kurdish Issue Is Not Ending; Its Political Form Is Changing
What is happening today in Syria and Turkey represents, at its core, an attempt to close one historical phase and open another. The United States is seeking to reduce its direct involvement and redistribute responsibilities, Turkey is seeking to eliminate the armed Kurdish challenge to its national security while positioning itself for the period following Iran’s decline, Damascus is seeking to rebuild the central state, and Israel is attempting to preserve and expand its security and military freedom of action within a rapidly changing regional environment. In the middle of all these transformations, the Kurds are facing the end of a military phase that began with the war against ISIS and the beginning of a far more complicated political phase.
The Kurdish question, therefore, has not disappeared. Rather, its position within the regional equation has changed. The Kurds are moving from a period in which they possessed a powerful local military structure backed by the United States toward a period in which they will have to demonstrate their ability to operate politically and institutionally within a new regional order. Turkey will be one of the most important actors with whom they will have to deal, but Damascus, Washington, Europe, Israel, Arab states, and other regional powers will also remain influential. The fundamental challenge is to ensure that the Kurds do not once again become merely a card in the conflicts of others.
The next struggle will therefore not primarily be about preserving weapons, but about preserving political decision-making. It will not be defined solely by who controls territory, but by who can transform social and political presence into sustainable institutional power, who can build relationships without surrendering strategic autonomy, and who can enter the emerging regional order as an actor rather than as an object of decisions made by others. The previous phase was fundamentally a struggle over territory and military power; the coming phase will be a struggle over political legitimacy, institutions, alliances, constitutional rights, and strategic autonomy.
For the Kurds, this may ultimately prove more difficult than the military struggle itself. Military power can create leverage, but it cannot by itself guarantee political recognition. External protection can provide security, but it cannot substitute for an independent political strategy. Regional conflicts can create opportunities, but they can also turn those who rely on them into instruments of other powers. The central task, therefore, is to transform the experience and political capital accumulated during the previous period into an independent Kurdish political capacity capable of negotiating with Turkey, Damascus, Washington, Baghdad, and other regional and international actors without becoming subordinate to any of them.
The Syrian settlement, the Turkish-PKK process, the weakening of Iran, the rise of Turkey, and the growing Turkish-Israeli competition are therefore not separate developments. They are interconnected components of a broader transformation in the Middle Eastern balance of power. The United States is attempting to preserve its strategic influence while reducing the direct costs of its presence; Turkey is moving toward a larger regional role; Iran is losing part of the influence it once exercised; Israel is preparing for a new phase of regional competition; and Syria is being reconstructed around a stronger central state.
The Kurds stand at the intersection of all these developments. Their challenge is no longer simply to defend a territory or maintain a military formation, but to determine what political position they will occupy within the new regional order. If they succeed in transforming military experience into political and institutional power, the end of the previous military model does not have to mean the end of Kurdish influence. It could instead become the beginning of a different form of Kurdish political power. But if they fail to preserve their independent political decision-making, the current process of integration could gradually turn into political absorption, leaving the Kurds once again dependent on the calculations of others.
The Kurdish issue has therefore not ended in Syria; it has entered a new phase in which its tools, institutions, and political environment are changing. The military battlefield is giving way to the political arena, and the decisive struggle will increasingly take place around constitutions, institutions, representation, rights, alliances, and decision-making.
The central question is no longer simply who controls the territory, but who will have the political capacity to shape the future.
The United States is redistributing its regional responsibilities, Turkey is moving toward the center of the regional security architecture, Iran is retreating, Israel is preparing for a new struggle over influence, and Syria is returning to the center of the regional equation. The Kurds, meanwhile, face a historic choice: whether to remain a strategic card in the conflicts of regional and international powers, or to develop the political capacity necessary to become an independent actor capable of shaping the new order rather than merely adapting to it.
The previous phase was a struggle for territory and military power. The next phase will be a struggle for political decision-making.
