Post-SDF:
Who Will Protect the Kurds When the Era of Deterrence Comes to an End?
From Deterrence to a New Phase of the Balance of Power
From Deterrence to a New Phase of the Balance of Power
GeoStrategic Studies Team
The integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the institutions of the Syrian state was not merely a military arrangement involving the relocation of forces or the transfer of some fighters from one institution to another. Rather, it represented a profound transformation in the balance of power that had taken shape in northeastern Syria over more than a decade. For the Kurds, the SDF was not simply a military formation that emerged in the context of the war against ISIS. Over the years of conflict, it became the principal force providing a security and political umbrella for a Kurdish community confronted with a complex chain of threats, ranging from ISIS to Turkish interventions and the armed factions associated with them, alongside the continuing conflict with various Syrian forces. Therefore, the announcement of the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military structure and the integration of its fighters into the Syrian military, which entered a decisive phase in August 2026, raises a question that goes beyond the integration process itself: what happens to the Kurds when the era of possessing an independent deterrent force comes to an end, while clear political and security guarantees to protect them from forces that may view the decline of this power as an opportunity to reshape the balance of power against them have not yet fully emerged?
The integration process could have been viewed as the end of a long conflict between Damascus and the SDF and the beginning of an era of a unified state if the new Syrian state had reached a stage where it possessed an effective monopoly over the use of force and could impose the law equally on all communities. The problem, however, is that Syria has not yet reached that stage. The country remains in a complex transitional process, while local, regional, tribal and military centers of power continue to exert direct influence over security and politics, as Damascus attempts to rebuild state institutions after more than a decade of war and fragmentation. Therefore, dismantling a force that possessed significant military and organizational capabilities does not necessarily mean that the state will immediately fill the vacuum created by its withdrawal. In some areas, that vacuum could instead be filled by other social or armed forces if there is no genuine state monopoly over weapons. This is precisely the point that the Kurds need to consider seriously, not from the perspective of rejecting the state or opposing Syrian unity, but from the perspective of asking what security framework will ensure that the transition from the SDF system to the state system does not become a transition from deterrence to vulnerability. Recent studies and analyses have pointed to the integration of the SDF as one of the most important tests facing Syria's transitional phase, particularly in Kurdish areas that had operated under different security and administrative arrangements in previous years.
The integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the institutions of the Syrian state was not merely a military arrangement involving the relocation of forces or the transfer of some fighters from one institution to another. Rather, it represented a profound transformation in the balance of power that had taken shape in northeastern Syria over more than a decade. For the Kurds, the SDF was not simply a military formation that emerged in the context of the war against ISIS. Over the years of conflict, it became the principal force providing a security and political umbrella for a Kurdish community confronted with a complex chain of threats, ranging from ISIS to Turkish interventions and the armed factions associated with them, alongside the continuing conflict with various Syrian forces. Therefore, the announcement of the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military structure and the integration of its fighters into the Syrian military, which entered a decisive phase in August 2026, raises a question that goes beyond the integration process itself: what happens to the Kurds when the era of possessing an independent deterrent force comes to an end, while clear political and security guarantees to protect them from forces that may view the decline of this power as an opportunity to reshape the balance of power against them have not yet fully emerged?
The integration process could have been viewed as the end of a long conflict between Damascus and the SDF and the beginning of an era of a unified state if the new Syrian state had reached a stage where it possessed an effective monopoly over the use of force and could impose the law equally on all communities. The problem, however, is that Syria has not yet reached that stage. The country remains in a complex transitional process, while local, regional, tribal and military centers of power continue to exert direct influence over security and politics, as Damascus attempts to rebuild state institutions after more than a decade of war and fragmentation. Therefore, dismantling a force that possessed significant military and organizational capabilities does not necessarily mean that the state will immediately fill the vacuum created by its withdrawal. In some areas, that vacuum could instead be filled by other social or armed forces if there is no genuine state monopoly over weapons. This is precisely the point that the Kurds need to consider seriously, not from the perspective of rejecting the state or opposing Syrian unity, but from the perspective of asking what security framework will ensure that the transition from the SDF system to the state system does not become a transition from deterrence to vulnerability. Recent studies and analyses have pointed to the integration of the SDF as one of the most important tests facing Syria's transitional phase, particularly in Kurdish areas that had operated under different security and administrative arrangements in previous years.
When the Vacuum Begins to Appear
The problem that has begun to emerge following the steps toward integration is not that all Arab tribes have turned into adversaries of the Kurds, as such a generalization would be inaccurate and analytically unhelpful. Rather, the issue is that certain local forces have begun to behave as though a new phase in the balance of power has already begun. In August, armed tribal mobilization was reported near Hasakah, including the establishment of what was described as a "war tent" and threats directed against the Kurds and against the continuation of the Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria. Such developments raised concerns about the possible return of communal confrontation along ethnic lines.
This is where the contradiction becomes particularly significant. At the very moment when the SDF was moving from the position of an independent military force toward integration within state institutions, some local forces appeared to be testing the limits of the new phase. Such tests do not necessarily require a full-scale war to become dangerous. It is enough for a local actor to believe that its counterpart has lost its previous capacity to respond and that the central government has not yet reached the level of strength and authority required to enforce the law. Under such circumstances, a new phase of provocations, attacks and social pressure can emerge. This is the essence of deterrence: deterrence does not mean that military force is used in every incident, but rather that the existence of such force makes the other side think carefully before deciding to attack. Once that force disappears or becomes uncertain, calculations change. The political position of an adversary may not change, but it may become more willing to test its opponent socially and security-wise, particularly if it believes that a previous balance of power has come to an end.
This is why some of the recent developments in Kurdish areas should be viewed as indicators worthy of examination rather than as isolated incidents that can each be separated from the others. In Kobani, a city historically associated with the fight against ISIS, the killing of a Kurdish man amid tensions between Kurds and Arabs led to protests and unrest. Events later escalated inside a prison into rioting and a fire that caused deaths, with recent reports directly linking the incident to the Kurdish-Arab tensions that preceded the prison unrest. The question, therefore, becomes larger than a specific criminal or security incident, because what deserves attention is whether we are witnessing the beginning of a transformation in the very nature of the conflict.
During the years of war, the equation was relatively clear for the Kurds: there was ISIS as an identifiable military enemy, Turkey as a regional power hostile to the SDF, and Damascus, which was engaged in a political and military conflict with the Kurdish administration. Today, however, the picture is more complicated. The SDF has ceased to exist as an independent force, Damascus has become a partner in the process of rebuilding state institutions, the Turkish threat is taking different forms, and some aspects of the conflict may be shifting from the direct military sphere into the local social sphere. This is where the real danger lies, because the transformation of the conflict from a clear military confrontation into social and ethnic tensions makes it more difficult to contain, particularly when historical memories, local calculations and new balances of power become intertwined.
The Social Environment of ISIS Does Not Disappear with the Fall of ISIS
With the support of the international coalition, the SDF carried out one of the most significant military campaigns against ISIS in Syria, and the fall of its last territorial strongholds marked the culmination of years of warfare. Yet the military defeat of the organization does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the social environment that once sheltered it, tolerated it, or provided conditions that facilitated its expansion. This is entirely different from claiming that everyone who criticizes or disagrees with the Kurds is part of an ISIS support base. The point is that the social, ideological and security legacy of ISIS does not disappear simply because its military structure has collapsed. Elements of that legacy can reappear in different forms, whether through hate speech, religious or tribal mobilization, rejection of the other, ethnic targeting, or attempts to reproduce local control under new labels.
The danger becomes greater when the confrontation shifts from a clearly identifiable armed organization to a less clearly defined social environment. An organization can be targeted militarily, whereas an environment that produces extremist, nationalist or religious rhetoric against another community is much more difficult to address because it intersects with tribal structures, local society, politics, economic interests and security considerations. This is why a clear distinction must be made between Arab tribes as deeply rooted social communities in the region and the use of certain tribal structures in political and military conflicts. The problem is not Arabs or tribal identity as such, but rather the transformation of tribal affiliation into an instrument of mobilization against the Kurds, or its use to cover acts of revenge or to impose local influence at a moment when one side believes that its deterrent capacity has weakened. This issue is not new in Syrian history, but it becomes more dangerous at the present stage because the country is rebuilding its entire political and security order.
The Syrian State Faces the Kurdish Test
The primary responsibility therefore falls on Damascus. If the integration of the SDF genuinely means a transition from an era of multiple armed forces to an era of state authority, then the Syrian state must demonstrate this on the ground. It is not enough for Damascus to say that the Kurds are Syrian citizens, nor is it enough to speak about national unity or cultural and political rights. These principles must be reflected in security and legal practice when a Kurdish citizen is attacked or when tribal mobilization threatens another community. The real test of a state does not come when conditions are calm, but when it confronts a powerful local actor, an armed group or a social discourse capable of triggering communal conflict.
If Damascus allows certain areas to become spheres of local influence, or allows the law to operate differently from one area to another, the Kurds will face an extremely difficult equation: they will have lost the deterrent force they possessed over the past years without receiving, in return, a strong state capable of guaranteeing their security and rights. This is precisely the scenario that must be avoided. Genuine integration does not mean that the Kurds surrender their weapons and then wait for the goodwill of others. Genuine integration means that protection is transferred from a partisan, ethnic or local force to state institutions, and that the law becomes stronger than the tribe, stronger than the faction, and stronger than ethnic or religious affiliation.
If weapons are transferred to the Ministry of Defense while actual power remains distributed among multiple local centers, the integration process could become an institutional form that does not necessarily reflect the real balance of power on the ground. At this point, the Kurdish question must be clearly stated: have the Kurds genuinely entered a state, or have they merely left a zone of military influence and entered a transitional phase in which the new rules of power have yet to be defined? The difference between these two possibilities is the difference between a successful state-building project and the emergence of a new crisis.
The Kurds Between Trust and Guarantees
A stable future for Syria cannot be built through the continuation of mutual fear. The Kurds do not need another war, just as Syria does not need to reproduce civil conflict along ethnic lines. But genuine peace cannot be built on hopes alone; it requires guarantees and institutions. International and regional actors have welcomed the integration of the SDF as a step toward unifying the Syrian state, and it has been presented as a new phase of national reconciliation. Yet even those who welcomed the move recognize that integrating forces and territories does not automatically resolve all political, social and security issues. The rights of the Kurds, their representation within state institutions, the status of former fighters, the role of Kurdish women in military and security institutions, and the question of local administration all require clear arrangements.
The most dangerous mistake Syrian political elites could make, therefore, would be to assume that the end of the SDF means the end of the Kurdish question. The SDF was the product of a deeper political, security and social reality; it did not create the Kurdish question. If the SDF disappeared tomorrow, questions concerning rights, representation, identity, language, political participation, development, justice and security would remain. If these issues do not find a path toward resolution within the Syrian state, they will return in different political forms, perhaps in even more complicated ways.
For this reason, the current phase should not become a test of the Kurds' willingness to relinquish their power. It should instead become a test of the Syrian state's ability to demonstrate that it deserves this trust. This is the essence of the matter. The Kurds have offered something fundamental to the new Syrian state by accepting the transition from an independent military and administrative position toward integration, while the state must now provide something in return: the rule of law, equal citizenship, and genuine political and security guarantees. A state that asks its citizens to relinquish their own means of deterrence assumes an even greater responsibility for protecting those citizens afterward.
The Question That Cannot Be Postponed
It may still be too early to issue a final judgment on the integration process. The process remains in its early stages, Damascus is still reorganizing its institutions, and the Kurdish leadership itself has entered a new political phase. Mazloum Abdi has also assumed an advisory role to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa following the dissolution of the SDF, signaling an attempt to transform the relationship from military confrontation into political partnership within the state.
Yet recent developments carry a message that cannot be ignored: the end of an independent military force does not mean the disappearance of the risks that once made such a force necessary. This is precisely where a strategic reassessment must begin. If the past years have taught the Kurds that power alone does not produce a lasting political solution, the new phase must teach the Syrian state that political unity alone does not produce lasting security either.
Security requires a strong state, but a strong state is not strong simply because it possesses an army. It is strong because it prevents the army, the tribe, the faction, the political party and the religious group from becoming authorities above the law. Therefore, the real question in Syria today is not what remains of the SDF. The more important question is: what remains of the deterrent system that once prevented others from considering attacks against the Kurds, and who guarantees that the new Syrian state will take its place?
If Damascus succeeds in providing a practical answer to this question, the integration of the SDF could become the end of a military phase and the beginning of a new national phase. But if it fails, the vacuum created by the end of the era of deterrence may not remain a vacuum for long. Other forces may begin to fill it, not necessarily by forming a new army, but through tribal structures, local weapons, rhetoric of revenge, and ethnic or religious mobilization. At that point, the problem will be much larger than the SDF.
The problem will be a state that failed to replace the force it asked the Kurds to give up.
